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is dissertation studies questions in the elds of labor and environmental economics.
It consists of four self-contained chapters that examine how seemingly small di er-
ences in the environments in which individuals work, live, shop, and grow up shape
their pay, health, and consumption behavior. e dissertation covers two particular
research areas. e rst area examines the role that managers play in gender inequal-
ity. e second area concerns how air quality and its regulation a ect the health of
workers and young children, and the behavior of consumers. Chapter 1 contributes to
the former of these research areas, Chapters 2, 3, and 4 to the la er.
Chapter 1, which is co-authored with Moritz Drechsel-Grau, sheds light on the role
that bosses, and in particular male bosses, play in explaining gender gaps. We seek to
answer the question of whether women are more likely than men to work for lower-
paying bosses. Noting that the persistent under-representation of women in leadership
could structurally disadvantage female workers, we also ask whether male bosses are
bad for women
Another aspect of labormarkets, labor supply, is studied in Chapter 2, which is joint
work with Laura Hospido and Ulrich J. Wagner. We provide the rst comprehensive
causal estimates of howmany days of work are lost due to air pollution. Our work also
contributes rst evidence on how the estimated pollution-sick leave gradients interact
with features of the labor market.
Chapter 3 is joint with Jose-Enrique Galdon-Sanchez, Ricard Gil, and Guillermo
Uriz-Uharte. It concerns Low Emission Zones, a common policy banning emission-
intensive vehicles from entering city centers. ese tra c restrictions are e ective in
improving air quality but they also increase transportation costs and could thereby
redistribute economic activity. To examine this unintended consequence, we build on
the case of Madrid and study how a Low Emission Zone a ects consumer behavior.
1
Introduction
While air quality management can distort economic activity, Chapter 4 stresses
that important latent health benets of reducing pollution are di cult to detect. In
joint work with Hannah Klauber, Nicolas Koch, Nico Pestel, Nolan Ri er, and Alexan-
der Rohlf, we argue that this is the case because health adjusts slowly over time and
because health bene ts are likely to take subtle forms. We use health insurance data
to test whether children born just before and just a er Low Emission Zone-induced
air quality improvements exhibit persistent di erences in medication usage.
In what follows, I brie y summarize each chapter.
1. Gender Gaps and the Role of Bosses
e rst chapter investigates the contribution of managers to gender gaps and ana-
lyzes whether the over-representation of men in management positions puts women
at a disadvantage. We separate out the factors explaining gender gaps relying on per-
sonnel data from one of the largest European manufacturing rms. ese data con-
tain detailed information on compensation, job descriptions, performance ratings, and
workers’ superiors. Adjusted pay gaps are positive, which means that men earn more
than observationally equivalent women. Around 20% of the gender pay gap in base
salaries and bonus pay can be explained by the di erential sorting of men and women
to managers. ese decompositions also demonstrate that women receive be er per-
formance ratings than men, what challenges the view that the positive adjusted wage
gap re ects productivity di erences between genders. More importantly, gender gaps
in bonus payments causally depend on the manager’s gender. Accounting for worker
and manager heterogeneity, bonus gaps are around 5% larger when the manager is
male. is is driven by the fact that performance ratings are more favorable to men
if handed out by a male manager. We present suggestive evidence that the relevance
of manager gender for pay gaps is driven by discrimination rather than same-gender
complementarities in productivity as manager gender tends to ma er less when man-
agers are supposedly more knowledgeable about a worker. However, independent of
the root cause of these di erences in evaluations by manager gender, the ndings im-
ply that a lower number of femalemanagers increases gender gaps and thus constitutes
a structural disadvantage for women.
2
2. Urban Air Pollution and Sick Leaves: Evidence from Social Security Data
In the second chapter, we estimate the causal impact of air pollution on the incidence
of sick leaves in a representative panel of employees aliated with the Spanish social
security system. While the literature on the health e ects of air pollution is exten-
sive, li le is known about the e ect on daily labor supply and sub-clinical outcomes.
Using over 100 million worker-by-week observations from the period 2005-2014, we
estimate the relationship between the share of days an individual is on sick leave in a
given week and exposure to particulate ma er (PM10) at the place of residence, con-
trolling for weather, individual e ects, and a wide range of time-by-location controls.
We exploit quasi-experimental variation in PM10 that is due to Sahara dust advection
in order to instrument for local PM10 concentrations. We estimate that the causal e ect
of PM10 on sick leaves is positive and varies with respect to worker and job charac-
teristics. e e ect is stronger for workers with pre-existing medical conditions and
weaker for workers with low job security. Our estimates are instrumental for quanti-
fying air pollution damages due to changes in labor supply. We estimate that improved
ambient air quality in urban Spain between 2005 and 2014 saved at least e 505 million
in foregone production by reducing worker absence by more than 5.58 million days.
3. Bene ts and Costs of Driving Restriction Policies: e Impact of Madrid
Central on Congestion, Pollution and Consumer Spending
e third chapter examines the economic impact of a popular air quality control policy,
Low Emission Zones. Low Emission Zones are de ned areas within a city that regulate
tra c to reduce congestion and pollution. We empirically evaluate the e ects of such
a Low Emission Zone in Madrid, Spain, known as Madrid Central. Non-residents of
the regulated area can access it only using electric or hybrid vehicles. While the e ec-
tiveness of such driving restrictions has been demonstrated in several se ings, li le is
known about the indirect costs of these policies. Consumers and local commerce bear
part of these indirect costs if transportation costs to the city center increase. is chap-
ter sheds light on this aspect by examining the policy’s impact on consumer behavior.
First, using a di erence-in-di erences identi cation strategy, we nd a decrease of
15% in both tra c and nitrogen dioxide levels. Second, we rely on a unique dataset
on credit card transactions detailing spending for each pair of buyer-seller zip codes in
3
Introduction
Madrid and its surroundings in the period 2015-2019 to analyze how the Low Emission
Zone changed consumption behavior. Although we nd no signi cant e ect on over-
all consumption spending inside the regulated area, our ndings show that consumers
a ected by the regulation partially substitute their consumption spending from brick-
and-mortar to online shopping. is nding suggests that e-commerce may smooth
the impact of changes in transportation costs due to environmental regulations.
4. Killing Prescriptions So ly: Low Emission Zones and Child Health from
Birth to School
e fourth chapter examines the impact of early-life exposure to air pollution on chil-
dren’s health from their in utero period to school enrollment. ere is ample evidence
for particularly severe impacts of contemporaneous air pollution on infant health.
Also, persistent e ects of early-life exposure to air pollution on human capital and
labor market outcomes have previously been found. In contrast, we present evidence
for the persistence of health bene ts from exposure to cleaner air in a xed period,
the time from conception until age one. We use administrative public health insurance
records covering one third of the population of children in Germany. For identi cation,
we exploit air quality improvements caused by the implementation of Low Emission
Zones across German counties. Our results indicate that children born just before and
just a er the policy adoption exhibit persistent di erences in medication usage for at
least ve years a er treatment. We document that a slight improvement in air quality
in a single year reduces spending for respiratory medication for children born between
2008 and 2017 by about e 26.5 million over their pre-school years. e initially latent
health response materializes only gradually in lower medication usage, leaving impor-




and the Role of Bosses
Joint with Moritz Drechsel-Grau
1.1 Introduction
While the gender wage gap has declined considerably, convergence has slowed down
and substantial gender disparities persist. In the US, for example, the unadjusted gen-
der gap has stagnated at around 19% since the turn of the century (BLS, 2019). e
adjusted wage gap is even more persistent as, for the past three decades, women have
been earning about 9% less than men a er adjusting for di erences in education, ex-
perience, industry and occupation (Blau and Kahn, 2017). Gender pay gaps thus con-
tinue to receive signi cant a ention as policy makers discuss gender quotas and many
rms and large organizations train managers to be more aware of gender-related bi-
ases (Chang et al., 2019a). It has been suggested that the adjusted wage gap is driven by
di erences in productivity, negotiation prowess, temporal exibility, or (unconscious)
discrimination (e.g. Azmat and Ferrer, 2017; Babcock et al., 2003; Goldin, 2014; Sar-
sons, 2018, respectively). All of these explanations could be closely related to the be-
havior of bosses. e direct superiors of workers a ect productivity, negotiate salaries,
shape work environments, and evaluate performance and thereby determine bonus
5
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payments (e.g. Lazear et al., 2015; Homan and Tadelis, forthcoming; Frederiksen
et al., 2019).
In this chapter, we use novel personnel data of a large multinational rm in or-
der to shed light on the role of managers for gender gaps. In particular, we ask two
novel questions connecting the literature on managers to that on gender gaps. First, do
women work for “worse” bosses than men? Similarly to the distribution across occu-
pations, sorting of workers and managers may explain a part of the gender wage gap.
In other words, if male workers in the same occupation work for be er-paying bosses
than their female colleagues, this will drive a wedge between the earnings of equally
quali ed men and women. Second, are male bosses bad for women? ree main mech-
anisms come to mind. First, men may undervalue the performance of women due to
conscious or unconscious biases. Second, male managers may create work environ-
ments that make it harder for women to shine. ird, men might be more produc-
tive under male managers due to gender-speci c complementarities in productivity.1
e persistent under-representation of women in powerful positions may therefore be
cause and consequence at the same time if—for some reason—female employees are
systematically disadvantaged when having male superiors.
In order to separate out the di erent factors explaining gender disparities and in-
vestigate the importance of (male) managers for gender gaps, we bring in unique per-
sonnel data provided by one of the largest European manufacturing rms. e panel
dataset cover themultinational’s entire workforce in the period 2014–2019 and has sev-
eral key advantages allowing us to address these questions. First, the data contain de-
tailed information on job characteristics, sociodemographics, compensation, and per-
formance evaluations. is allows us to identify the performance-related component
of earnings. Second, we are able to trace out the organizational hierarchy and identify
every employee’s coworkers, superiors, and subordinates. ird, we can condition on
time-invariant unobservable characteristics of both employees and their managers.2
e chapter has two sets of results. e rst quanti es to which extent the sorting
of male and female workers to di erent managers can explain gender gaps while also
taking into account the contributions of other observables such as sociodemograph-
1 e opposite could also be true if women hinder otherwomen, as for example has been documented
by Bagues and Esteve-Volart (2010)
2We will refer to a worker’s direct superior as manager. A manager is also a worker from the
perspective of his or her manager.
6
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ics and job characteristics. To that end, we implement a Kitagawa-Oaxaca-Blinder-
decomposition for base salaries, bonus payouts, contracted bonus targets, and perfor-
mance ratings (Kitagawa, 1955; Oaxaca, 1973; Blinder, 1973). For male and female
workers, we run separate regressions of the outcome of interest on job characteristics,
manager indicators, age, tenure, and location controls. e decomposition reveals the
following three ndings.
First, the raw gender gaps in base salary and bonus payouts are 12.3 log points
and 22.2 log points, respectively. Men’s contracted bonus targets are on average 2.8%
greater than those of women. e raw gender gap in performance ratings is negative as
men are two percentage points less likely than women to receive a high performance
rating.
Second, 25% of the raw gender gap in base salary and 19% of the gender bonus gap
are a ributed to the sorting of male and female workers to di erent managers. e
unexplained component of the gender gap is larger for bonuses (16.9%) than for base
salaries (8.8%). For performance ratings, we nd that a large part of the gender gap
cannot be explained. However, while the contribution of standard observables such as
age or job characteristics drops substantially, the impact of managers remains sizable.
Worker-manager sorting increases the performance gap (in favor of men) by 2.1 log
points. is means that if women were assigned to the same jobs and managers, the
performance gap would be even more negative.
ird, comparing similar employees doing the same job under the same manager,
we nd signi cant residual gender gaps in base salaries (1.1%), bonus targets (2.0%),
and bonus payouts (3.8%). While all of these gaps favormen, the opposite holds for per-
formance evaluations. Women are 3.5 percentage points (14.2% relative to the mean)
more likely to receive high a performance rating, which implies above-target bonus
payouts. e performance-corrected gap in bonus payouts is thus even larger than the
raw gap. We nd no evidence that women simply receive be er ratings because they
would cost the rm less in terms of implied bonus payments. We do not nd evidence
in favor of the interpretation that residual pay gaps are majorly related to child care
obligations.
e second set of results answers the question whether the gender gap is di erent
under male and female managers. Intuitively, we do so by de ning within-manager
gender gaps and comparing their average sizes between male and female managers in
7
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a dierence-in-di erences framework. As we take into account unobserved worker
heterogeneity, identi cation comes from workers working for managers of di erent
genders over time. As the worker xed e ects fully absorb the absolute level of the
gender gaps, we identify by how much the expected gender gap changes when the
manager is male rather than female.
We nd that the over-representation of male managers implies a structural dis-
advantage for women. In particular, male managers cause the gender gap in bonus
payouts to increase by 5.1%. is is driven by a relative increase of the gender gap in
performance evaluations of 2.7 percentage points comparing male to female bosses.
Hence, while in general men receive lower ratings, this gap closes considerably when
the manager is male.
We evaluate which mechanism is likely to drive these ndings. While more pro-
ductive men could workmore o en for male bosses, this mechanism cannot rationalize
our ndings as we control for unobserved worker characteristics. Another potential
explanation are within-gender complementarities. However, gender gaps do not in-
crease with the share of male coworkers in a team. Assuming that potential within-
gender complementarities would also exist among coworkers, we can rule out that the
productivity channel drives the results. In contrast, we nd suggestive evidence con-
sistent with (unconscious) discrimination, as manager gender tends to ma er more
for less knowledgeable decision makers. In particular, we split managers into groups
who should be more or less informed about the true quality or the needs of their sub-
ordinates. While not statistically signi cant, we nd that for all proxies of manager
knowledge the e ect of manager gender is smaller. e observation that a manager’s
experience, team size, spatial proximity and the time that a manager has worked with a
subordinate all are correlated with a lower e ect of manager gender is consistent with
discrimination due to biased beliefs of less knowledgeable managers. is mechanism
relates to Bohren et al. (2019), who show that decision makers resort to their biased
beliefs if li le information about workers is available to them.
Related literature is chapter primarily contributes to the vast literature on gen-
der inequality in the labor market summarized among others by Altonji and Blank
(1999), or more recently by Bertrand (2011) and Blau and Kahn (2017). One set of pa-
pers tries to understand (raw) gender pay gaps. Early papers focused on the role of
8
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education and human capital (Altonji and Blank, 1999). As the gender gap in human
capital has vanished over time, recent studies have highlighted the role of children as
well as dierences in occupation and industry. Kleven et al. (2019b) use Danish data to
show that the arrival of children creates a substantial long-run gender gap in earnings
driven by hours worked, participation, and wage rates (see also Kleven et al., 2019a,
for evidence on other countries). Blau and Kahn (2017) document that di erences in
occupation continue to account for parts of the gender wage gap, and Goldin (2014)
nds that work environments rewarding working long hours prevent female wages
from fully catching up. Based on an AKM-model (Abowd et al., 1999) in which work-
ers are sorted to rms, Card et al. (2016) nd that part of the gender wage gap can
be a ributed to women working for rms that pay lower premiums. We add to the
literature on raw gender wage gaps by showing that the sorting of men and women to
di erent managers in part explains the gender wage gap. To our knowledge, our work
is the rst to focus on the impact of worker-manager sorting on pay gaps. We bring
in a data source—a large manufacturing rm’s personnel data—that allows for be er
control over job characteristics. Research on gender gaps using personnel data dates
back to Malkiel and Malkiel (1973) and is vast.3 However, our data are unique as they
identify hierarchical relations between workers and managers while also containing
highly detailed information about pay, performance ratings, ranks, and occupations
A second strand of the literature investigates the reasons behind the persistence
of the adjusted gender wage gap, in particular with a focus on performance and eval-
uations. Previous studies come from very speci c se ings and may therefore lead to
di erent conclusions. In the context of academia—where performance is relatively easy
to measure—Sarsons et al. (forthcoming) show that female researchers get less credit
for joint work than male co-authors. Card et al. (2020) conclude that journal editors
and referees hand out too few revise-and-resubmit decisions to female-authored pa-
pers relative to a citation-maximizing benchmark. Similarly, Hospido and Sanz (2019)
nd that all-female authored papers are less likely to be accepted for major economics
conferences. Outside of academia, female surgeons and nancial advisors have been
found to bemore heavily penalized for bad performances ormisconduct (Sarsons, 2018;
3For example, Sorensen (1986), Kahn (1992), Ransom and Oaxaca (2005), Barnet-Verzat and Wol
(2008), Dohmen et al. (2008), Ichino and More i (2009), Pema and Mehay (2010) or Pekkarinen and
Vartiainen (2016) study within-organization gender gaps, mainly based on public sector data.
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Egan et al., 2017, respectively). Mengel et al. (2019) show that female university tutors
receive systematically lower teaching evaluations. Azmat and Ferrer (2017) nd that
gender performance di erences exist as male lawyers actually outperform their fe-
male colleagues and that accounting for this substantially alters the interpretation of
the gender wage gap. What distinguishes our work is that we observe wages, bonus
payouts and performance evaluations in the context of a large multinational enterprise
in the manufacturing sector, i.e. a se ing that is highly relevant to many workers in
developed economies. In this context, we nd that the over-representation of men in
top positions does harm women as gender gaps in bonus payments and performance
ratings increase substantially undermalemanagers. In addition, our ndings challenge
the view that productivity di erences can account for adjusted gender wage gaps in
a wide range of occupations. We further provide suggestive evidence in favor of the
biased-beliefs mechanism proposed by Bohren et al. (2019).
We also add to the literature on the e ect of male leadership on gender gaps. While
the gender composition at the very top of rms does not a ect gender gaps (Bertrand
et al., 2019; Maida and Weber, 2019), a number of papers show that gender compo-
sitions ma er when the distance between superior and subordinate is smaller. Kunze
andMiller (2017) and Kurtulus and Tomaskovic-Devey (2011) nd that a larger share of
women at higher ranks increases women’s chances of being promoted. However, it is
unclear whether individual interactions between workers and managers or rm-wide
policies drive these observations. is work di ers in that we directly link workers
to their managers at all levels of the rm hierarchy rather than only at the very top.
Using cross-sectional survey data, several authors have documented that gender gaps
tend to be greater under male superiors (Ragan and Tremblay, 1988; Rothstein, 1997;
Abendroth et al., 2017).4 In the context of schools, Biasi and Sarsons (2020) nd that
gender pay gaps among teachers increase when principals or superintendents aremale.
A recent study by Cullen and Perez-Truglia (2019) shows that the gender promotion
gap in a Southeast Asian bank widens when the direct superior is male. Relative to
their study, we focus on how manager gender impacts within-team gaps in wages and
performance evaluations in a wide range of occupations and countries. Our approach
4Another cross-sectional study by Halldén et al. (2018), based on Swedish survey data, nds that
women earn less when their superior is female. However, the data do not allow to make claims about
the gender gap.
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also takes into account unobserved manager characteristics, which prove critical to
the nding that managers a ect gender pay gaps.
Outline e remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 1.2 provides
more information about the data and the rm. Section 1.3 describes our empirical
strategy, Section 1.4 documents the ndings, and Section 1.5 concludes.
1.2 Data and setting
e rm We use the personnel data of a large rm in the manufacturing sector.5
e rm is among the 250 largest European rms in terms of sales and employment
and an industry leader in an R&D-intensive sector. A quarter of the multinational’s
workforce is located in the rm’s home country but it has establishments in over 50
countries. For example, around 20% of the workforce is located in the United States.
While a single rm can hardly be representative of the economy as a whole, its size,
international representation, range of occupations, and diversity of skills required en-
sure that its internal labor market is typical for what a worker would encounter at
any large rm. Key variables of our study are earnings and the share of male work-
ers, which we can use to compare the rm to other rms in the same sector. In the
US, workers in the same three-digit NAICS industry earned during the sample period
around 7.2% less than workers in our data.6 At the rm, the share of female workers
in the US is about 6 percentage points higher than the sectoral average.7
By now, administrative data matching employees to rms are widely available.
While such kind of data would be preferable to use for a more holistic view, our dataset
has several unique features. As opposed to administrative data where workers would
be linked by working in the same rm and same occupation, we observe precisely who
works in the same team and who is each worker’s responsible superior. Furthermore,
the description of jobs and hierarchy provided to us by the rm goes beyond typical
5We are not allowed to reveal the identity of the rm.
6Bureau of Economic Analysis, Wages and Salaries Per Full-Time Equivalent Employee by Industry,
https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/iTable.cfm?reqid=13&step=3&isuri=1&nipa table list=201&keyword index
=w
7Bureau of Labor Statistics, Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey, https://ww
w.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat18.htm
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denitions of occupations. is allows us to control muchmore precisely for the nature
of the job. We also do not only observe earnings but the detailed variables determining
compensation, including performance ratings.
Personnel data Wewere providedwith an anonymizedmonthly panel of all person-
nel records between January 2014 and March 2019. e data includes information on
employees’ compensation (base salaries and bonus payments), performance ratings,
occupation, hierarchical rank, location, tenure, and some sociodemographic charac-
teristics such as gender, age, or nationality.8 Importantly, the data also indicate the
identity of each worker’s superior, to which we refer as manager or boss. erefore,
we can trace out the organizational hierarchy and identify employees’ coworkers, su-
periors, and subordinates. Employees can be superiors and subordinates at the same
time as the rm has many hierarchical layers.
We observe ten thousands of full-time employees.9 e unadjusted gender gap (the
average di erence between male and female outcomes) in base salaries (before taxes)
is 3917e, or 7.6%. One would typically control for experience, location, and job charac-
teristics to determine the adjusted gender pay gap. Such an adjustment yields a gender
gap in base salaries of 1.7%. 26 404 workers are paid a bonus. In this set of workers, the
gender gap in annual bonus payout (before taxes) is 2375e, or 20.3%. Controlling for
experience, location, and job characteristics results in an adjusted bonus gap of 4.6%.
Job de nitions Jobs are classi ed into 109 di erent occupations, for example Elec-
trical Engineering, Scienti c Technical Assistance, Fire Brigade, or Web Design.10 In ad-
dition, jobs are classi ed by hierarchical rank on a scale from one to ten, representing
a range from low-skilled helpers to executives. Ranks one to three are to a large extent
blue-collar production jobs. While workers of di erent hierarchical rank can work in
the same occupation, occupations only comprise a limited number of ranks. Starting
at rank four, white-collar occupations are more prevalent. We henceforth characterize
a job by the combination of occupation and hierarchical rank.
8 e number of employees reporting education and previous employers is very small.
9We cannot report the exact number to protect the identity of the rm.
10We cannot show a full list of occupations as it could reveal the identity of the rm.
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Table 1.1: Gender Distribution across Hierarchical Ranks
Rank Share [%] Salary [e] Bonus [e] Any Bonus [%] Share Male [%] Salary Gap [e] Bonus Gap [e]
1 0.5 18 002.58 13 036.89 33.67 63.85 −5324.59 5792.14
2 7.65 27 131.86 4007.53 53.26 66.3 5958.01 2095.94
3 14.76 32 181.96 2479.71 54.02 67.62 2395.46 454.9
4 25.54 32 771.42 3002.1 47.4 57.1 −860.15 −162.59
5 27.79 44 937.26 5931.84 44.28 57.01 654.7 138.78
6 17.25 76 957.14 14 907.22 71.98 61.8 3002.29 131.61
7 3.71 117 899.9 31 514.63 80.15 68.5 −8527.77 −135.85
8 2.41 154 211.52 57 869.84 81.39 75.94 −5702.43 −1890.47
9 0.34 227 647.17 137 310.0 74.71 87.77 −16 322.27 −24 453.82
10 0.05 335 444.2 276 739.82 69.79 72.92 59 631.59 17 396.89
All 100.0 50 090.26 10 781.41 54.27 61.16 3917.02 2374.62
Notes: e table displays mean values of base salaries and bonus payouts in e with base year 2010 for nine out
of ten hierarchical ranks (1 being lowest and 10 highest). e table also displays the share of workers, the share
of men, and the gender gaps (male outcome - female outcome) in base salaries and bonus payouts.
From Table 1.1 we can see that the majority of workers works on jobs of inter-
mediate hierarchical rank. In general, higher ranks pay higher salaries and bonuses,
but not all workers receive bonuses. While participating in a bonus program seems to
be more common at high ranks, a number of workers opts out. At very high ranks,
other long term incentives also play a greater role. e share of men at low ranks
is relatively large as many production-related occupations are ranked here. Women
represent around 40% of the workforce in the middle range of the hierarchy. But the
higher the rank, the lower becomes the share of women. While there is no clear pat-
tern of raw gender pay gaps at separate hierarchical levels, it seems that men face an
advantage at the most common ranks in the rm.
Salaries, bonus payments and performance ratings According to the rm, con-
ditional on individual productivity, experience, and location, employees working in
the same job should be compensated equivalently. It might well be the case that a cer-
tain occupation pays more at a lower rank than another occupation at a higher rank.
Each job has a salary band set by the human resource department which is only known
by the worker’s manager and not part of the data we obtain. Managers and workers
negotiate a base salary within such a band. Usually, pay raises within the same job are
only negotiated once a year, namely when an employee’s performance is evaluated.
e contract also speci es a bonus target, which is the amount that will be paid
out in addition to the base salary as an annual bonus. e target is expressed as a
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percentage of the base salary. For example, if the employee’s target is 5% and the base
salary is 50 000e, she can expect annual earnings of 50 000e + 2500e = 52 500e.
However, the bonus is supposed to incentivize eort. Workers showing satisfac-
tory but not outstanding performance are paid as just described. Less is paid out as
a bonus if the employee performs poorly, and more is paid out if the employee does
especially well. is means that workers with a higher base salary, higher bonus tar-
get, or higher performance will receive a larger annual bonus. Workers’ e ort has a
signi cant in uence on the amount eventually paid out as a bonus. Workers know
the function 𝑓 (rating), which maps their grading into a factor multiplying base salary
and bonus target. In principle, earnings can be expressed as the sum of base salary
and the performance-dependent component, i.e. the product of base salary, target and
a function of performance.
Earnings ≈ Base Salary + Base Salary × Target × 𝑓 (rating)
Performance ratings are handed out by the employee’s direct superior once per
year, evaluating the previous twelve months. An evaluation scheme of six grades is
applied across all jobs and countries. e rm considers a ranking to be high if an
employee achieves at least the second-best grade. A high ranking will ceteris paribus
result in a bonus payout greater than the contracted target. As an employee’s out-
put is hard to measure, the mapping from e ort to performance ratings cannot be
contracted.11 Hence, performance ratings are potentially subject to conscious or un-
conscious gender biases of the manager (e.g. Bordalo et al., 2019). rough their per-
formance evaluations, managers thus have a substantial impact on the total earnings
of their subordinates.
Figure 1.2.1 displays the distribution of performance ratings for men and women.
e majority of workers receives a 𝐶 , which implies no adjustment to the contracted
bonus. A high performance rating is achieved by workers receiving ratings 𝐴 or 𝐵.
e graph also shows that in the raw data women are more likely than men to receive
a high rating.
11Employees for which individual output can easily be measured are sales workers. ey receive a
separate sales bonus in addition to the general bonus which re ects the generated revenue. We do not
have access to these data.
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Note: e gure plots a histogram of annual performance ratings received by male and female workers. e best rating is 𝐴, the
worst rating is 𝐹 .
Observed bonuses are not equivalent to Base Salary × Target × 𝑓 (rating). ere
are several reasons for this. First, department-wide achievements also a ect bonus
payout. Second, we are not provided with the mapping for workers with changes in
workplace characteristics. ird, performance ratings are very detailed, while we only
use a simple approximation, an indicator for receiving a high rating. Importantly, it
holds that all else equal, workers with high performance should receive a larger bonus.
Sample description We focus on full-time employees aged 25 to 60 and for which
we observe gender, superior, job, age, and tenure. We aggregate the data to annual
frequency for 2014-2019 as bonus payments and performance ratings are only deter-
mined once per year. Monetary variables are converted to Euros with 2010 as the base
year. e resulting dataset is summarized in Table 1.2.12
Base salaries are on average 50 000e. We observe positive bonus payouts only for
a subset of workers because not every worker receives performance pay and due to
12Extreme values are omi ed for con dentiality reasons.
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Table 1.2: Descriptive Statistics
Mean SD 10th Perc. Median 90th Perc. Observations
Salary [e] 50 090.26 53 096.49 10 077.67 40 404.73 94 234.79 178 377
Bonus [e] 10 781.41 20 324.33 1289.45 4233.43 24 812.78 96 803
High Performance 0.22 0.42 0.0 0.0 1.0 154 790
Low Performance 0.13 0.33 0.0 0.0 1.0 154 790
Bonus Target [%] 11.82 8.81 4.0 10.0 22.51 108 839
Male 0.61 0.49 0.0 1.0 1.0 178 377
Age 41.53 9.24 29.0 41.0 55.0 178 377
Tenure 9.82 9.19 1.0 7.0 24.0 178 377
Span of Control 1.16 3.77 0.0 0.0 5.0 178 377
Coworkers 9.65 20.59 1.0 5.0 19.0 178 377
New Manager in Same Job 0.25 0.44 0.0 0.0 1.0 128 521
New Manager in New Job 0.07 0.25 0.0 0.0 0.0 128 521
Male Manager 0.72 0.45 0.0 1.0 1.0 178 377
Male & Male Manager 0.49 0.5 0.0 0.0 1.0 178 377
Male & Female Manager 0.12 0.33 0.0 0.0 1.0 178 377
Female & Male Manager 0.23 0.42 0.0 0.0 1.0 178 377
Female & Female Manager 0.16 0.36 0.0 0.0 1.0 178 377
Age of Manager 44.97 8.08 34.0 45.0 56.0 178 377
Notes: Extreme values omied for con dentiality reasons. Unbalanced panel based on ten thousands of workers
and the years 2014-2019. Monetary variables normalized to Euros in 2010.
data limitations. e size of bonus payments is signi cant with a mean annual payout
of almost 11 000e. Approximately 20% of workers receive a high performance rating,
so are entitled to a bonus payout greater above their contracted bonus target. 13% of
workers underperform, implying a below-target bonus payout. Some workers receive
a rating even though their contracts do not include performance pay. 60% of employees
are male and the average age is 42 years. e span of control measures the number of
direct subordinates.
Identifying each worker’s manager is key to studying managers’ impact on gender
gap. We do so by matching each worker to his or her direct superior. Each employee
has on average 9.7 coworkers who work under the samemanager. Employees are more
likely to have a change in their manager due to managers rotating than due to a job
change of the worker. One quarter of employees stay in their current job but work for
a new manager. Managers are more likely to be male and on average three years older
than workers.
e data reveal thatmale and femaleworkers are sorted to di erentmanagers based
on gender. e share of male workers sorted to a male manager is 80%. Women are
more likely to work for female managers as the share of female workers sorted to a




In the rst part of the empirical analysis, we examine how the sorting of workers to
managers can explain gender gaps. Evidence for the impact of managers on worker
productivity has been provided by Frederiksen et al. (2019) or Lazear et al. (2015). For
example, womenmaywork for managers who are less productive. is could happen if
male workers have stronger social networks within the rm which provide them with
be er information about managers. In Table 1.2 we saw that workers are sorted to
managers based on gender. If female managers are less productive on average (in line
with the gender gaps in performance found by Azmat and Ferrer, 2017) and manager
productivity a ects worker productivity, female workers are disadvantaged.
ere are other explanations why managers could ma er. Male employees are of-
ten less reluctant to negotiate (e.g. Babcock et al., 2003). is could drive them towards
more generous managers who are open to negotiation. Similarly, the fact that women
tend to shy away from competition (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007) could drive female
workers to work more o en for managers who create less competitive work environ-
ments, with the e ect that workers are on average less productive. Women might
be also driven to managers who—at the cost of lost productivity—o er a more family
friendly environment, for example by allowing for more exible work hours or permit-
ting working from home on a regular basis (Goldin and Katz, 2015). is explanation
would imply that women might actually prefer to work for “worse” bosses, i.e. bosses
creating a environment which makes workers less productive.
In the second part of the analysis, we hold these manager e ects xed and study
whether there is evidence that managers a ect their within-team pay gaps. Observing
any residual gender gap within teams does not necessarily imply that managers are
to blame for gender pay gaps. But if within-team gaps vary across managers with
di erent characteristics, we can conclude that managers do a ect workplace equity.
1.3.1 Explaining gender gaps
We aim to answer the question what portion of gender gaps can be explained by ob-
servable characteristics. In particular, we want to quantify the contribution of the
matching of managers and workers to gender gaps. To do so, we implement tradi-
17
CHAPTER 1. GENDER GAPS AND THE ROLE OF BOSSES
tional Kitagawa-Oaxaca-Blinder-decompositions of dierences between male and fe-
male workers in log salaries, log bonus payouts, high performance indicators, and
contracted bonus targets (Kitagawa, 1955; Oaxaca, 1973; Blinder, 1973).
e decomposition classi es di erences between two groups into a composition
component that accounts for di erent characteristics, e.g. tenure or occupation, and
an unexplained, or wage structure, component. Such Kitagawa-Oaxaca-Blinder-
decompositions are commonly used in the estimation of gender gaps (e.g. Bertrand
et al., 2010; Blau and Kahn, 2017; Card et al., 2016; Juhn and McCue, 2017).
e unexplained component is o en interpreted as a measure of discrimination,
as it implies di erences in pay or other outcomes for observationally identical work-
ers. However, discrimination might also stem from di erent characteristics, i.e. the
explained part of the gender gap. Womenmight be discriminated against by being allo-
cated to worse-paying occupations. By controlling for the type of occupation, we take
this allocation as given while it could already be the result of discriminatory treatment.
It is also not clear that all unexplained di erences are the result of discrimination. If
men perform be er than women (as found by Azmat and Ferrer, 2017), productivity
di erences contribute to the residual term.
e Kitagawa-Oaxaca-Blinder-decomposition is implemented as follows. Each
worker 𝑖 is either male 𝑚 or female 𝑓 and observed in year 𝑡 . We estimate ordinary











𝛽 𝑓 + 𝑢 𝑓
𝑖𝑡
(1.2)
𝑌𝑖𝑡 is the outcome of interest of worker 𝑖 in year 𝑡 . 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a vector of variables
observed at the worker level, including a constant. 𝛽𝑚 and 𝛽 𝑓 are the gender-speci c
returns to these characteristics. 𝑢𝑖𝑡 is the error term.
We obtain the estimates of returns 𝛽𝑚 and 𝛽 𝑓 fromOLS.We then calculate means of
the outcomes and characteristics for both genders, denoted by a bar over the respective
term. e di erence of the means of Equations (1.1) and (1.2) is the observed gender
gap.
𝑌
𝑚 − 𝑌 𝑓 = 𝑋𝑚𝛽𝑚 − 𝑋 𝑓 𝛽 𝑓 = (𝑋𝑚 − 𝑋 𝑓 )𝛽𝑚 + 𝑋 𝑓 (𝛽𝑚 − 𝛽 𝑓 ) (1.3)
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e residuals drop out when taking the mean. e rst term of the decomposition
in Equation (1.3) is the di erence in male and female outcomes due to di erent char-
acteristics, based on male coe cients. e second term is the unexplained di erence
in outcomes due to di erent returns for men and women. One could perform the de-
composition using the coe cients on female returns as well. However, here we are
interested in how the outcomes of women would change if the rm is required to treat
women like men.
We decompose log base salaries, log bonus payouts, high performance indicators,
and log bonus targets. Due to the richness of the rm’s personnel data, we can include
a wide range of variables in 𝑋𝑖𝑡 . For age and tenure, we create bins for every six years
of age. We include indicators for each year and each country. Job characteristics are
controlled for by including the combination of occupation and hierarchical rank. As
we are particularly interested in the role of bosses, 𝑋𝑖𝑡 also includes an indicator for
worker 𝑖’s boss at time 𝑡 .
e high resolution of worker-level controls comes at a cost. e matrices 𝑋𝑚 and
𝑋 𝑓 , which respectively collect the vectors 𝑋𝑚𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑋
𝑓
𝑖,𝑡
, need to have full rank. is
is not the case if, for example, there is a certain job which is only done by men. In
such a case the column of the matrix 𝑋 𝑓 indicating working for this manager would
always be zero and hence perfectly correlated with the column indicating the constant.
We therefore only include observations with a characteristic observed among men and
women.
Another requirement for full rankmatrices is that the di erent categorical variables
are connected. is is identical to the condition explained by Abowd et al. (2002), that
xed e ects in an AKM-model (Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis, 1999) are only identi-
ed within a connected set. A set of observations is unconnected if a categorical vari-
able is nested in another categorical variable. Consider an example where we include
a constant, occupation, and location. Assume that engineers and accountants always
work in Spain, cleaners always work in France, and there are no other occupations
or countries. When comparing a worker in France to a worker in Spain it is unclear
whether their pay di erence is due to location or occupation. But if accountants work
in both countries, they identify di erences due to location. Once these di erences are
determined, residual di erences in pay can be a ributed to occupations. Note that
even in this case we still require a linear restriction due to the inclusion of a constant.
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For this reason, we only keep the largest connected set of categorical variables for
men and women. In practice, we iterate over the algorithm proposed by Abowd et al.
(2002) for dierent combinations of categorical variables until the matrices 𝑋𝑚 and𝑋 𝑓
are full rank and only include observations with a characteristic observed both among
men and women.
Assuring that matrices are full rank reduces the sample size. Tomaintain a constant
size of data, we also impose that workers participate in bonus schemes and that bonus
targets and performance ratings are observed. e resulting dataset consists of 59 813
observations based on 20 048 workers and 4327 managers from 58 countries and 421
jobs. Appendix Table 1.A.1 shows that in this dataset workers earn a bit more which is
due to the fact that some low-rank jobs without performance pay are excluded. Besides
that, the subset of data used for estimation is very similar.
1.3.2 Understanding residual gender gaps
Residual gender gaps could be interpreted as productivity di erentials between men
or women. In the decomposition, managers can contribute to gender gaps through the
channel that male and female workers work for di erent managers. But it does not tell
us anything about how individual managers treat men and women who actually work
for them. For example, these residual gaps could persist if the majority of bosses for
some reason favor male workers. At the rm, 72% of managers are male.
Illustration of within-manager-gender gender gaps Figure 1.3.1a is an illustra-
tion of how gender gaps could look like, separating gaps at male and female managers.
e light dots indicate the earnings of women, the dark dots earnings of men. e
lled dots on the le plot earnings at female managers, the lled dots on the right at
male managers. e labels𝑀𝐹 , 𝐹𝐹 , etc. also refer to the four possible combinations of
worker and manager gender. For example, 𝑀𝐹 stands for male workers working for
female managers. Focusing on female managers only, the di erence between 𝑀𝐹 and
𝐹𝐹 is the gender pay gap. Workers at male bosses earn more (𝐹𝑀 − 𝐹𝐹 ), but the size
of the gender gap 𝑀𝑀 − 𝐹𝑀 is equal to the gap under female managers. e gender
pay gap𝑀𝐹 − 𝐹𝐹 is a quantity of interest, but it is unclear why this di erence exists.
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Figure 1.3.1: Illustration of Gender Gaps
(a) Equal Gender Gaps at Male and Female Managers












(b) Di erent Gender Gaps at Male and Female Managers














Notes: ese gure provides a graphical illustration of gender gaps under male and female managers. 𝐹𝐹 stands for a female
worker working for a female manager, 𝑀𝐹 for a male worker working for a female manager, 𝐹𝑀 for a female worker working
for a male manager, and 𝑀𝑀 for a male worker working for a male manager. 𝜔 is the di erence in gender gaps between male
and female managers, i.e. 𝜔 = (𝑀𝑀 − 𝐹𝑀) − (𝑀𝐹 − 𝐹𝐹 ) .
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In the example from Figure 1.3.1a, all managers could be discriminating against
women, or women could be less productive. In such a seing we cannot draw any
conclusions on the impact of managers on gender gaps.
But if we nd that there is variation in gender gaps across teams managed by man-
agers of di erent gender, we know that manager gender and hence managers a ect
gender gaps. is is depicted in Figure 1.3.1b. In this example, the gender gap at male
bosses is greater than the gender gap at female bosses. If the di erence in gender gaps,
𝜔 , is signi cant, we can conclude that managers a ect gender gaps.
Estimation To estimate the change in the gender gap depicted in Figure 1.3.1b, we
run a di erence-in-di erence estimation for outcome 𝑌 of the following form.
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1 ×𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖 + 𝛾2 ×𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑀 (𝑖,𝑡) + 𝜔 ×𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖 ×𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑀 (𝑖,𝑡) + 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 (1.4)
𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖 is a dummy taking value 1 if worker 𝑖 is male. Its coe cient represents the
gender gap under female managers, i.e.𝑀𝐹 −𝐹𝐹 in Figure 1.3.1b.𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑀 (𝑖,𝑡) is a dummy
taking value 1 if the manager𝑀 of worker 𝑖 at time 𝑡 is male. Its coe cient can be in-
terpreted as the di erence in earnings among women when working for a male instead
of a female manager, i.e. 𝐹𝑀 − 𝐹𝐹 in Figure 1.3.1b. 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 controls for age-bin, tenure-bin,
year, country, and job as before. We are interested in the di erence-in-di erences coef-
cient𝜔 on the interaction of the dummy𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖 with the dummy𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑀 (𝑖,𝑡) . is prod-
uct is 1 if worker and manager are male and 0 otherwise. As shown in Figure 1.3.1b,
𝜔 is the di erence in gender gaps between male and female managers. A positive 𝜔
indicates that the gender gap moves in favor of men when the manager is male.
Replacing all gender dummies by 𝑓 𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖 = 1 −𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖 etc., results in exactly the
same estimate of 𝜔 , but now on the product of dummies 𝑓 𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖 × 𝑓 𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑀 (𝑖,𝑡) .13 e
natural interpretation would be as follows. e inverse gender gap (female outcome -
male outcome) increases if themanager is female. is shows that we only can quantify
13 is can be shown by a simple replacement of variables:
𝛾0 + 𝛾1 𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖 + 𝛾2 𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑀 (𝑖,𝑡 ) + 𝜔 𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖 ×𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑀 (𝑖,𝑡 ) + . . .
= 𝛾0 + 𝛾1 (1 − 𝑓 𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖 ) + 𝛾2 (1 − 𝑓 𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑀 (𝑖,𝑡 ) ) + 𝜔 (1 − 𝑓 𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖 ) × (1 − 𝑓 𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑀 (𝑖,𝑡 ) ) + . . .
= (𝛾0 + 𝛾1 + 𝛾2 + 𝜔) − (𝛾1 + 𝜔) 𝑓 𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖 − (𝛾2 + 𝜔) 𝑓 𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑀 (𝑖,𝑡 ) + 𝜔 𝑓 𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖 × 𝑓 𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑀 (𝑖,𝑡 ) + . . .
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by how much the gender gap changes, but not whether male or female managers are
to blame.
A major problem when estimating Equation (1.4) can be unobserved heterogeneity
ofworkers andmanagers. If workers are sorted tomanagers based on these unobserved
characteristics, the estimate of 𝜔 is biased. For example, if good male workers tend to
work for good male managers, or good female workers oen work for good female
managers, identi cation is compromised. erefore, we introduce in Equation (1.5) a
worker xed e ect, 𝛼𝑖 , and a manager xed e ect, Ψ𝑀 (𝑖,𝑡) , for 𝑖’s manager𝑀 at time 𝑡 .
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝜔 ×𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖 ×𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑀 (𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛼𝑖 + Ψ𝑀 (𝑖,𝑡) + 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 (1.5)
Estimating 𝜔 in Equation (1.5) yields the change in within-manager pay gaps, ad-
justed for worker quality, when the manager is male instead of female. Intuitively, this
does the following. We residualize each worker’s outcome based on the controls 𝑋𝑖𝑡
and remove the worker mean. en, we calculate the within-manager pay gap based
on all workers who worked for the manager. Again, the level of the gap has no inter-
pretation, because we subtract the mean from each worker’s outcome. 𝜔 is the mean
di erence of the adjustedwithin-manager pay gap betweenmale and femalemanagers.
Identi cation Identi cation of 𝜔 in Equation (1.5) comes from “movers”, i.e. work-
ers who work for di erent managers. ere are two reasons why a worker experiences
a manager change. First, workers who switch their job will face a new manager.14
Second, workers who do not change positions receive a new manager if the previous
manager rotates to another job or leaves the rm. In the present se ing, 32% of work-
ers observe a change in manager in a given year, and almost 80% of these switches are
due to managers rotating jobs.
We require an exogeneity assumption regarding the changes of managers. Sorting
of workers to managers based on time-varying performance would bias estimations of
Equation (1.5). e fact that the majority of changes is due to managers rotating limits
this concern becausemanagers would need to be assigned based on the potential future
performance of workers. From our interviews with the human resources department
of the rm this is extremely unlikely. Usually, managers only get to know their subor-
14Excluding the possibility that boss and worker jointly switch teams.
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Notes: ese gures plot average residual base salaries and bonus payments in the two years before and a er manager changes.
Based on Card et al. (2013), workers are classi ed into 16 groups, of which eight are displayed. Workers are grouped by the quartile
of their coworkers’ pay before and a er the manager change. e label “1 to 4” denotes workers whose coworkers’ average salary
was in quartile 1 before and in quartile 4 a er the change of managers.
dinates a er having started a new position. However, one might still worry that moves
of workers correlate with time-varying performance or that workers only move if they
get a be er deal. While one cannot prove exogeneity, we examine whether there is ev-
idence that sorting could bias the estimation results. As suggested by Card et al. (2013)
in a se ing where workers move across rms, we implement event studies on pay for
workers changing managers.
To do so, we classify managers by the average of salaries or bonuses. To account for
job characteristics, we rst residualize these outcomes, taking into account job charac-
teristics, location, tenure, age, and year. en, we calculate the leave-one-out mean of
the residual to avoid selection based on worker 𝑖’s own productivity is is the average
residual observed under 𝑖’s current manager 𝑀 (𝑖, 𝑡), excluding the contribution of 𝑖 .
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e leave-one-out means are then used to classify each worker-year observation into
one of four quartiles. Next, we calculate the average residuals of workers two years
before and two years a er changing managers. We do so for salaries and bonuses of
workers in all 16 possible transitions, e.g. workers changing from a category 4 to a
category 1 manager, workers changing from a category 4 to a category 3 manager, etc.
For clarity, we focus on workers who previously worked for category 4 or category 1
managers. Note that we include changes in manager due to job changes of workers
and due to manager rotation.
Figure 1.3.2 shows that the groups have di erent pay levels before (years -2 and
-1) and a er changing managers (years 0 and 1). For example, salaries of workers with
coworkers in the fourth quartile who move to a quartile 1 manager have lower salaries
prior to a change compared to workers who change from quartile 4 to another quartile
4 manager. Moving to a manager with higher-paid coworkers, e.g. from quartile 1
to quartile 4, increases pay. Workers who stay in the same quartile have relatively
constant pay, although bonus pay seems to increase quite a bit for workers switching
from a quartile 1 to another quartile 1 manager. Workers who change from a quartile
4 manager to a lower quartile manager lose pay, with larger losses for more extreme
changes.
Pay changes in Figure 1.3.2 look symmetric for workers moving between quartile
1 and quartile 4 managers. is suggests that a simple additive model is a reasonable
approximation of base salaries and bonus payments. It implies that workers do not
only change managers if higher residual pay is expected.
e pay pro les in Figure 1.3.2 also look relatively at before and a er changing
manager. While there is some variation in pre-change pay, for example amongworkers
moving from bonus quartile 1 to 4, these changes are small compared to the jumps we
observe. is suggests that a static model as in Equation (1.5) should be a su cient
approximation.
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Age 0.75 6.1% 0.93 4.2%
Tenure 0.16 1.3% 0.25 1.1%
Manager 3.13 25.4% 4.16 18.7%
Job 6.59 53.5% 13.57 61.1%
Year -0.23 -1.8% -0.83 -3.7%
Country 0.84 6.8% 0.38 1.7%
Total explained 11.24 91.2% 18.45 83.1%
Total unexplained 1.08 8.8% 3.75 16.9%
Total gap 12.32 100.0% 22.20 100.0%
Notes: e table displays Kitagawa-Oaxaca-Blinder-decompositions of the gen-
der gap in Log Salary and Log Bonus Pay based on 59 813 observations. Age and




In the rst set of results, we look at the impact of men and women doing di erent jobs
and in particular working for di erent managers. e decomposition of gender pay
gaps requires that male and female workers identify the same set of characteristics and
full-rank matrices for each gender. erefore, we reduce the data to a dual-connected
set, as described in Section 1.3. We also impose that for a given observation we ob-
serve base salary, bonus payout, performance ratings, and targets. While this excludes
workers who do not have performance pay in their contract, this has the advantage
that di erent results for the outcomes are not driven by sample composition.
Table 1.3 displays the gender pay gap decomposition based on 59 813 observations.
e raw gender pay gap in salary is 12 log points (13%). e raw gap in bonuses is even
larger, with a di erence between men’s and women’s payouts of 22 log points (24%).
While the raw pay gaps are large, between 80 and 90% can be explained by di erent
observed characteristics of men and women. e residual gender gap is 1.1 log points
for base salaries and 3.8 log points for bonuses.
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e Kitagawa-Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition in Table 1.3 shows the relative im-
portance of the di erent characteristics explaining the gap. Age and tenure di er-
ences between men and women exist but are of small magnitude. Also, the fact that
the gender distribution of the workforce might not be uniform over countries is not of
primary importance. Job characteristics, i.e. the combination of hierarchical rank and
occupation, explain between 55 and 60% of the gender gaps in salary and bonus. is
means that if women worked in the same occupations and hierarchical levels as men,
and earned the same returns from these jobs as men, the gender pay gap in salaries
would be reduced by more than half.
e sorting of workers to managers ma ers. 25% of the gender pay gap in base pay
and 19% of the gap in bonuses can be explained by the fact that menwork for managers
who have more positive impacts on pay. is is true conditional on workers doing
the same job, i.e. working in the same occupation within the same hierarchical rank.
While we cannot tell why women tend to work for bosses who are less generous or
have less favorable impacts on productivity, we can see that managers are not perfectly
substitutable but di er in terms of productivity or styles. is also means that rms
seeking to reduce gender pay gaps need to carefully consider if and how to be ermatch
women to high-impact managers. Should women prefer to work for managers whose
style implies a productivity reduction, for example due to exible work hours, female
workers might in spite of a nancial cost prefer the current allocation to managers
(Goldin and Katz, 2015).
e role of child care A large part of gender pay gaps has been a ributed to reduced
working hours due to child care obligations (Kleven et al., 2019a,b). We neither observe
family status nor overtime work. By limiting the data to full-time workers only and
controlling granularly for the nature of the job, much of the variation in actual hours
worked is already taken into account. However, to examine the role of child care in
our se ing, we expand the decompositions in several dimensions.
First, we repeat the pay decomposition for workers aged 44 and younger and work-
ers aged 45 and older. Here one would expect that older workers are less likely to be
a ected by small kids at home. While child birth may have a lasting e ect on careers
of older workers as well, our approach already takes into account that parents might
climb up the hierarchy more slowly. Appendix Table 1.A.2 shows that the adjusted
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salary gap among younger workers is actually zero, and smaller than among older
workers. e adjusted bonus gap is around 5% for both groups. is suggests that
di erences in unobserved actual hours worked do not play a role for the gender gap
in this sample. As the sample is limited to full-time workers only and due to the exact
controlling for job xed e ects, most di erences in work hours are probably already
accounted for.
To examine this further, we recalculate pay decompositions while including all
workers in the data and controlling for contracted working hours. As Appendix Ta-
ble 1.A.3 shows, a signi cant part of the gender pay gap can be explained by di erences
in working hours. 34% of the pay gap in base salary of 13.7 log points is a ributed to
this channel. Unexplained gender pay gaps are larger in this full sample, relative to
full-time workers only. is nding suggests that gender di erences in working hours
do ma er, but are largely taken into account already by limiting observations to full-
time employees.
Full-time workers might di er in their accumulated working hours. In particular,
workers with children might have worked fewer hours in the past. Workers can also
have spells during which they did not work at all, for example because of child birth.
We treat these spells as havingworked zero hours. Havingworked part-time in the past
could be interpreted as a measure of experience, less exibility, or reduced likelihood
of working overtime because of child care obligations. Appendix Table 1.A.4 decom-
poses full-time workers’ pay while controlling in addition for accumulated full-time
equivalent months. As we need to observe every worker’s full employment history
at the rm, the sample size is reduced. e unexplained gender pay gap is similar to
our baseline estimate from Table 1.3. Di erences in accumulated full-time equivalent
months do not contribute to gender gaps. Once more, this could be because workers
sort into jobs with di erent requirements of exibility or because the rm requires
certain experience for working in particular positions.
ese extensions demonstrate that it is unlikely that the unexplained part of the
gender pay gap documented in Table 1.3 can be a ributed to child care obligations.
Sources of gender bonus pay gaps Bonuses depend on base salary, performance
ratings, and contracted bonus targets. We have seen that a gap in base salaries exists
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Table 1.4: Gender Gap Decomposition









Age -0.93 46.7% 0.27 9.5%
Tenure -0.00 0.0% -0.13 -4.6%
Manager 2.12 -106.0% -3.44 -121.9%
Job 0.71 -35.3% 6.61 234.6%
Year -0.06 2.9% -0.08 -2.8%
Country -0.30 14.9% -2.44 -86.7%
Total explained 1.54 -76.8% 0.79 28.1%
Total unexplained -3.54 176.8% 2.03 71.9%
Total gap -2.00 100.0% 2.82 100.0%
Notes: e table displays Kitagawa-Oaxaca-Blinder-decompositions of the gender gap
in the probability of a high performance rating and contracted Log Bonus Targets based
on 59 813 observations. Age and tenure are summarized in six-year bins. Jobs are the
combination of hierarchical rank and occupation.
and can be explained by sorting to jobs and managers. Here we study whether sorting
with regard to contracted bonus target or performance rating ma ers as well.
Table 1.4 reports that the raw gender gap in performance is −2 percentage points.
e penultimate line shows that the adjusted gender gap is even more negative (−3.5
percentage points). is is mainly driven by the fact that women tend to work for
managers handing out worse ratings. is means that if women had the same char-
acteristics as men and were to earn the same returns on these characteristics as men,
their performance ratings would be even be er.
It is a striking result that gender performance gaps are negative, i.e. favor women,
while the unexplained gap in salaries and bonus payouts is positive. If performance
ratings are a good proxy for actual performance, these residual gaps are di cult to rec-
oncile with the explanation that men are more productive. Previous work by Azmat
and Ferrer (2017) shows that female lawyers performworse than their male colleagues.
Our results demonstrate that the use of subjective ratings can make much of a di er-
ence when comparing the performance of male and female workers.
How can it be that women earn lower bonuses, despite the fact that their ratings
are be er? Bonuses depend on base salaries and contracted bonus targets. As these
gaps bene t men—the unexplained gap in targets is 2.0 log points and the unexplained
gap in base salaries is 1.1 log points—the eventual payout still favors men.
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Women do not sort to more generous or high-impact managers as can be seen from
the detailed results of the decomposition in Table 1.4. Instead, men work for managers
who hand out beer ratings. If women worked for the same managers and bene ted
from them in the same way as men, the probability to receive a high performance
rating would go up by two percentage points.
Table 1.4 also indicates that women are sorted to jobs with signi cantly lower
bonus targets. However, women actually tend to work for managers who negotiate
higher bonus targets. is means that while women might shy away from competi-
tion (as found by Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007), it does not imply that they work for
managers where performance pay plays a smaller role.
Are women’s better ratings explained by lower costs? One explanation for neg-
ative performance gaps is that managers might be more willing to hand out good rat-
ings if they are less costly. We observed that women earn lower salaries and negotiate
lower bonus targets. Managers could therefore use performance ratings to compensate
women for negotiating lower salaries and targets.
To check this, we once more decompose the gender gaps in performance ratings,
taking salary and target as predetermined variables and including them in the controls.
We nd in Appendix Table 1.A.5 that the unexplained gender gap opens even more in
favor of women. is suggests that women do not simply receive be er ratings because
they cost the manager less.
Controlling for additional workplace characteristics We control for job char-
acteristics by including a set of indicators for each combination of occupation and hi-
erarchical rank. However, it could also be the case that male and female workers who
work in the same job are located in di erent units of the rm. For example, a so ware
engineer could work in the compensation unit of the human resources department
or in the nancial analysis team – and these di erent workplaces could provide very
di erent pay packages. is means that by not taking into account the exact unit in
which a worker is located, we could a ribute such di erences to the managers and




In Appendix Table 1.A.6, we repeat the pay gap decomposition, but now including
indicators for the unit in which a worker is employed. Each worker is matched to one
of more than 200 units. e results show that a di erential sorting of men and women
can explain only very li le of the gender pay gap. If anything, women tend to work in
teams with slightly higher bonus pay. While not substantially changing our previous
ndings, this exercise further reduces the sample size to 50 002 observations because
we nding a connected set in all categorical variables becomes more challenging.
1.4.2 Within-manager gender gaps
Having documented that the sorting of women to managers contributes to gender pay
gaps, we now ask whether managers a ect residual gender pay gaps.
Based on the same data used in the Kitagawa-Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition we
estimate Equation (1.5) on salaries, bonus payouts, performance ratings, and bonus
targets. e number of observations contributing to the estimates is slightly reduced
relative to the sample in the decomposition due to the inclusion of worker xed ef-
fects. If a worker is only observed for a single period she cannot contribute to the
identi cation of 𝜔 , the coe cient on the term of interest,𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖 ×𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑀 (𝑖,𝑡) .
In addition to this fully saturated speci cation, we estimate two less granular ver-
sions on the same observations. First, as speci ed in Equation (1.4), we do not account
at all for unobserved heterogeneity at the worker and manager level. is allows us to
include dummies for the worker and manager being male, respectively. In an interme-
diate step, we add manager xed e ects. A dummy indicating the gender of the worker
can then still be estimated. ird, we estimate the fully saturated Equation (1.5).
Table 1.5 shows the results. e coe cients from the rst row reports the adjusted
gender gap when working under a female manager. e coe cient from the second
row is the di erence in outcomes of women when they work under a male instead of a
female manager. e third row estimates the di erence between the gender gap under
male and female managers. Before turning to more granular estimations, we look at
columns 1, 4, 7, and 10, which report the coe cients from estimating Equation (1.4).
e gender salary gap under female managers is 2.3 log points. Women who work
for male managers earn 1.9 log points higher salaries. Men only earn 1.6 log points
higher salaries, but the di erence to women is insigni cant. is means that the esti-
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mated gender pay gap at male managers is smaller than at female managers by 0.3 log
points, but this is highly insignicant.
Turning to bonuses, we nd that gender gaps are 4.1% larger when the manager is
male. e other coe cients imply that there is no statistical gender bonus gap under
female managers and no advantage for women who work for male managers instead
of female managers.
e increase in gender bonus gaps when the manager is male should be explained
by higher salaries, performance ratings, or bonus targets. However, as we can see
from the third row in columns 1, 7, and 10 this is not the case. e reason for this is
that the high performance indicators are noise measures of actual performance ratings,
which aremore nuanced. We cannot reconstruct the exact mapping frommore detailed
performance ratings to bonuses. Also, omi ed variable bias in unobserved worker or
manager characteristics could invalidate the estimation approach.
In columns 2, 5, 8, and 11 we control for unobserved manager characteristics. ree
observations can be made in comparison to the version without manager e ects. First,
the gender gap under female workers in salaries and ratings is almost unchanged.
Second, the bonus gap under female workers now is higher and signi cant at 2.8 log
points. ird, di erences in gender gaps are all insigni cant and smaller.
While the gender gap at female managers is an interesting statistic, we are looking
for a causal interpretation of the e ect of manager gender on gender gaps. To ensure
that workers are comparable, we add worker xed e ects in the complete speci cation
of Equation (1.5) in columns 3, 6, 9, and 12. is proves critical for the estimation of
the coe cient of interest.
Working for a male manager increases bonuses by 5.1 log points relative to women
when controlling for worker and manager xed e ects. Put di erently, the within-
manager gender gap increases by 5% if the manager is male. Due to symmetry, this also
implies that the within-manager gender gap falls by 5%, i.e. moves in favor of women,
if the manager is female. ere is no evidence that the manager’s gender ma ers for
gaps in base salaries or bonus targets. Instead, the advantageous position of men at
male managers is driven by changes in performance ratings. e performance gap
increases by 2.7 percentage points, i.e. moves in favor of men, when the manager is
male. is represents more than 10% relative to the observed probability of receiving a
high rating. e nding that gender gaps open up when the manager is male relates to
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Hospido and Sanz (2019) and Mengel et al. (2019) who document dierences in gender
gaps for di erent decision-maker genders in academic se ings and thereby challenges
ndings by Card et al. (2020) who cannot document such di erences.
As the point estimate for high performance ratings is only statistically signi cant
at 10%, we examine the robustness of our ndings to alternative performance rating
measures in Appendix Table 1.A.7. e e ect of male managers on the gender gap
in the probability of receiving a very high rating (the highest possible grade) is not
signi cant. However, Table 1.A.7 also shows that the gender gap in the probability
of receiving a bad rating (one of the two lowest possible grades) shrinks when the
manager is male. Finally, we translate the six grades to a numeric scale from one
to six, where six refers to the best grade and one to the worst. e gender gap in
this measure signi cantly increases by 0.02 points when the manager is male. ese
alternative performance outcomes lend support to our nding that working for male
managers bene ts male workers’ ratings more than those of female workers.
Heterogeneity in the impact of manager gender on gender gaps We also allow
the e ect of male bosses on the gender gap to vary along other dimensions. Table 1.6
displays these results. Each panel and column refers to a separate regression. All
estimates of manager gender impacts on base salaries are insigni cant. e e ects of
manager gender on the bonus gap do not di er by worker or manager characteristics.
However, some interesting pa erns emerge.
Younger workers seem to be more a ected by the di erential gender gaps. is
could be because younger workers are found at lower ranks. But as panel B shows, if
anything the opposite is true. It seems that at higher ranks the gender of the manager
plays a larger role for gaps. In panel C it looks like the e ects of manager gender
are larger when the team is mostly male. is observation supports the interpretation
that male bosses cater to the needs and preferences of male workers. Panels D to F
look at characteristics of managers. e results for age and hierarchical rank follow
a similar pa ern as for workers. Because the cultural background of managers could
impact their treatment of workers of di erent gender, we allow the e ect to vary by
the region of origin. We classify managers as “western” if they have a European or
Anglo-Saxon nationality. However, the point estimates look very similar. Overall,
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there is lile statistical variation in the e ect of managers, suggesting that the e ect
of manager gender on the gender gap is an issue across the entire rm.
Othermanager characteristics It could be that manager characteristics apart from
gender are the actual fundamental drivers of within-manager gaps. Note that even if
this was the case, it is already clear that managers doma er. Here we examinewhether
gender indeed drives this nding.
We repeat the estimation of Equation (1.5) for all four outcomes considered, but
in addition interact the dummy 𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖 with manager characteristics correlated with
manager gender. We allow gender gaps to vary by managers’ age, tenure, origin, and
hierarchical rank. If managers can experience a change in their characteristics, for
example in hierarchical rank, the manager xed e ect does not absorb it. In this case,
in addition to𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖 × 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑀 (𝑖,𝑡) we include 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑀 (𝑖,𝑡) as a regressor, etc.
Comparing the results from Table 1.7 with the original results from Table 1.5 shows
that even if we control for the interaction betweenworker gender and variousmanager
characteristics, the estimated coe cient on𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖 ×𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑀 (𝑖,𝑡) in the rst row is almost
identical. is suggests that omi ed variable bias is not driving our nding but that
indeed manager gender a ects within-manager gender gaps.15
Table 1.7 also reveals that older managers close gender gaps in base salaries and
contracted targets, relative to younger managers. e estimation also suggests that
gender gaps in performance rating are greater when the manager is “western”, sug-
gesting that coming from a culturally more progressive society does not guarantee a
reduced impact of managers on gaps. e nding could also mean that managers from
a minority group are more concerned about the interests of other minorities.
Allowing for di erential returns formen andwomen In the estimation of Equa-
tion (1.5), returns from male managers can di er between men and women while all
other characteristics are assumed to have equal e ects on men’s and women’s out-
comes. is simpli cation could lead to bias if the di erential returns capture di eren-
15With a p-value of 12%, the coe cient on𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖 ×𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑀 (𝑖,𝑡 ) in Table 1.7 is statistically insigni cant
when considering gaps in the probability of receiving a high performance rating. is again might be
because the grading is more complex than just an indicator for high ratings. Furthermore, while e ects
on base salary and contracted bonus targets remain insigni cant, these can of course contribute to the
e ect on bonus payments in column 2.
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Male × Male Mngr. 0.003 0.062
(0.004) (0.021)
Male × Male Mngr. × > 44 years −0.003 −0.027
(0.005) (0.028)
𝑁 55,464 55,464
Panel B: Hierarchical Rank
Male × Male Mngr. 0.003 0.052
(0.004) (0.037)
Male × Male Mngr. × Medium Rank −0.002 −0.011
(0.006) (0.040)
Male × Male Mngr. × High Rank 0.005 0.070
(0.011) (0.058)
𝑁 55,464 55,464
Panel C: Team Composition
Male × Male Mngr. −0.003 0.045
(0.004) (0.020)
Male × Male Mngr. × Majority Male 0.007 0.014
(0.005) (0.024)
𝑁 55,016 55,016
Panel D: Manager Age
Male × Male Mngr. 0.003 0.049
(0.004) (0.019)
Male × Male Mngr. × > 44 years −0.002 0.006
(0.006) (0.024)
𝑁 55,464 55,464
Panel E: Manager Hierarchical Rank
Male × Male Mngr. −0.011 −0.177
(0.020) (0.167)
Male × Male Mngr. × Medium Rank 0.012 0.215
(0.020) (0.168)
Male × Male Mngr. × High Rank 0.013 0.256
(0.021) (0.168)
𝑁 54,654 54,654
Panel F: Manager Region
Male × Male Mngr. 0.002 0.065
(0.007) (0.034)
Male × Male Mngr. × Western −0.001 −0.018
(0.008) (0.038)
𝑁 55,464 55,464
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the worker and manager level.
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Table 1.7: Eects of Having a Same-Gender Superior: Alternative Chan-
nels
log(Salary) log(Bonus Payout) High Performance log(Bonus Target)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Male × Male Mngr. 0.001 0.055 0.024 0.004
(0.003) (0.016) (0.015) (0.006)
Male × Mngr. Age ≥ 45 -0.006 -0.020 0.012 -0.009
(0.003) (0.013) (0.013) (0.004)
Male × Mngr. Tenure ≥ 10 -0.001 0.003 -0.000 -0.002
(0.003) (0.014) (0.013) (0.005)
Male × Mngr. Western 0.011 -0.012 0.066 0.010
(0.009) (0.036) (0.034) (0.010)
Male × Mngr. High Rank 0.002 0.014 0.015 -0.005
(0.005) (0.020) (0.020) (0.008)
Job FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Tenure FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Manager FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Worker FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
𝑁 54,784 54,784 54,784 54,784
𝑅2 0.995 0.937 0.565 0.988
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the worker and manager level. Age and tenure are
summarized in six-year bins. Jobs are the combination of hierarchical rank and occupation.
tial returns from other characteristics. For example, if male bosses are more likely to
work in engineering, and men have, for whatever reason, higher returns than women
whenworking in engineering, we would blamemanagers for these di erential returns.
In Appendix Table 1.A.8 we repeat the estimation of Equation (1.5) but interact
all variables except worker and manager e ects with a gender dummy. e e ect of
managers on gender gaps is unchanged. is adds to con dence that we are indeed
estimating the gender-di erential e ect of bosses.
Controlling for additional workplace characteristics We also examine the ro-
bustness of our ndings when adding controls for work units. In the gender gap de-
composition, this exercise did not a ect the interpretation of the results. is is also
the case here. In Appendix Table 1.A.9 we report estimates which are highly similar
to the e ect of manager gender on gender gaps shown previously.
Identi cation fromworkers not switching jobs In Equation (1.5), the coe cient
of interest𝜔 is identi ed by workers who work for di erent managers during the sam-
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ple period. But identication could be compromised if a worker selects into a new job
with a di erent boss based on unobserved time-varying performance of the worker.
While our analysis of event studies (based on Card et al., 2013) suggests that assum-
ing that the matches of workers and managers are as good as exogenous, we can of
course not formally test whether this assumption is true. In Table 1.A.10 we therefore
replicate our analysis based on a sub-sample of workers who do not face a new man-
ager because of job changes of workers but because of new managers substituting the
previous manager of a team. is means that we drop all observations where a worker
who changes manager also changes her job. For this exercise we do not make use of
the sample used in the decomposition where worker mobility was key in order to nd
a connected set and identify all xed e ects. Here, we want to restrict the mobility
of workers. e results in Table 1.A.10 look very similar to our main result from Ta-
ble 1.5, providing further con dence that assuming as good as exogenous matching of
workers and rms is a reasonable approximation.
1.4.3 Why does manager gender matter?
ree main mechanisms could explain why the gender pay gap moves in favor of men
when managers are male. First, the sorting of more productive men to male man-
agers could result in an observed gender gap. Second, within-gender complementari-
ties might make male workers relatively more productive than women when working
under a male manager. ird, (unconscious) discrimination of workers of the other
gender could drive our ndings. Whatever explanation holds true, as long as women
are underrepresented in managerial positions, these explanations would imply struc-
tural disadvantages for female workers We now evaluate which of these mechanisms
is likely to explain the e ect of manager gender.
Sorting Workers are not allocated randomly to managers. Managers might be bet-
ter informed about the quality of a worker of the same gender. is could for example
imply that a male manager’s male workers are on average be er than female work-
ers. While such a mechanism could exist in the rm, it cannot explain our results. In
Speci cation (1.5), we control for unobserved heterogeneity of workers. Doing so fully
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takes into account time-invariant ability dierences. is means that our results hold
true conditional on the sorting of workers to managers.
Within-gender complementarities A second explanation could be complemen-
tarities within gender. While there is ample evidence that diverse teams are more fact-
focused, process facts more carefully, and are more innovative (e.g. Dı́az-Garcı́a et al.,
2013; Herring, 2009; Levine et al., 2014; Nathan and Lee, 2013; Phillips et al., 2009),
one could think that homogeneity can also bene t employee performance. For exam-
ple, a competitive worker might be more productive in a competitive environment,
while a cooperative worker might be more productive in a cooperative environment.
If the distribution of styles di ers for men and women, men should be more productive
whenworkingwithmen andwewould observe awider gender gap due to productivity.
While we have nomeasure of productivity available, we can test for the plausibility
of this mechanism. Under the assumption that within-gender complementarities also
would exist with respect to coworkers of the same gender, we can test for complemen-
tarities by studying the e ect of male coworkers on the gender pay gap. We therefore
repeat the estimation of Equation (1.5) for the share of male coworkers working for the
same manager. e interaction of male-dummies for worker and manager is replaced
by the interaction of a male-dummy for the worker and the share of male coworkers.
We include the share of male coworkers because in contrast to manager gender it is not
absorbed by the manager xed e ect. We still include worker xed e ects, manager
xed e ects, and all other controls. is di ers from Panel C of Table 1.6 as here we
directly estimate the e ect of male coworkers instead, not the heterogeneous e ect of
a male managers leading majorly male teams.
Table 1.8 contains only one signi cant coe cient, indicating that bonuses are
higher when working in predominantly male teams. But, if anything, bonus payments
are lower for men compared to women when working with more male coworkers.
Under the assumption that within-gender complementarities also need to exist with
respect to coworkers, the results imply that such complementarities do not exist
with respect to manager gender. erefore, we take this as supporting evidence that
complementarities within gender are highly unlikely to substantially explain the
favorable outcomes of men (women) under men (women).
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Table 1.8: Eects of Having more Same-Gender Coworkers
log(Salary) log(Bonus Payout) High Performance log(Bonus Target)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Male × Share of Male Coll. 0.001 -0.040 0.006 -0.001
(0.006) (0.028) (0.027) (0.011)
Share of Male Coll. 0.004 0.045 -0.004 0.006
(0.006) (0.023) (0.022) (0.009)
Job FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Tenure FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Manager FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Worker FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
𝑁 55,016 55,016 55,016 55,016
𝑅2 0.995 0.939 0.564 0.988
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the worker and manager level. Share of Male Coll. is
the share of colleagues, de ned as workers with the same superior, who are male. Age and tenure are summa-
rized in six-year bins. Jobs are the combination of hierarchical rank and occupation.
Discrimination and biased beliefs Managers who are uninformed about the pro-
ductivity of their subordinates might be more likely to resort to (unconscious) biases
when evaluating or negotiating with workers. Discrimination due to biased beliefs
(Bohren et al., 2019) implies that decision-makers discriminate according to their bi-
ased priors if they are uninformed. If they are provided with previous evaluations of
work quality by other decision-makers, discrimination is reduced and eventually ips
if much previous information is available.
We suggest that a related mechanism can drive discrimination in our se ing. In-
stead of collecting information from previous evaluators, one can easily think that
decision-makers are less likely to discriminate according to their preexisting biased
beliefs as they learn about the worker’s true quality. So while Bohren et al. (2019)
relate a reduction in discrimination to be er information, one can also expect that a
reduction in discrimination is related to be er knowledge of the worker.
Besides learning about the true quality of workers, managers learning about their
workers also could exhibit less discrimination for a separate reason. It could be the
case that managers are less aware of the needs of workers of the other gender. For
example, male managers could be less considerate of child care obligations of female
workers. Over time, they could learn about their workers’ needs and reshape the work
environment such that all workers can show their best.
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Note that this does not necessarily mean that only male managers discriminate.
Female managers could be discriminating as well, so that we estimate the additional
advantageous treatment of men. eoretically, it could also be the case that male man-
agers do not discriminate at all, and female managers favor female workers. We do not
consider this a likely scenario, as previous research showed that women if anything
tend to discriminate against women (e.g. Bagues and Esteve-Volart, 2010) and bias in
evaluations has been found in other se ings to be driven by men (Hospido and Sanz,
2019; Mengel et al., 2019)
Whether discrimination takes more direct forms, e.g. biased ratings, or indirect
forms, e.g. biased work environments, we would expect in both cases that discrimi-
nating is reducedwhenmanagers aremore knowledgeable about their workers. To test
this, we group observations by a number of variables capturing aspects of information.
First, we split managers into a group with less than ten and a group with more than
ten years of tenure at the rm. One would expect that these managers are more expe-
rienced and therefore less likely to fall back to preexisting biases, or less aware about
the needs of workers of the other gender. Second, we examine whether managers of
larger teams ( ve or more subordinates) show stronger e ects of manager gender on
gaps. Managers of larger teams might nd it harder to observe the true e ort of each
worker and to cater to speci c needs. Similarly, a manager who works at a di erent lo-
cation than the subordinate and who only communicates remotely might nd it harder
to evaluate workers or build a connection with workers who are less alike themselves.
Finally, we allow e ects to change with the time a worker and manager have worked
together. We do so by grouping relationships into a group with two or less and a group
with more than two years of joint work. Over time, one would expect that superiors
learnmore and build connections with workers. Note that this measure could be biased
if workers who feel discriminated against are more likely to leave their team.
Table 1.9 shows the results. Each column of each panel refers to a separate regres-
sion. Sample sizes vary because some variables are not observed for all workers and
managers. For salary, the e ect of manager gender on pay gaps remains statistically
insigni cant. For bonus payments, one can observe a pa ern that could be taken as
support of the ndings of Bohren et al. (2019), i.e. that be er information leads to less
discrimination. e coe cients are not statistically distinguishable at conventional
levels. However, in all cases it seems that gender e ects are larger in magnitude when
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Table 1.9: Eects of Information
log(Salary) log(Bonus Payout)
Panel A: Manager Tenure
Male × Male Mngr. −0.001 0.058
(0.004) (0.021)
Male × Male Mngr. × ≥ 10 yrs Mngr. Tenure 0.006 −0.013
(0.005) (0.027)
𝑁 55,450 55,450
Panel B: Team Size
Male × Male Mngr. 0.002 0.057
(0.003) (0.017)




Male × Male Mngr. −0.000 0.096
(0.007) (0.032)
Male × Male Mngr. × Same Location 0.001 −0.054
(0.008) (0.034)
𝑁 54,326 54,326
Panel D: Joint Time
Male × Male Mngr. 0.001 0.057
(0.003) (0.017)
Male × Male Mngr. × > 2 Years Joint 0.001 −0.040
(0.005) (0.028)
𝑁 49,338 49,338
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the worker and manager level. Age and tenure
are summarized in six-year bins. Jobs are the combination of hierarchical rank and occupation.
information is harder to obtain. In particular, manager gender e ects on pay gaps are
larger when managers are less experienced, manage larger teams, work at di erent
locations and know workers for a shorter amount of time. While none of these dif-
ferences are statistically signi cant, all coe cients are negative and, in the case of lo-
cation and joint time, close to signi cance with respective p-values of 12.0 and 15.8%,
respectively. Proximity could also have led to the opposite e ect on gender gaps if
closer ties between managers and workers facilitate favoritism, an observation made
by Cullen and Perez-Truglia (2019). Of course, such an e ect might exist but seems




e observation that overall the e ect of manager gender on pay gaps seems to fall
when the manager should be be er informed supports the interpretation that some
form of (unconscious) discrimination is an important driver of the results. While the
observations here are in favor of discrimination by initially biased managers, they also
contradict the mechanism discussed previously. If gender-speci c complementarities
would play a role, it is unclear why they should fall with be er informed managers.
1.5 Conclusion
Using novel personnel data from a large company we examine gender gaps in wages
and performance, and we show that they are a ected by managers. Our analysis
yielded three main ndings.
First, a signi cant part of the gender gap can be explained by the sorting of male
and female workers to di erent types of managers. Men are more likely to work for
“be er” managers, i.e. managers whose workers receive higher salaries, bonuses, and
performance evaluations. e observation that women tend to work for “worse” man-
agers means that rms seeking to improve gender equity need to nd out what makes
a “good” manager and why women tend to work for managers with a lower impact.
While our research cannot determine which underlying manager characteristics drive
wage inequality or why workers are sorted as they are, our results imply that rms
should not only foster the occupational upgrading of female employees, but also con-
sider how female workers can work for “be er” bosses. However, women might actu-
ally prefer to work for “worse” managers if these o er more family-friendly environ-
ments (Goldin and Katz, 2015).
Second, we show that the gender pay gap cannot be explained by the notion that
men outperform women. On the contrary, women actually receive signi cantly bet-
ter ratings than men. Yet, on average, they earn less. is is a striking result as it
implies that adjusted gender pay gaps should be even larger. It also challenges the
notion that women’s performance is worse due to being less ambitious or competi-
tive (Azmat and Ferrer, 2017; Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007). In spite of the positive
impact of ratings on bonus pay, bonus pay gaps still favor men because the perfor-
mance e ect is outweighed by di erences in salaries and targets. Firms o en resort
to performance ratings determined by superiors if actual output cannot be quanti ed,
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as is typical in complex organizations characterized by division of labor. Future re-
search should examine whether male and female superiors dier in what aspects of
worker performance they value most when determining ratings. If rms interpret per-
formance ratings as good proxies of actual performance, gender equity is not achieved
when women earn the same as men. If anything, a negative gender performance gap
means that women should earn more than men.
ird, we show that manager gender ma ers as male managers cause within-team
bonus gaps to increase. is is driven by the fact that performance ratings are relatively
more favorable towards men when the manager is male. As manager gender a ects
pay gaps, the over-representation of men in management position puts women at a
disadvantage. erefore, our research has important implications for the discussion
of gender quotas. e basic requirement for such quotas to work is that having more
female managers indeed improves gender equality. In contrast to quotas applying at
the executive level only (Bertrand et al., 2019; Maida and Weber, 2019), our ndings
imply that quotas across all hierarchical ranks can be e ective. Future research would
need to consider other requirements that need to be ful lled such that gender quotas
across all ranks are indeed a suitable policy.
Digging deeper, we nd suggestive evidence that discrimination due to biased be-
liefs could drive the ndings, as manager gender tends to ma er less with more knowl-
edge about the workers. Alternatively, managers might learn about workers’ needs
and improve upon their initially biased work environments. is observation can in-
form alternative pathways for promoting gender equity. Organizing employees into
smaller and more stable teams in closer physical proximity could be a feasible measure
to reduce gender gaps. In addition, many rms train their sta to be more aware of
gender-related biases. While the success of such diversity programs is found to vary
signi cantly (Chang et al., 2019a), they seem to be a necessity to make managers more




Table 1.A.1: Descriptive Statistics
Mean SD 10th Perc. Median 90th Perc. Observations
Salary [e] 64 315.32 75 438.37 23 323.65 56 252.3 114 753.28 59 813
Bonus [e] 12 293.32 21 707.14 1393.49 4816.59 28 924.78 59 813
High Performance 0.25 0.43 0.0 0.0 1.0 59 813
Low Performance 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.0 1.0 59 813
Bonus Target [%] 12.36 8.68 4.0 11.0 25.0 59 813
Male 0.58 0.49 0.0 1.0 1.0 59 813
Age 42.65 9.04 30.0 43.0 55.0 59 813
Tenure 10.73 9.24 2.0 8.0 25.0 59 813
Span of Control 1.64 4.55 0.0 0.0 6.0 59 813
Coworkers 8.33 9.6 2.0 5.0 18.0 59 813
New Manager in Same Job 0.24 0.43 0.0 0.0 1.0 46 534
New Manager in New Job 0.07 0.25 0.0 0.0 0.0 46 534
Male Manager 0.72 0.45 0.0 1.0 1.0 59 813
Male & Male Manager 0.45 0.5 0.0 0.0 1.0 59 813
Male & Female Manager 0.13 0.34 0.0 0.0 1.0 59 813
Female & Male Manager 0.27 0.44 0.0 0.0 1.0 59 813
Female & Female Manager 0.15 0.36 0.0 0.0 1.0 59 813
Age of Manager 45.92 7.93 35.0 46.0 56.0 59 813
Notes: Extreme values omied for con dentiality reasons. Unbalanced panel based on 20 048 workers and the
years 2014-2019. Monetary variables normalized to Euros in 2010.
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Table 1.A.2: Gender Gap Decomposition for Younger and Older Workers










Age 0.40 6.2% 0.60 4.7%
Tenure -0.01 -0.2% -0.04 -0.3%
Manager 1.50 23.2% 4.39 34.9%
Job 3.87 59.9% 1.93 15.3%
Year -0.13 -2.0% -0.44 -3.5%
Country 0.95 14.8% 1.06 8.4%
Total explained 6.58 101.9% 7.50 59.6%
Total unexplained -0.12 -1.9% 5.09 40.4%
Total gap 6.46 100.0% 12.59 100.0%










Age 0.11 0.6% 0.13 0.3%
Tenure -0.00 -0.0% 0.16 0.4%
Manager 3.93 22.7% 4.85 13.1%
Job 13.21 76.4% 28.98 78.0%
Year -0.29 -1.7% -0.91 -2.5%
Country -0.93 -5.4% -1.42 -3.8%
Total explained 16.03 92.7% 31.78 85.5%
Total unexplained 1.27 7.3% 5.37 14.5%
Total gap 17.30 100.0% 37.15 100.0%
Notes: e tables display Kitagawa-Oaxaca-Blinder-decompositions of the gender gap in Log Salary and Log Bonus Payout based















Working hours 4.67 34.1% 1.93 7.5%
Age 0.56 4.1% 0.62 2.4%
Tenure 0.04 0.3% -0.04 -0.2%
Manager 1.45 10.6% 4.52 17.5%
Job 5.72 41.8% 13.08 50.7%
Year -0.25 -1.8% -0.88 -3.4%
Country -0.18 -1.3% -0.54 -2.1%
Total explained 12.01 87.7% 18.69 72.5%
Total unexplained 1.68 12.3% 7.10 27.5%
Total gap 13.69 100.0% 25.79 100.0%
Notes: e table displays Kitagawa-Oaxaca-Blinder-decompositions of the gender
gap in Log Salary and Log Bonus Payout based on 66 040 observations. Age and
tenure are summarized in six-year bins. Jobs are the combination of hierarchical
rank and occupation.
Table 1.A.4: Gender Gap Decomposition Controlling










FTE months -0.00 -0.0% 0.12 0.6%
Age 0.50 4.1% 0.51 2.4%
Tenure -0.03 -0.2% 0.41 2.0%
Manager 1.37 11.2% 2.63 12.5%
Job 7.38 60.0% 12.21 58.1%
Year -0.18 -1.5% -0.25 -1.2%
Country 1.37 11.2% 0.42 2.0%
Total explained 10.42 84.7% 16.06 76.3%
Total unexplained 1.88 15.3% 4.98 23.7%
Total gap 12.30 100.0% 21.04 100.0%
Notes: e table displays Kitagawa-Oaxaca-Blinder-decompositions of the gender
gap in Log Salary and Log Bonus Payout based on 24 389 observations. Age and
tenure are summarized in six-year bins. Jobs are the combination of hierarchical
rank and occupation.
47
CHAPTER 1. GENDER GAPS AND THE ROLE OF BOSSES
Table 1.A.5: Gender Gap Decomposi-














Total explained 1.82 -99.7%
Total unexplained -3.64 199.7%
Total gap -1.82 100.0%
Notes: e table displays Kitagawa-Oaxaca-Blinder-
decompositions of the gender gap in the probability of a
high performance rating based on 59 813 observations. Age
and tenure are summarized in six-year bins. Jobs are the
combination of hierarchical rank and occupation. Salary
and bonus target are measured in logs.











Age 0.68 6.4% 0.90 4.3%
Tenure 0.13 1.2% 0.16 0.8%
Manager 2.29 21.4% 4.85 23.4%
Job 6.07 56.6% 11.72 56.5%
Year -0.25 -2.3% -0.83 -4.0%
Country 0.64 5.9% 0.24 1.2%
Unit -0.15 -1.4% -1.17 -5.6%
Total explained 9.41 87.8% 15.87 76.5%
Total unexplained 1.31 12.2% 4.89 23.5%
Total gap 10.72 100.0% 20.75 100.0%
Notes: e table displays Kitagawa-Oaxaca-Blinder-decompositions of the gender
gap in the probability of a high performance rating based on 50 002 observations.
Age and tenure are summarized in six-year bins. Jobs are the combination of hi-
erarchical rank and occupation. Salary and bonus target are measured in logs.
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Table 1.A.7: Eects of Having a Same-Gender Superior: Additional Performance
Measures
High Performance Very High Performance Low Performance Linearized Performance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Male ×Male Mngr. 0.027 0.009 -0.022 0.058
(0.015) (0.007) (0.013) (0.025)
Job FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Tenure FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Manager FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Worker FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
𝑁 55,464 55,464 55,464 55,464
𝑅2 0.563 0.469 0.533 0.607
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the worker and manager level. Age and tenure are summarized
in six-year bins. Jobs are the combination of hierarchical rank and occupation.
Table 1.A.8: E ects of Having a Same-Gender Superior: Gender-
Interacted Controls
log(Salary) log(Bonus Payout) High Performance log(Bonus Target)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Male ×Male Mngr. -0.001 0.053 0.026 0.003
(0.003) (0.016) (0.015) (0.005)
Job × Gender FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year × Gender FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age × Gender FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Tenure × Gender FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country × Gender FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Manager FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Worker FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
𝑁 55,412 55,412 55,412 55,412
𝑅2 0.995 0.940 0.569 0.989
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the worker and manager level. Age and tenure
are summarized in six-year bins. Jobs are the combination of hierarchical rank and occupation.
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Table 1.A.9: Eects of Having a Same-Gender Superior: Controlling
for Unit
log(Salary) log(Bonus Payout) High Performance log(Bonus Target)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Male × Male Mngr. 0.002 0.047 0.030 0.004
(0.003) (0.017) (0.017) (0.005)
Job FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Tenure FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Manager FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Worker FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Unit FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
𝑁 48,138 48,138 48,138 48,138
𝑅2 0.995 0.939 0.560 0.990
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the worker and manager level. Age and tenure
are summarized in six-year bins. Jobs are the combination of hierarchical rank and occupation.
Table 1.A.10: E ects of Having a Same-Gender Superior: Keeping
workers who do not switch managers due to job changes
log(Salary) log(Bonus Payout) High Performance log(Bonus Target)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Male × Male Mngr. 0.001 0.052 0.044 -0.002
(0.002) (0.018) (0.017) (0.004)
Job FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Tenure FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Manager FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Worker FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
𝑁 68,719 68,719 68,719 68,719
𝑅2 0.996 0.939 0.574 0.991
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the worker and manager level. Age and tenure





Evidence from Social Security Data
Joint with Laura Hospido and Ulrich J. Wagner
2.1 Introduction
Air pollution poses a major threat to public health by shortening lives (Deryugina
et al., 2019) and increasing acute morbidity (Schlenker and Walker, 2016). As a nega-
tive externality of many economic activities, air pollution causes additional damage by
reducing productivity on the job (Gra Zivin and Neidell, 2012) and by hindering hu-
man capital accumulation (Currie et al., 2009a; Ebenstein et al., 2016). e hypothesis
that air pollution damages the economy also via reductions in labor supply was rst
examined by Ostro (1983) and Hausman et al. (1984). Recent research has provided
credible evidence in support of this hypothesis in the context of emerging economies
(Hanna and Oliva, 2015; Aragón et al., 2017), but li le is known so far about this rela-
tionship in post-industrial societies where pollution levels are low and productivity is
high.
In the G7 countries, themean population exposure to ne particulatema er (PM2.5)
fell by 35% between 1990 and 2017, driven in no small part by costly environmental
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regulations. Over the same period, GDP per hour worked increased by 50% (OECD,
2019). ese trends have important implications for cost-bene t analysis of air quality
regulations. First, with air quality improving, sub-clinical health impacts such as sick
leaves taken gain relative importance compared to severe health impacts which have
been the main focus of the health literature so far. Second, higher labor productivity
means that work days lost due to air pollution account for larger economic damages.
Taken together, this calls for a be er understanding of the labor-supply impacts of air
pollution.
To shed light on this important issue, this chapter provides the rst causal estimates
of how many work days are lost due to air pollution concentrations typically observed
in post-industrial economies. Our empirical analysis is based on a novel administra-
tive dataset that links rich information on personal and occupational characteristics
of Spanish workers to the frequency, length, and diagnosis, of sick leaves taken. We
estimate the impact of air pollution on workers’ propensity to call in sick, based on
weekly variation in ambient concentrations of particulatema er (PM10) across 99 cities
in Spain. Our baseline model is a linear regression of the share of sick-leave days on
the share of high-pollution days and weather variables. To control for non-random
assignment of pollution across workers, we include city-by-year, year-by-quarter, and
worker xed-e ects. Possible remaining endogeneity is addressed in an instrumental-
variables regression that exploits exogenous variation in PM10 driven by dust storms
in Northern Africa.
Our estimates imply that a 10%-reduction in high-pollution events reduces the ab-
sence rate by 0.8% of the mean (2.79%). is e ect is robust across a variety of spec-
i cations and economically signi cant when scaled up to the entire work force. e
estimates imply that the improvement in ambient air quality in urban Spain between
2005 and 2014 saved at least e 505 million in foregone production by reducing worker
absence by more than 5.58 million days. In further analysis, we uncover two important
sources of treatment heterogeneity. One relates to pre-existing medical conditions that
we infer from a worker’s sick leave record. We estimate that the health response of
vulnerable workers (de ned as those belonging to the top- ve percentile of the dis-
tribution of sick leaves taken during the pre-estimation period) is almost three times
that of healthy workers. Furthermore, our analysis of treatment heterogeneity across
workers and occupations reveals that job security is an important moderating factor
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in workers’ decisions to take a sick leave in response to a pollution shock. Speci-
cally, we estimate that workers with a high predicted risk of losing their job respond
less strongly than those with high job security. Using counterfactual analysis, we show
that such interactions of behavior and labor market institutions have a large impact on
estimates of the external costs of air pollution that arise from changes in labor supply.
is chapter makes several substantive contributions to the literature. First and
foremost, we provide a comprehensive assessment of the impacts of air pollution on
labor supply, an understudied outcome thus far in an otherwise quite extensive em-
pirical literature on the health e ects of air pollution.1 Early research on this rela-
tionship uncovered negative correlations between air pollution and labor supply in
cross-sectional data (Ostro, 1983), repeated cross sections (Hausman et al., 1984), and
case studies (Hansen and Selte, 2000). More recent evidence shows that air pollution
reduces hours worked among households in Mexico City, Lima, and Santiago de Chile
(Hanna and Oliva, 2015; Aragón et al., 2017; Mon , 2018). Yet there is a lack of
causal evidence for developed countries where exposure to ambient air pollution is
much lower. Another fundamental di erence is that employment contracts in devel-
oped economies are shaped by rigid labor market institutions and a comprehensive
social security system. In such a se ing, the typical channel of adjusting labor sup-
ply in response to a high-pollution event is by taking a (paid) sick leave. By studying
this outcome for workers in Spain, a post-industrial economy with universal sickness
insurance, this work lls an important gap in the literature.
Second, our analysis substantially broadens the range of health impacts considered.
While the literature has mostly focused on severe health outcomes such as mortality
and hospital admissions, our analysis additionally captures all health impairments that
workers nd troublesome enough to go and seek a sick leave from their general practi-
tioner. Moreover, thanks to having information on the diagnosis, we shed light on the
pathology behind the estimated treatment e ect by identifying the medical conditions
1Previous research has provided credible evidence that air pollution adversely a ects health in in-
fants (Chay and Greenstone, 2003b; Currie and Neidell, 2005; Currie et al., 2009b, 2014; Arceo et al.,
2016; Kni el et al., 2016) as well as in adults, based primarily on hospital records of births, deaths and
emergency-room admissions (Neidell, 2009; More i and Neidell, 2011; Gra Zivin and Neidell, 2013;
Schlenker and Walker, 2016; Deryugina et al., 2019; Currie et al., 2009b). Another strand of the litera-
ture investigates how air pollution a ects the productivity of workers and students, and nds negative
and statistically signi cant impacts in a variety of se ings (Currie et al., 2009a; Gra Zivin and Neidell,
2012; Chang et al., 2016, 2019b; Ebenstein et al., 2016; Roth, 2016; Lichter et al., 2017; He et al., 2019b).
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most aected when pollution levels spike, an aspect that is not yet well understood in
the literature. We thus contribute new evidence that helps drawing a more complete
picture of the pollution-health gradient.
ird, this chapter contributes rst evidence on how the estimated pollution-sick-
leave gradient interacts with features of the labor market. is aspect is new to the
literature on air pollution because our outcome variable is much more driven by in-
dividual choices than severe health outcomes. Empirical evidence on this is needed
because it is not evident how behavior interferes with sick leaves as a health out-
come. A sick leave can be regarded as both, a health impact and an investment for
improving future health. In the labor market studied by us, sick leaves might also be
a ected by workers pretending to be sick (moral hazard) or pretending to be healthy
(presenteeism). We provide rst evidence on this by showing that treatment e ects
systematically vary with idiosyncratic job security. We discuss the implications of this
nding for cost-bene t analysis in the short and long run.
Finally, the strong segregation between employment contracts with high and low
job security makes the Spanish labor market a prime example of a dual labor market.
Previous research has shown that this duality lowers productivity and reduce welfare
(Dolado et al., 2002; Cabrales et al., 2014; Bentolila et al., 2019). is chapter con-
tributes to this strand of research by identifying an additional channel of ine ciency
in dual labor markets: Since workers at risk of losing their jobs are found to be less
likely to take a sick leave during high-pollution events, exacerbated presenteeism could
adversely a ect future health outcomes and lower productivity in this tier of the labor
market.
2.2 Policy background
2.2.1 Sick leave pay in Spain
e vast majority of workers in Spain are entitled to temporary disability bene ts.
In particular, all a liates of the social security system continue to be paid when on
sick leave, provided that they see a doctor a liated with the public health care system
for treatment and that they have contributed to social security during a minimum
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contribution period of 180 days in the ve years immediately preceding the illness.2
Unlike in the U.S. where sick pay is granted as a xed amount of days per year, sick
pay in Spain continues either until convalescence or until a permanent disability is
diagnosed.
e bene t consists of a daily subsidy, the amount of which is given by the product
of a regulatory base and a replacement rate. e regulatory base is the amount that
is used to determine the bene ts paid by the social security system (Instituto Nacional
de la Seguridad Social) in an insured event such as a sick leave, a permanent disability
caused by a work accident, unemployment, or retirement. For each of those events,
the law stipulates which and howmany contribution bases must be taken into account
to determine the regulatory base of the pertaining bene t.
e contribution base is calculated according to the total monthly remuneration
received by the employee. To this end, all wage components including extra payments
are prorated to the monthly level such that every worker has exactly twelve contribu-
tion bases per year. e replacement rate changes over the course of the sick leave.
In case of common illness, no bene t is paid until the fourth day of the leave. e
replacement rate corresponds to 60% from day four until day 20 of the sickness spell,
and rises to 75% from day 21 onward. e maximum duration of the bene t is twelve
months, renewable for another six.3 e bene ts are always paid by the employer.
However, from the sixteenth day of a leave, the employer can claim reimbursement of
the bene ts paid by the social security administration.
In addition to social security bene ts, many employers have schemes in place that
complement sick pay to provide more complete coverage, especially during the rst
three days of an illness. Moreover, some collective labor agreements grant matching
funds that add to the replacement rate during a temporary disability. As a result, the
2No minimum contribution period is required in the case of an accident.
3In the case of an accident or occupational disease, the employer pays the rst day of the leave in
full. A er that, social security pays a replacement rate of 75%.
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dierence between the regular salary and the amount of the disability payment may
be small or even nil.4
2.2.2 Air quality standards in Europe
To harmonize air quality standards across EU member states, the European Parliament
and the Council have passed a series of directives (1999/30/EC, 2000/69/EC, 2002/3/EC,
2004/107/EC) over the past two decades. e most recent “Directive on Ambient Air
ality and Cleaner Air for Europe” (2008/50/EC) establishes limit values for ambi-
ent pollutant concentrations measured over di erent time intervals (hour, day, year).
ese standards are chosen in accordance to a pollutant’s potential to cause health
damages in the short and long run. Table 2.2.1 summarizes the standards that apply
to air pollutants such as particulate ma er smaller than 10 micrometers (PM10), ni-
trogen dioxide (NO2), sulfur dioxide (SO2), carbon monoxide (CO), and ozone (O3).5
e pollutant of main interest in this chapter, PM10, is subject to two standards. e
annual mean concentration must not exceed 40 micrograms per cubic meter (µg/m3).
In addition, the occurrence of daily mean concentrations of 50 µg/m3 or higher must
remain below 36 days per year. Since our econometric identi cation strategy is based
on short-run uctuations in air pollution concentrations, the analysis below will focus
on the 24-hour standard of 50 µg/m3.
4As an example, consider a worker who earns a monthly base salary of e 1,340.54 (before taxes)
which amounts to e 44.68 per day. He has been sick at home for 22 days and his collective agreement
does not complement the temporary disability bene t. During days one to three of the sick leave, the
worker earnse 0. During days four through 15, the company pays a bene t of 60% of the base salary, i.e.,
e44.68×60%×12 = e321.73. During days 16 through 20, the social security administration pays a bene t
of 60%, i.e. e44.68 × 60% × 5 = e134.05. Finally, the bene t paid by the social security administration
rises to 75% during days 21 and 22 (2 days), i.e. e44.68 × 75% × 2.
5 e directive also regulates particulate ma er smaller than 2.5 micrometers (PM2.5). is pollutant
is not considered in the subsequent analysis due to insu cient data.
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Table 2.2.1: Ambient air quality standards for selected pollutants
Pollutant Concentration Averaging Legal Exceedances
(per m3) period nature each year
Particulate maer 50 µg 24 hours Limit 35
(PM10) 40 µg 1 year Limit -
Sulphur dioxide 125 µg 24 hours Limit 3
(SO2) 350 µg 1 hour Limit 24
Nitrogen dioxide 200 µg 1 hour Limit 18
(NO2) 40 µg 1 year Limit -
Carbon monoxide 10 mg Max. daily Limit -
(CO) 8-hour mean
Ozone 120 µg Max. daily Target 25 days averaged
(O3) 8-hour mean over 3 years
Notes: Abridged from European Environment Agency, http://ec.europa.eu/environment/air/quality/stand
ards.htm
2.3 Research design
2.3.1 Sick leaves as a health outcome
Previous research into the e ects of air pollution on human health has focused on po-
lar cases. On the one hand, an extensive literature has linked air pollution to severe
health outcomes such as morbidity and mortality in adults and infants. On the other
hand, a recent strand of the literature has established that air pollution a ects humans
even under seemingly normal conditions by reducing their productivity at work and
in school. Sick leaves can be regarded as an ‘intermediate’ health consequence that is
severe enough to prevent people from following their daily routines while not neces-
sarily leading to dramatic consequences such as hospitalization or death.
Although sick leaves cause substantial economic costs beyond the physical health
impact, the literature has not yet investigated this outcome in a systematic way. is
chapter provides the rst, nation-wide study of the impact of urban air pollution on
work absenteeism. Speci cally, we study paid sick leaves taken by workers within
the context of a publicly-provided sickness insurance scheme. Given the novelty of
this outcome variable in the context of environmental valuation, it is important to
57
CHAPTER 2. URBAN AIR POLLUTION AND SICK LEAVES
emphasize two peculiarities of this outcome variable which bear relevance for the in-
terpretation of the results.
First, a sick leave indicates, at the same time, a negative health shock and an in-
vestment in future health. Taking a sick leave may help to prevent a hospitalization
during the pollution spell, and may contribute to beer health outcomes in the future.
is e ect is reinforced if exposure to pollution occurs mainly at the workplace as the
sick leave reduces exposure.
e second peculiarity relates to the fact that, like other insurance schemes, sick-
ness insurance is vulnerable to moral hazard. at is, workers might pretend to be sick
and take a paid leave. How to reign in moral hazard in sickness insurance is a question
of great policy interest in itself, which has been the subject of a burgeoning empirical
literature (e.g. Johansson and Palme, 1996, 2005; Henrekson and Persson, 2004). In our
econometric analysis below, we assume that moral hazard gets absorbed into worker
and time xed-e ects and hence cannot confound the impact of air pollution on sick
leaves. However, moral hazard might play a role in explaining heterogeneous impact
estimates. Because employers cannot observe the true health status of a worker, they
may take the frequency and length of sick leaves taken as a signal about the worker’s
health. All else equal, employers prefer to award permanent job contracts to workers
with good health. erefore, workers with a low level of job protection have a stronger
incentive to signal good health — e.g. by reducing moral hazard — than workers with
strong levels of job protection. We shall test this hypothesis in Section 2.6.2 below.
2.3.2 Empirical model
Our econometric approach focuses on modeling how short-run variation in ambient
pollution a ects an individual’s propensity to take a sick leave.6 We specify a linear
probability model (LPM) for the share of sick days that worker 𝑖 living in city (munici-
6 is is in line with the literature on the impact of pollution on health outcomes, in that it relates
ambient pollution concentrations to a binary health outcome.
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pio)𝑚 takes in week 𝑡 ,
𝑆𝐼𝐶𝐾𝑖𝑚𝑡 = 𝛼𝑝𝑚𝑡 +𝑤 ′𝑚𝑡 [𝛽1 + 𝛽2 𝑤𝑚𝑡 ] + ℎ′𝑚𝑡𝛾 +




\𝑎 · I{𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑚𝑡 = 𝑎} + [𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖𝑚𝑡 (2.1)
where 𝑝𝑚𝑡 is a measure of ambient pollution concentrations in city𝑚 and week 𝑡 ,𝑤𝑚𝑡
is a vector of weather variables in city 𝑚 and week 𝑡 , and ℎ𝑚𝑡 is a vector containing
further city-level controls for school vacations, bank holidays and u prevalence in
week 𝑡 . Furthermore, the equation includes quarter-by-year e ects _ and city-by-year
e ects ` to control for business-cycle e ects and for unobserved local shocks, respec-
tively. As worker-level controls, we include a full set of age dummies and individual
xed e ects [𝑖 .
e identifying variation in this regression comes from week-to-week changes in
local pollution concentrations and sick leaves within a city and year, a er ne ing out
worker-speci c e ects and correcting for weather as well as other reasons for absence
such as business-cycle uctuations. Inference on the parameters in Equation (2.1) is
based on robust standard errors with two-way clustering at the week and city levels.
It is widely held that air pollution is not randomly assigned across space and indi-
viduals (Gra Zivin and Neidell, 2013). In Equation (2.1), endogeneity of air pollution
might arise for a variety of reasons. First, economic uctuations that a ect both em-
ployment and pollution might confound the estimates. For example, an unobserved
shock to labor demand might induce both an increase in local pollution while also in-
creasing labor supply (Hanna and Oliva, 2015). Second, to the extent that sick workers
cause fewer emissions than they do at work (or on their way to the workplace), the
causality might go from sick leaves to air quality. ird, individuals that are more
susceptible to adverse health impacts of air pollution might choose to live in less pol-
luted areas. Fourth, pollution exposure is likely measured with error because we use
average concentrations rather than individual exposure. All of the above sources of
endogeneity would bias the estimated health impact of pollution towards zero. Fi-
nally, the estimated pollution impact might also be biased away from zero if it picks
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up the eect of omi ed pollutants that are correlated with the pollutant of interest.
e direction of the overall bias is thus ambiguous.
Our research design mitigates concerns about endogeneity in the following ways.
First, our focus on sick leaves discards variation from extensive-margin adjustments
to labor supply which are not related to a temporary disability. Second, the high-
frequency nature of the data allows us to control for a variety of time e ects that
mitigate simultaneity bias. ird, thanks to the longitudinal structure of the data, we
are able to purge the estimates from the e ects of locational sorting by individuals or
rms. ese features help to mitigate some causes of endogeneity, but not necessarily
all of them. In particular, if pollution is subject to classical measurement error, an in-
strumental variable is needed to consistently estimate its causal impact on sick leaves.
In the next section, we propose such an approach to instrument for PM10, the pollutant
of interest in this study.
We focus on PM10 because no other pollutant exhibited more frequent and more
severe violations of the 24-hour limits set by the EU during our study period (cf. Ta-
ble 2.A.2 below). Consequently, PM10 is a primary target for air quality management
in urban Spain. Estimating dose-response functions for PM10 is necessary for design-
ing e cient pollution control regulations, and it is feasible thanks to long-range at-
mospheric transport of PM10 which shi s ambient concentrations in ways that are
conditionally independent of local pollution sources.
2.3.3 Instrumental variable estimation
We address the issue of endogenous pollution in Equation (2.1) within a two-stage
least squares (2SLS) estimation framework that exploits quasi-experimental variation
in PM10 originating from Sahara dust advection. Under certain meteorological condi-
tions, storms in the Sahara desert stir up dust into high altitudes. ese dust clouds can
travel very long distances and reach European territory several times a year. e ar-
rival of Sahara dust occurs throughout all of Spain, and it is most frequently observed
on the Canary Islands, due to their geographical proximity to the Sahara, where the
phenomenon is popularly known as ‘Calima’. For the sake of brevity, we shall use this
term henceforth when referring to episodes of increased PM10 concentrations due to
long-range transport of African dust. A Calima episode typically lasts several days and
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Figure 2.3.1: Sahara dust intrusion in Spain
(a) June 9, 10pm (b) June 12, 4pm
(c) June 14, 9am (d) June 21, 10am
OD550 Dust
Notes: Visualization of Sahara dust intrusions on the Iberian peninsula during the month of June 2009. Data and images from the
BSC-DREAM8b model, operated by the Barcelona Supercomputing Center, available online at: http://www.bsc.es/earth-science
s/mineral-dust-forecast-system/
is accompanied by regional weather paerns that facilitate atmospheric dust transport.
For this reason, the distribution of Calima episodes is not uniformly distributed over
the year but peaks during the summer months as depicted in Appendix Figure 2.B.1.
Figure 2.3.1 illustrates how Sahara dust traveled across di erent regions in Spain
during a Calima episode in June 2009. On June 9, the dust plume was building up over
North Africa (Figure 2.3.1a). ree days later, the plume had extended to cover the
Canary Islands and Southern Spain, but not the Balearic Islands (Figure 2.3.1b). On
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June 14, all of Spain was exposed to Sahara dust, though the intensity varied across
regions (Figure 2.3.1c). Figure 2.3.1d depicts the withdrawal of the dust cloud which
was completed at the end of June.
e in uence of Sahara dust on ambient PM10 concentrations cannot be measured
by regular air quality monitors. erefore, the possible link between ambient pollu-
tion and Calima is evaluated ex post using data from rural background monitors and
meteorological back-tracking models such as the one that generated the data under-
lying Figure 2.3.1. e scienti c procedure (Escudero et al., 2007; erol et al., 2013)
behind this a ribution is standardized across EU member states and designed to en-
sure a level playing eld across European cities when determining whether they are
in compliance with the EU standard for PM10 concentrations. Because Calima events
substantially increase non-anthropogenic PM10 concentrations, the cities a ected by
this phenomenon are allowed to discount the measured 24-hour-mean concentration
for this e ect (see Appendix 2.C for more details). O cal PM10 discounts constitute
a valid instrument for pollution because they shi local PM10 concentrations in ways
that are plausibly orthogonal to local conditions that drive sick leaves, a er condition-
ing on weather.
Speci cally, denote by 𝑐𝑚𝑡 theweekly share of days forwhich the city𝑚’s applicable
PM10 discount is strictly positive (Calima days). e rst-stage equation for pollution
is given by
𝑝𝑚𝑡 = 𝛼𝑐𝑚𝑡 +𝑤 ′𝑚𝑡
[
𝛽1 + 𝛽2 𝑤𝑚𝑡
]
+ ℎ′𝑚𝑡𝛾 +




\̃𝑎 · I{𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑚𝑡 = 𝑎} + [̃𝑖 + Z𝑖𝑚𝑡 (2.2)
where all variables other than 𝑐𝑚𝑡 correspond to those in Equation (2.1). In the second
stage, we estimate the outcome equation a er substituting predicted pollution 𝑝𝑚𝑡 from
Equation (2.2) for 𝑝𝑚𝑡 in Equation (2.1).
A crucial assumption underlying this approach is that Calima events have no di-
rect e ect on sick leaves other than via increased ambient concentrations of PM10. We
exibly control for local weather to rule out the possibility that particular weather con-
ditions associated with Calima a ect the outcome variable. is strategy has proven
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eective even when the instrument is based on local weather conditions such as wind
direction (Hanna and Oliva, 2015; Deryugina et al., 2019) or thermal inversion (Arceo
et al., 2016; He et al., 2019b). Since our instrument is based on a more regional weather
phenomenon, the potential for confounding weather impacts and pollution appears to
be small. e exclusion restriction would also be violated if Calima changed behavior.
A precondition for this is that workers are aware of Calima while it lasts. On the Ca-
nary Islands, located 1,300 kilometers to the south-west of the Iberian peninsula and
just 115 kilometers o the Moroccan Atlantic coast, Sahara dust advection is frequent
and sometimes visible, hence awareness must be taken for granted. Although we can-
not rule out behavioral responses to Calima there a priori, robustness checks discussed
in Section 2.5.2 below show that our results are not driven by workers from the Canary
Islands. In the rest of Spain, Sahara dust events are less frequent and less intense. We
found no evidence of the public being alerted to such events during our study period.
Finally, the exclusion restriction would be violated if PM10 originating from the Sa-
hara has a substantially di erent e ect on human health than PM10 from local sources.
Speci cally, if the chemical composition of PM10 from the Sahara di ered substantially
from that of non-desert PM10, we should suspect that their health impacts di er, too.
Perez et al. (2008, Fig. 3) compare mass-adjusted concentrations of the four group el-
ements in PM10 and nd that crustal elements are more frequent during Saharan dust
days whereas carbon, secondary aerosols, and marine aerosols show no di erence.
From a study of Madrid, Barcelona and eleven other southern European cities, Stafog-
gia et al. (2016, p. 418) conclude that “the health e ects of dust-derived PM10 are of the
same (or similar) magnitude as those reported for anthropogenic sources of air pollu-
tion”. is lends support to our assumption that the instrumental variable has no direct
e ect on human health except through raising overall ambient PM10 concentrations.
2.4 Data
For the analysis in this chapter, we merge several large datasets that are described in
more detail in this section.
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2.4.1 Data sources
Employment histories Our primary data come from the National Institute of Social
Security which administrates both health insurance and pension benets formore than
93% of the workforce in Spain. Since 2004, the administration maintains a research
dataset, the Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales, henceforth referred to as the MCVL
(Spanish Ministry of Employment, Migration and Social Security, 2018). e MCVL
is a non-strati ed random sample of anonymized individual work histories, covering
approximately 4% of all individuals who were a liated with social security at some
point during the reporting year. An individual record contains information on both
current-year and historical employment relations, dating back to the time when the
administration began to keep computerized records.
Sick leaves Information on sick leaves taken by social security a liates is rst gath-
ered and processed by the employer’s mutual indemnity association which relegates
the information back to the social security administration when reimbursements are
claimed. While sick leaves are not contained in the MCVL, the social security admin-
istration has provided us with a customized dataset that merges individual records of
sick leaves to the MCVL during the years from 2005 to 2014. As a result, we have a
panel dataset containing daily observations of sick leaves taken by 1.6 million individ-
uals, the diagnosis code based on the International Statistical Classi cation of Diseases
and Related Health Problems (ICD), as well as information on their employment status,
wage, age, occupation, and many other characteristics. To the best of our knowledge,
we are the rst team of researchers to analyze this extraordinary dataset.7 A caveat is
that the dataset is not well-suited to analyze sick leaves taken by unemployed workers.
is implies that the analysis to follow has li le to say about the impact of air pollution
on the unemployed, and on severe health consequences such as permanent disability
or death.
Air pollution Data on air pollution were obtained from the SpanishMinistry for the
Ecological Transition (2016). ese data are updated on a yearly basis and are also used




within the EU framework for reciprocal interchange of information and reporting on
ambient air quality (2011/850/EU).e database is comprised of time series data on am-
bient concentrations of a variety of air pollutants with up to hourly resolution as well
as meta-data on monitoring stations. For our analysis, we use readings taken by 784
air quality measurement stations across Spain between January 2005 and December
2014. Apart from location, these stations di er in terms of the set of air pollutants they
monitor and the time window of measurement. e vast majority of stations remain
active throughout the sample period. e meta-data report the municipality where the
measurement station is located. is allows us to link them to construct a dataset of
air quality across Spanish cities. When more than one air quality station is located in
a municipality, the readings are averaged across stations.
Weather Meteorological data were provided by the Royal Netherlands Meteorolog-
ical Institute (2019) as part of the European Climate Assessment & Dataset (ECA&D)
project. Within the ECA&D project, national meteorological institutes and research
institutions from 31 European countries collect daily data on twelve essential climate
variables. For Spain, historical information is available from 1896 onward. e num-
ber of variables and geographical coverage has been increasing steadily until today.
Based on a total of 193 geocoded weather stations, we assign to each municipality
the weather conditions at the station that is closest to the municipality’s centroid and
has non-missing data. Hence, the assigned weather station is not necessarily located
within the boundaries of the municipality.
Calima variables We downloaded data on PM10 discounts from the website of the
Spanish Ministry for the Ecological Transition (2018). e data report daily PM10 dis-
counts for 29 locations in Spain. We follow the o cial procedure and assign to each
municipality the closest station with available data (see Appendix 2.C for more details).
Other controls Factors such as epidemics, bank holidays, and school vacations
likely a ect an individual’s propensity to call in sick. To the extent that these factors
are correlated with pollution, omi ing them from the analysis might result in biased
estimates. We thus collected data to control for such factors.
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Flu outbreaks are monitored and recorded by the Spanish center for disease control
(Instituto de Salud Carlos III ) under the auspices of its u surveillance system (Sistema
centinela de Vigilancia de la Gripe en España). Weekly data for the u incidence (num-
ber of cases per 100,000 inhabitants) are published for each autonomous community,8
except Galicia and Murcia (Spanish Center for Disease Control, Instituto de Salud Car-
los III, 2016).9 We merge the u data to our estimation sample at the level of the Au-
tonomous Community. In case of missing observations, data were imputed using the
national average.
e dates of school vacations and bank holidays vary at the levels of the au-
tonomous community, province, and even municipality. We gather this information
from the various regional “o cial bulletins” and numerous other sources. e linking
is done at the pertinent geographic level.
2.4.2 Data cleaning
Our dataset contains daily records of individual sick leaves between January 1, 2005
and December 31, 2014. e raw sample is comprised of approximately four billion
worker-by-day observations over the full sample period. However, some cleaning steps
are necessary in order to use the sample for our purposes. is subsection describes
and justi es those steps.
First, we drop all workers living in municipalities with less than 40,000 inhabitants.
For these workers, the place of residence is reported only at the level of the province,
which is too coarse for accurate spatial matching to pollution and weather data. For all
remaining workers, we know the place of residence at the ve-digit municipality code
level which is required for matching. Since these muncipalities have 40,000 inhabitants
or more, we shall henceforth refer to them as cities. We retain just over half of the
workers in the raw sample a er performing this step.
Second, we impose the following sample restrictions. We only keep worker-by-day
observations of individuals aged 16 to 65 who are actively employed and for which we
have information on employers and wages. Individuals who are reported to have taken
8Spain is not a federation, but a decentralized unitary state comprised of 17 autonomous commu-
nities and two autonomous cities.
9In a normal year, the monitoring is in place during the u season, i.e. from week 40 until week 20
of the following year. In 2009, year-round surveillance was in place because of the swine u.
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any sick leave ofmore than 550 days are dropped, as this number exceeds the legalmax-
imum duration. We also remove individuals with reported employment relations aer
death, negative-length employment durations, as well as duplicate or negative wages.
Worker-by-day observations with in ation-adjusted wages in the 99.5th percentile are
also excluded.
ird, we drop observations with missing pollution data. In cities where pollution
measurements are derived from more than one air quality monitor, failure to account
for entry and exit of monitors would lead to incoherent time series. In such cases, we
drop all data frommonitors reporting less than 120 days of PM10 in any reporting year.
If this leaves two or moremonitors in the data, we require that all monitors report in all
years. Finally, we drop all observations on December 31 and January 1 because of the
unusually high contamination levels that result from reworks during the new year’s
festivities.
Following these cleaning steps, our sample contains between 231 thousand and 263
thousand workers per year who live in 99 cities spread across the Spanish peninsula
and the islands (Appendix Figure 2.B.5 displays the location of cities and air quality
monitors included in the estimation sample). ese cities are home to 55% of the Span-
ish population and to 51% of all workers a liated with the general regime of the social
security system.
2.4.3 Descriptive statistics
Our sample contains more than half-a-billion daily observations for 466,174 workers
aged between 16 and 65 years. To improve computational tractability, we aggregate the
data to the weekly level. e rst panel of Table 2.4.1 provides summary statistics at
the worker level. e average propensity to take a sick leave in a given week is 2.79%.
e share of female workers is 46%. Figures 2.B.2 and 2.B.3 in Appendix 2.B plot the
duration of sick leaves and the frequencies of the main diagnosis codes, respectively.
e remaining panels of Table 2.4.1 report descriptive statistics on pollution vari-
ables and other covariates, gathered at the city-by-week level. e second panel sum-
marizes the data on particulate ma er. e average concentration of PM10 is 27 µg/m3,
which is well below the EU annual standard of 40 µg/m3, but higher than 20 µg/m3,
the limit value recommended by the World Health Organization (WHO, 2006). Non-
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Table 2.4.1: Descriptive statistics, 2005-14
Variable mean sd min max observations
1. Social security data (workers)
Age 37.7 11.5 16 65 466,174
Female share [%] 46 49.8 0 100 466,174
Absence rate [%] 2.79 15.9 0 100 > 100 million
2. Particulate maer PM10 (city-by-week)
Ambient concentration [`g per m3] 26.8 13.0 0.0 188.0 38,613
Concentration due to Calima event [`g per m3] 2.1 5.5 0.0 140.6 38,613
Days PM10 exceeds 24-hour standard [%] 7 19 0 100 38,613
Calima days [%] 15 25 0 100 38,613
3. Other air pollutants (city-by-week)
CO [mg per m3] 0.5 0.3 0.0 5.2 25,279
SO2 [`g per m3] 5.5 4.9 0.0 121.6 29,529
NO2 [`g per m3] 25.7 14.7 0.0 140.8 33,421
O3 [`g per m3] 73.1 25.8 1.0 176.6 31,305
4. Weather data (city-by-week)
Temperature [◦C] 15.9 6.4 -6.7 36.8 38,613
Wind speed [0.1 m/s] 29.4 15.2 0.0 142.9 38,613
Precipitation [0.1mm] 15.5 32.0 0.0 972.0 38,613
Cloud cover [okta] 3.9 1.8 0.0 8.0 38,613
Sunshine [h] 7.3 3.2 0.0 14.5 38,613
Humidity [%] 66.7 13.5 20.0 100.0 38,613
Pressure [hPa] 1,016.7 5.8 978.3 1,041.2 38,613
5. Flu prevalence (region-by-week)
Flu rate per 100,000 inhabitants 49.7 89.2 0.0 953.5 11,654
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anthropogenic PM10 contributes just 2.1 µg/m3 to this average value. However, the
maximum values show that non-anthropogenic PM10 maers on high-pollution days.
e share of days exceeding the 24-hour standard is 7%, and the share of Calima days
is 15%. is means that not every Calima day is a high-pollution day.
e third panel of Table 2.4.1 provides descriptive statistics for other air pollutants.
Daily air pollution limits were also exceeded for O3 concentrations (although those
violations were less frequent and less extreme than for PM10) but hardly ever for CO
and SO2 (cf. Appendix Table 2.A.2). For NO2, annual standards were violated in one
sixth of the cases.
e fourth panel summarizes the weather variables. Daily average temperature is
measured in degrees Celsius, wind speed in 0.1 meters per second, precipitation in 0.1
millimeters, and cloud cover in integer-valued oktas ranging from 0 (sky completely
clear) to 8 (sky completely cloudy). Sunshine is measured in hours per day, humidity
in % and pressure in hectopascals. e last panel of the table reports the u rate, in
cases per 100,000 inhabitants.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Baseline estimates
Figure 2.5.1 plots weekly absence rates against ambient levels of PM10. Both the raw
data and the residualized data from an OLS estimation of Equation (2.1) at the city-
level suggest that the relationship is positive and increasing. is is also born out by
the estimation results for Equation (2.1). Table 2.5.1 reports OLS and IV estimates for
two alternative measures of air pollution.10 In the rst three columns, PM10 is mea-
sured as the share of days per week on which the daily limit concentration of 50 µg/m3
is exceeded (PM10 exceedance). is identi es the treatment e ect of pollution using
only high-pollution events. In columns 4 to 6, pollution is measured as average con-
centrations in µg/m3. If it was known with certainty that the sick leave response is
directly proportional to pollution concentrations, estimating a speci cation linear in
10 e estimation of OLS and IV regressions with high-dimensional xed e ects is implemented with
the Julia programming language package FixedE ectModels.
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Figure 2.5.1: Sample correlation between sick leaves and PM10
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Notes: e gures show binned sca er plots a er grouping all observations into 20 bins of equal size based on the variable depicted
on the x-axis. e dots represent the mean value for each bin. e dashed line shows the predicted relationship based on an OLS
estimation for the underlying data. Sub gure (a) plots the relationship between PM10 and weekly absence rates at the city-level.
Sub gure (b) plots the relationship of the same variables, a er controlling for city-year xed-e ects, year-by-month xed-e ects,
weather conditions, school holidays, other public holidays, and u rates.
PM10 would be more e cient as it exploits variation in pollution over the entire sup-
port.
e IV regression is implemented as a two-stage-least-squares (2SLS) procedure
where local PM10 is rst regressed on the Calima variable and controls. is regression
is reported in columns 3 and 6 of Table 2.5.1 for PM10 exceedance and PM10, respec-
tively, and shows that Calima is a strong predictor of ambient PM10 concentrations
(𝑅2 = 0.41 and 𝑅2 = 0.65, respectively). In the second stage, the absence rate is re-
gressed on the predicted PM10 variable and controls.
e association between pollution and sick leaves is positive and statistically signif-
icant across all speci cations, suggesting that higher levels of pollution lead to more
sick leaves. e IV estimates exceed the OLS estimates by a factor of 3. is points
to a enuation bias that could arise from measurement error in PM10 but also due to
other sources of bias that were discussed in Section 2.3.3 above. In the analysis to
follow, we thus focus on the IV estimator which allows for a causal interpretation of
the estimated relationship. e IV estimates of our baseline regressions imply that, on
average, a 10-percentage point reduction in the share of exceedances of the limit value
reduces the absence rate by 0.0214 percentage points, i.e. by 0.8% of the mean absence
rate (0.0279). Furthermore, a reduction in average PM10 concentrations by 10 µg/m3
reduces the absence rate by 0.03 percentage points.
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Table 2.5.1: Baseline estimates for PM10
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Weekly absence rate PM10 exceedance Weekly absence rate PM10






Estimator OLS IV First-stage OLS IV First-stage
Mean outcome 2.791 2.791 0.085 2.791 2.791 28.038
Observations 100,739,754
𝑅2 0.165 0.165 0.413 0.165 0.165 0.648
First-stage 𝐹 statistic 79.861 211.595
Notes: Coecients scaled by a factor of 100 for be er readability. All regressions control for individual xed
e ects, age xed e ects, city-year xed e ects, year-quarter xed e ects, u prevalence and include linear
and squared terms of eight weather variables. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by city and
by week.
2.5.2 Robustness checks
Dynamics Our main regression equation relates sick leaves to contemporaneous
pollution and weather. Previous research has documented that air pollution can have
dynamic e ects on worker productivity (He et al., 2019b). To investigate this, we es-
timate alternative speci cations of Equation (2.1) which include weekly lags of PM10
exceedance and use the respective lags of Calima as instrumental variables. e re-
sults, reported in Appendix Table 2.A.3, show that the impact of air pollution on sick
leaves can last for up to two weeks. Compared to the speci cation without lags, the
contemporary e ect of PM10 decreases in magnitude by about 15% but the coe cient
on the rst lag is almost as large. Further lags do not ma er empirically.
e lag distribution is open to more than one interpretation, however. When in-
terpreted as a dynamic treatment e ect, it implies that a one-o shock to pollution
a ects health in the current and in the next week. e total e ect would then be given
by the sum of both point estimates which amounts to twice the contemporaneous ef-
fect. Yet this could be confounded by high-pollution episodes that last multiple days.
For example, a four-day event can fall either into a single week or extend over two
subsequent weeks. In the former case, the event contributes only to identi cation of
the coe cient on contemporaneous PM10, but in the la er case the event also helps
to identify the coe cient on lagged PM10. Our regression model cannot disentangle
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the dynamic eects of two-day pollution event in the previous week from the contem-
poraneous e ects of four-day event that extends over both the previous and current
week. In the analysis to follow, we thus focus on the contemporaneous e ect only. We
acknowledge that this might underestimate the full health impact.
Non-linear e ects of pollution We shed light on the functional form of the
pollution-health relationship by re-estimating Equation (2.1) using alternative thresh-
olds to de ne a high-pollution event. Appendix Table 2.A.4 presents results for OLS
and IV regressions where we use the share of week days with pollution exceeding
50%, 75%, 100% (as in the baseline), or 125% of the legal limit of 50 µg/m3 on a given
day. e IV point estimates show a clear pa ern in that (i) higher threshold values for
pollution lead to stronger increases in the propensity to take a sick leave, and (ii) the
increment in the sick leave impact increases for constant increments in the pollution
threshold. e implication is that a linear functional form, which has o en been
used in the literature, would misrepresent the underlying pollution-health gradient
in our application and would lead us to underestimate the health hazard for the right
tail of the pollution distribution. e threshold-based approach we use throughout
the remainder of this chapter circumvents this problem, though it averages over the
impacts of high and extremely-high pollution days.
To investigate whether pollution levels below the EU 24-hour standard have a sig-
ni cant impact on sick leaves taken, we estimate a non-parametric version of Equa-
tion (2.1) where individual-by-week pollution exposures are sorted into 50 bins of equal
size.11 e share of days in the lowest quantile is omi ed. e OLS estimates for the
di erent pollution bins are plo ed in Figure 2.5.2. e gray area represents the 95%
con dence intervals of each indicator. For visual clarity, the 49 estimates and con -
dence intervals are connected by straight lines. e point estimates are positive and
increasing for values of 35 µg/m3 and higher, and they become statistically signi cant
at 50 µg/m3 just at the limit value.
11We classify daily city-level PM10 into 50 quantiles a er weighing each city-day by the number
of workers observed in the MCVL to account for di erent exposure pro les across cities. To avoid a
disproportionately large bin at the top, we drop PM10 readings in the 99.9th percentile. e 50 indicators
for each bin are then averaged at the weekly level. Hence, the resulting variable indicates the share of
days in a given city and week in a particular bin. A er matching the indicators to the worker-level data,
we estimate Equation (2.1), replacing 𝑝𝑚𝑡 by 49 indicators.
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Figure 2.5.2: Non-linear impacts of PM10 on sick leaves
Notes: e graph depicts point estimates for di erent bins of PM10 concentrations from an OLS regression of sick leave on
indicators for each bin and controls. e vertical line indicates the location of the EU 24-hour standard for PM10. e gray areas
indicate 95%-con dence intervals.
Exclusion of Canary Islands e IV estimation rests upon variation in particulate
ma er due to Sahara dust advection and transport. Because of their geographic prox-
imity to the Sahara, the Canary Islands are subject to this phenomenonmore frequently
and with greater intensity than the rest of Spain. is could lead to a violation of the
exclusion restriction, e.g., if the local population change their behavior in response to
Calima. We therefore estimate the main speci cation a er dropping all cities located
on the Canary Islands from the sample. Results reported in Appendix Table 2.A.5 show
that the Canary Islands have no particular in uence on the estimation results.
Non-linear regression model Our baseline speci cation (2.1) ts a linear proba-
bility model to an outcome variable that ranges only between zero and one. e model
is thus necessarily mis-speci ed, but it has the enormous bene t of allowing us to im-
plement high-dimensional xed-e ects and IV estimators in straight-forward ways.
Since the realizations of the outcome variable – the share of sick leaves at the city-
by-week-level – takes values between 0.38% and 7.02%, we reckon that the bias due
to misspeci cation is not large enough to give up the simplicity and computational
tractability of the linear model. We investigate this by estimating a logit model with
fractions and worker xed e ects as a non-linear alternative model. is alternative
has its own drawbacks as it does not accommodate instrumental variables and, in gen-
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eral, the inclusion of individual xed e ects gives rise to an incidental parameters
problem.12 Results reported in Appendix Table 2.A.6 show that the average marginal
e ect for the PM10 exceedance of 0.060 is smaller than but very close to the OLS base-
line estimate of 0.070, while for the PM10 in levels, the average marginal e ect of 0.001
is almost equivalent to the OLS baseline estimate.
2.5.3 Estimates by ICD-9 diagnosis group
For a subset of absence spells we observe diagnoses, coded according to the Ninth Re-
vision of the International Statistical Classi cation of Diseases (ICD-9). is classi ca-
tion scheme subdivides diseases and health-related problems into 17 main categories,
referred to as chapters. e three most commonly diagnosed ICD-9 chapters in our
sample are “VI: diseases of the musculoskeletal system”, “V: mental disorders”, and
“XVII: injury and poisoning”, as reported in Appendix Table 2.B.4. Table 2.5.2 reports
estimates of 17 IV regressions, using as the dependent variable in Equation (2.1) the
chapter-speci c absence rate. In those regressions, we drop (i) all spells for which the
ICD-9 code is not reported and (ii) all spells with a diagnosis di erent from the diagno-
sis group used in the de nition of the respective dependent variable, which accounts
for the fact that diagnoses are mutually exclusive.13
e strongest e ect of PM10 on sick leaves is found for the diagnosis chapters XVI
and V. e former stands for “symptoms, signs and ill-de ned conditions” and includes
headaches, tachycardia (elevated heart rate), apnea (cessation of breathing), or nausea,
among others. e la er (mental disorders) includes, among others, symptoms re-
lated to dementia and depression, which have been linked to air pollution in recent
research (Bishop et al., 2018; Braithwaite et al., 2019; Fan et al., 2020). A positive
e ect also emerges for chapter VI (diseases of the nervous and sense organs) which
12When the panel is short (𝑇 small), noisy estimates of the xed e ects contaminate the estimates
of the common parameters and the marginal e ects due to the nonlinearity of the model. In particular,
the magnitude of the bias of the maximum likelihood estimator would be on the order of 1/𝑇 . However,
given that we use weekly data, the average number of observations per worker in our sample is 217.7,
suggesting that the incidental-parameter bias will be very small. Simulations by Fernandez-Val (2009)
show that the size of the bias is already small when 𝑇 = 16.
13Appendix Table 2.A.7 reports the results from an alternative regression where chapter-speci c
absences are set to zero whenever (i) no diagnosis is reported or (ii) an ICD-9 code does not belong
to the diagnosis chapter de ning the dependent variable. e results are almost identical to the ones
reported in Table 2.5.2.
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includes Alzheimer’s disease, migraine, and eye disorders. In addition, we nd a small
but statistically signi cant negative e ect for the chapter “diseases of the blood and
blood-forming organs”. We refrain from a causal interpretation of this point estimate
because it is based on very few observations: Less than 0.3% of all sick leaves are clas-
si ed in this chapter (vs. 11.6%, 13.5%, and 4.2%, respectively, for the above-mentioned
diagnosis chapters; cf. Figure 2.B.4). Interestingly, we do not nd statistically signi -
cant e ectswhen looking at diagnosis chapters for respiratory diseases (which includes
asthma, bronchitis, and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease) or cardiovascular dis-
eases.14
14We can only speculate about the reasons for this. It could be that patients with asthma or respira-
tory symptoms are more likely to self-medicate in response to a pollution shock, in particular when they
know that they have the disease. Bias could also arise due to the fact that ICD codes are not available for
all sick leaves, or due to systematic di erences in the reporting quality, depending on whether patients
were treated in the emergency room or by their general practicioner.
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Table 2.5.2: Eects of PM10 exceedance on ICD-9 Diagnosis Groups
ICD-9 Chapter Number and Name Coe cient Mean N
I Infectious and Parasitic Diseases 0.003 0.067 97,528,520
(0.007)
II Neoplasms 0.005 0.097 97,511,232
(0.005)
III Endocrine, Nutritional and Metabolic Diseases, 0.001 0.019 97,432,211
Immunity Disorders (0.001)
IV Diseases of the Blood and Blood-forming Organs -0.001 0.007 97,417,805
(0.000)
V Mental Disorders 0.037 0.302 97,730,323
(0.010)
VI Diseases of the Nervous System and Sense Organs 0.016 0.096 97,523,735
(0.007)
VII Diseases of the Circulatory System 0.000 0.091 97,507,524
(0.002)
VIII Diseases of the Respiratory System 0.003 0.137 97,624,631
(0.010)
IX Diseases of the Digestive System 0.010 0.101 97,535,500
(0.007)
X Diseases of the Genitourinary System -0.003 0.054 97,474,571
(0.004)
XI Complications of Pregnancy, Childbirth, 0.002 0.080 97,498,058
and the Puerperium (0.003)
XII Diseases of the Skin and Subcutaneous Tissue -0.001 0.026 97,441,348
(0.003)
XIII Diseases of the Musculoskeletal System 0.021 0.596 98,073,192
and Connective Tissue (0.019)
XIV Congenital Anomalies 0.000 0.006 97,416,810
(0.001)
XV Certain Conditions originating 0.000 0.001 97,412,186
in the Perinatal Period (0.000)
XVI Symptoms, Signs and Ill-de ned Conditions 0.043 0.282 97,745,795
(0.010)
XVII Injury and Poisoning 0.018 0.289 97,733,701
(0.011)
Notes: Each row reports the coe cient on PM10 exceedance estimated in an IV regression where the dependent variable is
de ned using sick leaves only when the diagnosis is from the given ICD-9 chapter (sick leaves with diagnosis form other
chapters are dropped). Coe cients are scaled by a factor of 100 for be er readability. All regressions control for individ-
ual xed e ects, age xed e ects, city-year xed e ects, year-quarter xed e ects, u prevalence and include linear and
squared terms of eight weather variables. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by city and by week.
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2.6 Heterogeneity of treatment eects
e richness of our data allows us to investigate the heterogeneity of treatment ef-
fects with respect to a wide variety of characteristics of workers and jobs. To do so,
we de ne for each characteristic a categorical variable and split the sample accord-
ingly. In this way, we accommodate heterogeneous reactions not only to air pollution
but also to any other variable speci ed in regression Equation (2.1). First, we analyze
heterogeneity with respect to worker characteristics. Next, we study how workers in
di erent occupations react to air quality. We conclude the examination of heteroge-
neous treatment e ects comparing workers with di erent initial health stocks.
2.6.1 Heterogeneity across workers
Gender When spli ing the sample by gender, the point estimates are larger for fe-
male workers than for male workers (cf. Appendix Table 2.A.8). A 10-percentage point
reduction in the share of PM10 exceedances reduces the absence rate by 0.026 percent-
age points for women and 0.017 percentage points for men. However, taking into ac-
count the mean absence rates for each group (3.41% for females, and 2.25% for males),
the relative e ect is 0.8% in both cases.
Age Appendix Table 2.A.9 reports the regression results a er subdividing workers
into three age groups of approximately equal size. e point estimates increase with
age among young and middle-aged workers. For workers older than 45 years, the
increment in the OLS point estimate is less pronounced and the higher mean absence
rate in this group implies that the relative impact of high-pollution events is as low as
in the group of young workers. When interacting PM10 exceedances with worker age
we estimate that an additional year increases the pollution impact on absences by 2.8%
of the main e ect (cf. Appendix Table 2.A.10)
Presence of dependent children Di erences in sick-leave taking across workers
could be related to the presence of dependent children in the household. We explore
this in Appendix Table 2.A.11 which reports the treatment e ects estimated separately
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for workers with and without children under age twelve in the household.15 We nd
that the point estimates are very similar in both groups. e di erences are well within
the margin of error and, relative to the mean absence rates, the treatment e ect is
around 0.8% in both groups.
is contrasts with the evidence provided by Aragón et al. (2017) that Peruvian
workers with dependent children are more likely to reduce their labor supply during
high-pollution episodes in order to take care of their children when air pollutionmakes
them sick. While it is plausible that caregivers in our sample stay at home when their
child is sick, such leaves are unlikely to be registered as a sick leave taken by the parent.
is is because Spanish labor regulations grant parents at least two days of paid leave
per year when a minor child is sick. Unfortunately, we cannot investigate this further
as we do not have information on such leaves.
Income and skills Di erences in income might induce heterogeneity in the treat-
ment e ects for a variety of reasons. Workers with higher income may a ach a higher
value to health, they might have access to be er health care and more expensive medi-
cation, be er options to avoid air pollution, or bene t from a collective agreement that
complements sick pay from the social security system. e overall e ect of these and
other income-related factors on the estimated impact is ambiguous from an ex ante
perspective.
e reporting of income is not very precise in our dataset because contribution
bases are bo om and top coded. erefore, we explore the treatment heterogeneity
with respect to skill groups that are highly correlated with the salaries that workers re-
ceived. e Spanish social security system classi es occupations into ten groups, three
of which can be considered as high-skilled (Bonhomme and Hospido, 2017). When es-
timating the treatment e ects separately for high-skilled and low-skilled workers, the
point estimates, reported in Appendix Table 2.A.12, barely di er.
15Age twelve is the threshold used in Spanish labor regulations for granting work-hour reductions
or leaves for child rearing.
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2.6.2 Heterogeneity across occupations
Sector aliation We begin our investigation of treatment heterogeneity across jobs
with a comparison across sectors. To this end, we split up the sample into nine sectors
and estimate Equation (2.1) for each sub-sample. Figure 2.6.1 displays themean absence
rates along with the point estimates for PM10 exceedance (see Appendix Table 2.A.13
for detailed sector de nitions and estimation results).
ree ndings emerge from this exercise. First, the estimated impact of high-
pollution events on sick leaves is positive in all sectors, and the relationship is statisti-
cally signi cant in all sectors but agriculture. Second, there is meaningful variation in
the magnitude of these e ects across sectors, with OLS estimates ranging from 0.02 to
0.11 (compared to 0.07 in the full sample) and IV estimates from 0.14 to 0.36 (compared
to 0.21 in the full sample). ird, the mean percentage absence rate across sectors
is quite heterogeneous and ranges from 1.83 in the information and communication
technologies (ICT) sector to 3.71 in the public sector.
Such di erences in mean absence rates could arise exclusively because of di er-
ences in job characteristics, but in reality they are likely driven also by selection. All
else equal, a worker with frail health prefers a job that doesn’t expose her to high levels
of air pollution or that comes with generous sick leave bene ts. Sorting on those char-
acteristics is likely to induce bias in previous, cross-sectional estimates of the impact of
air pollution on work days lost (Ostro, 1983; Hausman et al., 1984; Hansen and Selte,
2000). Since we have worker xed-e ects, our estimates are purged of selection bias.
Nonetheless, the heterogeneity in the sectoral estimates re ects the joint in uence of
these and other factors on the decision to take a sick leave. For an illustration, consider
the results for the ICT and the public sector. e IV point estimates for these two sec-
tors – 0.364 and 0.321, respectively – are at the top of the range of estimated treatment
e ects. However, workers in ICT exhibit the lowest average absence rate whereas pub-
lic sector employees have the highest. is suggests that selection on health cannot
alone explain all of the heterogeneity in treatment e ects. While the cross-sector com-
parison of treatment heterogeneities provides clues for the mechanisms driving them,
pinning down such mechanisms requires further analysis.
In the remainder of this section, we undertake such an analysis focusing on the
role of job security. is is motivated by the fact that both mean absence rates and
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Figure 2.6.1: Heterogeneous pollution impacts across sectors













Notes: e chart displays mean absence rates, OLS estimates and IV estimates separately for the following sectors: Information
and communication technology (ICT), nancial services, agriculture, construction, other services, trade, professional services,
manufacturing, and the public sector. All coe cients and absence rates have been multiplied by 100 for be er readability. e
full results are reported in Appendix Table 2.A.13.
treatment e ects are particularly high in the public sector, where employees enjoy
very high levels of employment protection – in particular, civil servants. Compared to
workers with low levels of job security, public sectors workersmight bemorewilling to
take a sick leave when experiencing a negative health shock because they do not have
to fear any consequences for the continuation of their tenure.16 In contrast, in sectors
where precarious employment conditions are more prevalent, such as agriculture and
services, workers might take fewer leaves in order to avoid repercussions on the likeli-
hood of remaining employed. Since we cannot rule out that confounding factors other
than employment security drive the cross-sector comparison, the subsequent analyses
cut the data in di erent ways to shed more light on this mechanism.
Employment protection in a dual labor market e Spanish labor market fea-
tures stark di erences in employment protection between temporary and permanent
employment contracts. Previous work has shown that this dual labor market a ects
unemployment, job ows, productivity and welfare (Dolado et al., 2002, 2005; Cabrales
16In addition, until July 2012, the replacement rates for the daily subsidy were substantially more
generous for workers in the public sector than in other sectors.
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Table 2.6.1: Treatment eects by contract type
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Temporary contract Permanent contract Civil servants
PM10 exceedance 0.066 0.155 0.062 0.203 0.135 0.505
(0.026) (0.055) (0.018) (0.072) (0.058) (0.186)
Estimator OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Mean outcome 2.238 2.238 2.850 2.850 4.321 4.321
Observations 25,786,038 67,323,069 7,055,193
𝑅2 0.191 0.191 0.181 0.181 0.180 0.180
First-stage 𝐹 statistic 85.831 78.619 66.814
Notes: Coe cients scaled by a factor of 100 for be er readability. All regressions control for individual xed
e ects, age xed e ects, city-year xed e ects, year-quarter xed e ects, u prevalence and include linear and
squared terms of eight weather variables. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by city and by
week.
et al., 2014; Bentolila et al., 2019). It is conceivable that di erences in employment pro-
tection could a ect the generosity of sick leave bene ts (e.g., at the level of collective
bargaining) or the worker’s willingness to take advantage of those bene ts.
We investigate this by spli ing the sample into three groups with increasing de-
gree of employment protection: temporary contracts, permanent contracts, and civil
servants. e results for each group are reported in Table 2.6.1. e IV point estimates
imply that, on average, a 10-percentage point reduction in the share of exceedances of
the limit value reduces the absence rate by 0.0155 percentage points for workers with a
temporary position, and 0.0203 percentage points for workers with a permanent con-
tract. Given the mean absence rates for each group (2.2% for temporary, and 2.9% for
permanent), the reaction is similar for both groups (0.7%). However, the implied reac-
tion for civil servants is larger both in absolute terms (0.0505 percentage points) and
relative to the mean (1.2%), corroborating the view that the propensity to take a sick
leave in this group is not only higher on average but also in response to pollution
shocks.
Unemployment risk Next, we use rich data on individual-level a ributes in order
to tease apart the potential e ect of unemployment risk from other factors driving
a worker’s decision to take advantage of sick leave bene ts when pollution spikes.
Unemployment risk might ma er for the following reason. If a worker fears that the
frequency of her sick leaves will be taken into account when her employer decides on
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Table 2.6.2: Treatment eects by unemployment risk - interaction
(1) (2)
Weekly absence rate
PM10 exceedance 0.069 0.213
(0.016) (0.063)
PM10 exceedance × unemployment risk -0.020 -0.091
(0.010) (0.032)
Estimator OLS IV
Mean outcome 2.798 2.798
Observations 100,199,483
𝑅2 0.165 0.165
First-stage 𝐹 statistic 34.881
Notes: Coe cients scaled by a factor of 100 for be er readability. All regressions
control for individual xed e ects, age xed e ects, city-year xed e ects, year-
quarter xed e ects, u prevalence and include linear and squared terms of eight
weather variables. Standardizedwithin-sector unemployment risk is also interacted
with weather variables, city-year dummies and year-quarter dummies. Robust stan-
dard errors in parentheses are clustered by city and by week.
whether or not to retain her in the event of a mass layo , it may be rational for her
to not take a sick leave even when sick. is is a testable prediction because we can
estimate individual unemployment risk from our data and relate this to the propensity
to take a sick leave.
In order to predict individual unemployment risk we t a logit model for the proba-
bility of losing a job in a givenmonth for each of the nine sectors above. All regressions
control for gender, year, age, age squared, tenure, tenure squared, experience, experi-
ence squared, nationality, and province of residence.17 Using ed regressions for
each sector, we predict the individual unemployment risk for the rst week in which
a worker is observed. We then assign workers to one of two groups, depending on
whether this prediction lies above or below the sector’s median risk. e assignment is
made once for the worker’s entire time series. In so doing, we capture time-invariant
heterogeneity in a worker’s risk of job loss while avoiding possible feedbacks of air
quality on employment risk. We derive two insights from this classi cation (summa-
17 is approach is inspired by the labor literature. For example, Card (1996) uses predicted wages
as a proxy for skills in order to study the impact of unions on workers with di erent skill levels. As
the MCVL contains only limited information on unemployment status, we use missing employment
entries in the dataset as proxies for job loss. Since some workers exit the MCVL sample at the end of the
year, we include a dummy for the month of December which allows us to control for this e ect when
predicting job loss. See Appendix 2.D for details.
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rized in results reported in Appendix Table 2.A.14). First, the average propensity to
take a sick leave is lower among those facing a higher risk of losing their job. Second,
the increase in this propensity in response to a high-pollution event is higher in the
low-risk group than in the high-risk group, an eect that holds in both relative and
absolute terms.
We further analyze this using continuous variation in predicted unemployment
risk. Table 2.6.2 reports regression results from a variant of Equation (2.1) that in-
cludes the interaction of PM10 exceedance with the individual unemployment risk,
standardized relative to other workers in the same sector. e IV coe cient implies
that a one-standard deviation decrease in individual unemployment risk is associated
with an impact of pollution on sick leaves that is 43% higher.
Our ndings imply that estimates of the health damages of air pollution derived
from sick leave data may be underestimating the true health e ects if workers in jobs
with low job security go to work despite being sick. In Section 2.7 we estimate the
magnitude of this divergence for all of Spain.
2.6.3 Heterogeneity with respect to health status
A long-standing interest in research on the pollution-health gradient has been with
the impact on particularly vulnerable individuals. In fact, much of the literature ap-
proaches the topic with a focus on vulnerable populations such as infants (Currie et al.,
2014) or the elderly (Deryugina et al., 2019).
anks to having rich data on workers’ health records, we can go beyond the cur-
rent state of the literature and identify vulnerable individuals in a representative sam-
ple of workers aged 16 to 65. To this end, we rst construct a straightforward indicator
of health as the share of days missed due to the sick leaves taken during the rst twelve
months that a worker is observed in the sample. We then estimate a variant of Equa-
tion (2.1) where PM10 exceedances are interacted with this health measure.18
Table 2.6.3 reports the results. We nd that the interaction term is positive and
statistically signi cant in the IV estimation but not for OLS. Two statistics from the
distribution of the absence share are helpful to further interpret these results. First, the
18In this estimation, we drop the rst 18 months of a worker’s record to ensure that the spells used
to de ne vulnerability do not extend into the estimation period (a sick leave can last up to six months)
and thereby have a direct e ect on the estimation results.
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Table 2.6.3: Treatment eects by health status
(1) (2)
Weekly absence rate
PM10 exceedance 0.074 0.157
(0.019) (0.084)
× absence share 0.579 2.488
(0.354) (0.710)
Estimator OLS IV
Mean outcome 2.915 2.915
Observations 74,706,090
𝑅2 0.176 0.176
First-stage 𝐹 statistic 38.477
Notes: Coe cients scaled by a factor of 100 for be er read-
ability. All regressions control for individual xed e ects,
age xed e ects, city-year xed e ects, year-quarter xed
e ects, u prevalence and include linear and squared terms
of eight weather variables. Robust standard errors in paren-
theses are clustered by city and by week.
healthiest 76.5% of workers have an absence share of zero. Hence this group responds
to high-pollution events according to the main e ect. Since the main e ect is positive
and signi cant in the OLS regression, but not the interaction e ect, a enuation bias
due tomeasurement error seems to be particularly severe for workers with poor health.
Second, we de ne as vulnerable workers the ones in the top ve percent of the
absence share distribution who missed at least 12.3% of work days due to illness. e
IV estimates imply that the impact of high-pollution events on vulnerable workers is
about 3 times the e ect on healthy workers. erefore, the mean e ect masks large
e ects for particularly vulnerable individuals, a result that has been established thus
far only for populations either younger or older than the working-age subjects we
consider in our analysis. In further results reported in Appendix Table 2.A.15, we nd
that the discrepancy between healthy and vulnerable workers is weaker when de ning
vulnerability based on the length of previous sick leaves.19 is is consistent with the
interpretation that especially workers with chronic conditions but not excessively long
sickness spells are harmed by air pollution.
19In particular, the e ect size ratio between lower 75% and top 5% of the distribution is 2.5 when the
health indicator is based on the maximum length and 1.2 when it is based on the mean length.
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Our results complement the available evidence to support the claim that air pollu-
tion imposes a disproportionately large health burden on vulnerable groups of society.
Our focus on sick leaves and workers also highlights the perhaps less appreciated fact
that universal sickness insurance with a benet scheme for temporary disability helps
to alleviate unequal distributional impacts of air pollution by granting a ectedworkers
both access to treatment and time to heal.
2.7 Aggregate bene ts of air quality improvements
e estimation results allow us to compute a lower bound on the bene ts of improving
urban air quality in Spain. We proceed in two steps. First, we calculate the reduction
in sick days caused by a speci c improvement in air quality. To translate this into a
monetary bene t, we then multiply this number by the average daily producer wage
across workers. Under the assumption that workers are paid their marginal product,
this approximates the value of incremental production enabled by the reduction in sick
days. While improving air quality yields sizable additional bene ts by reducing mor-
tality, human su ering, and medical treatment costs, we focus on foregone production
because this component of the social costs of air pollution is directly linked to our
outcome variable and has not yet been quanti ed in previous research.
We start by considering a counterfactual intervention that enforces strict compli-
ance with the 24-hour standard for PM10 throughout the sample period. e average
share of worker days on which PM10 exceeded the EU limit value was 8.11% between
2005 and 2014. e IV point estimate implies that reducing this share to zero would
lower the absence rate by 0.017 percentage points (0.621% of the mean). Speci cally,
we calculate the increase in work a endance as
Δ̂ = 0.0811 · 7 · 0.00214 · 6,867,199 = 8,343worker days perweek
where the product of the rst two terms yields the expected reduction in high-pollution
days per week, the third term is the IV coe cient and the last term is the average num-
ber of social security a liates in our sample of 99 cities over the period. We multiply
this number with the daily producer wage in constant 2018 Euros, averaged across
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Table 2.7.1: Productivity benets of reducing PM10 exposure in urban Spain




𝑚3 to > 50
`𝑔
𝑚3 since 2005
Weekly Annual Weekly Annual Cumulative
absence production absence production absence production
[days] [e million] [days] [e million] [days] [e million]
Baseline -8,343 39.49 -13,254 62.74 -5.58m 505
± 4,814 ± 22.79 ± 8,204 ± 38.83 ± 3.22m ± 291
Adjusted for -11,657 55.18 -18,636 88.21 -7.80m 706
job security ± 6,266 ± 29.66 ± 10,938 ± 51.78 ± 4.19m ± 379
Notes: Panel I reports counterfactual productivity bene ts of strictly enforcing 24-hour standards for PM10 in terms of
reductions in (i) work days lost per week and (ii) incremental production. Counterfactual air quality improvements are
calculated relative to the observed PM10 concentrations in each city contained in the sample, weighted by the number
of social security a liates in that city. Enforcing a limit of 50 µg/m3 is binding on 8.11% of worker days in the sample
whereas a limit of 37.5 µg/m3 is binding on 20.73% of days. Panel II reports the cumulative bene ts of reductions in
worker exposure to daily 𝑃𝑀10 concentrations of 50 µg/m3 or more that have actually occurred in urban Spain since
2005.
workers and years20 to obtain annualized bene ts of
Ω̂ = 52 · Δ̂ · e91.0 = e39.5m.
To account for sampling error we include 95% con dence bands for all counterfactual
calculations reported in Panel I of Table 2.7.1.
Our IV estimate is based on a binary indicator for high-pollution events. In the
above exercise, this implies an assumption that PM10 concentrations below 50 µg/m3
are not harmful to human health. Yet the non-parametric OLS estimates displayed in
Figure 2.5.2 suggest that pollution increases absence rates even at lower PM10 con-
centrations of less than 40 µg/m3. We thus repeat the calculations for a scenario that
enforces strict compliance with 75% of the PM10 limit value throughout the sample
period. is new standard would be binding for 20.73% of worker-days. Using the
IV estimate for exceedances above 37.5 µg/m3 (reported in Table 2.A.4), we compute
a reduction in the absence rate of 0.027 percentage points and an increase in work
a endance by 13,254 days per week. e annual bene ts in terms of foregone produc-
20Averaging wages and employment across years is intended to dampen the impact of economic
uctuations on the bene t estimates. As shown by Figure 2.7.1 below, such uctuations were substantial
during the ten-year sample period.
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Figure 2.7.1: Trends in Pollution, Employment, and Wages 2005-2014
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2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Year
Affiliated workers (cities in the sample)
Real daily producer wage
Notes: Figure a) displays the share of worker days with PM10 concentrations exceeding the EU 24-hour limit of 50 µg/m3 (solid
line) and the share of worker days with concentrations in excess of 75% of the limit value (dashed line). e gure is based on our
sample of 99 Spanish cities with at least 40,000 inhabitants. PM10 concentrations are weighted by the number of social security
a liates in each city and year. Figure b) displays the number of workers a liated with the General Social Security Regime on
our sample of 99 Spanish cities with at least 40,000 inhabitants (solid line) and the daily producer wage, expressed in constant
2018 Euros (dashed line).
tion amount to e 62.74 million, which is a 59% increase compared to merely enforcing
the EU limit value. Hence, the additional bene ts of improving air quality beyond the
current EU standard for PM10 would be economically signi cant.
According to our results, high-pollution events cause an increase in sick leaves, but
this e ect is signi cantly lower among workers facing a high risk of job loss relative
to the sector average. If those workers go to work despite being sick we underestimate
the burden of air pollution. To gauge how sensitive our bene t estimates are to such
presenteeism, we repeat the above calculations a er eliminating idiosyncratic unem-
ployment risk. at is, we replace each worker’s estimated unemployment risk by the
smallest risk observed in the sector and predict the sick-leave response based on the
IV estimates reported in Table 2.6.2 which allow for di erential responses to pollution
depending on unemployment risk. e results for the two counterfactual scenarios
are reported in the bo om row of Table 2.7.1. is exercise shows that correcting for
presenteeism leads to bene t estimates that are 40% higher than in the baseline.
With these concepts in mind, we turn to evaluating the bene ts of actual air qual-
ity improvements that have taken place in urban Spain between 2005 and 2014. Fig-
ure 2.7.1a shows a strong decline in worker exposure to PM10 concentrations exceed-
ing the EU 24-hour limit (or 75% of that limit). In our sample of 99 cities, the share of
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worker-weighted days with PM10 concentrations in excess of 50 µg/m3 declined from
18.8% in 2005 to just under 2% in 2014.21 e cumulative bene t of this development is
a reduction inwork days lost by 5.58 (± 3.22) millionwhichwould have resulted in fore-
gone production worthe 505 million (±e 291 million). We calculate these numbers by
computing for each year from 2006 onwards the reduction in PM10 exposure relative
to 2005 and summing the associated bene ts across years in the sample. It is important
to note that this calculation is a ected quite strongly by major economic uctuations
that occurred during the sample period, depicted in Figure 2.7.1b. e years 2005 to
2007 were the nal years of a massive construction boom in Spain, with strong growth
in both employment and producer wages. e nancial shock and grand recession of
2008 triggered a prolonged economic crisis in Spain which caused dramatic declines
in those variables from 2009 onward. If we used 10-year averages of employment and
wages to compute bene ts as in the counterfactual simulations above, we would likely
overestimate the value of foregone production because air quality improvements were
largest during the crisis years. We account for this by using annual values.
As above, one can adjust the estimated bene ts of air quality improvements to
account for presenteeism in the impact estimates. is yields a reduction in work
days lost by 7.80 (± 4.19) million and a corresponding increase in production worth
e 706 million (±e 379 million). Irrespective of which number one prefers, this exercise
shows that the productivity-related bene ts of air quality improvements that occurred
in Spain between 2005 and 2014 were both economically and statistically signi cant.
2.8 Conclusion
We have conducted the rst nation-wide study of the impact of air pollution on work
absenteeism. Our application is based on a representative panel of urban workers af-
liated with the Spanish social security system. Using naturally occurring variation
in Sahara dust advection to instrument for ambient concentrations of PM10 we have
estimated causal relationships that give rise to a number of policy implications.
First, higher PM10 concentrations lead to more work absences, in particular for
levels of pollution that exceed the EU-mandated 24-hour limit value of 50 µg/m3. is
21 is improvement is in line with a broader pa ern observed in the G7 countries, where the mean
population exposure to PM2.5 fell by 35% between 1990 and 2017 (OECD, 2019).
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eect is economically signi cant even when sick leaves are valued only with the fore-
gone production during work days lost, a lower bound on the full social costs which
also include cost components related to loss of life, human su ering, andmedical treat-
ment. e implication is that policies aimed at reducing particulate ma er have non-
negligible health bene ts that are not accounted for in a sizable literature focusing on
severe morbidity and mortality outcomes. Our ndings also underline that air pollu-
tion damages human health for a broad range of symptoms and diagnosis chapters.
Second, our ndings corroborate that air pollution control is needed in particular
to protect vulnerable members of society, a policy implication rst derived in previous
research on infants and the elderly. Our analysis has contributed new evidence for the
working population by showing that workers in bad health su er disproportionately
from air pollution. From a public policy perspective, protecting the vulnerable is im-
perative on the grounds that there are no good substitutes for health. In such a se ing,
monetary compensation is a blunt instrument for mitigating unequal welfare e ects
of environmental externalities.
ird, we establish that workers who su er an adverse health shock due to air pol-
lution are less likely to take a sick leave the higher their individual risk of job loss.
As a consequence, such workers might fail to seek adequate treatment for their dis-
eases. is would likely decrease their productivity in the short run and might also
have detrimental health consequences in the long run.
We note several caveats. Our study is based on data from the social security system
which covers most but not all workers in Spain. Our results may thus not be represen-
tative of self-employed, unemployed and permanently disabled workers. Further data
limitations imply that our results may not be representative for workers in rural parts
of the country.
A cautionary note is due in regards to the use of OLS vs. IV estimates when deriving
policy implications. Although our use of high-dimensional xed e ects is well-suited
to control for non-random assignment of air pollution in an OLS regression, mismea-
sured pollution exposure likely causes a enuation bias in our application. Our discus-
sion of the results has predominantly relied on the IV estimates because they mitigate
this bias. However, their validity requires that PM10 originating from Sahara dust ad-
vection a ects sick leaves only by shi ing local PM10 concentrations, conditional on
weather and other controls. Based on the evidence available to us, we have argued that
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violations of the exclusion restriction are unlikely to drive our results. We note, how-
ever, that our interpretation of the IV coecient as a dose-response relationship for
urban PM10 concentrations is based on the premise that the pathological e ects of PM10
blown in from the Sahara are identical to those of urban PM10. Previous research on this
topic documents small but measurable di erences in the chemical and mineralogical
composition of those variables (Perez et al., 2008), but also suggests there are no di er-
ential health impacts (Stafoggia et al., 2016). We are aware that this does not constitute
ultimate proof of identical health e ects. Nonetheless, it lends empirical support to an
assumption that allows us to derive valuable, additional insights from our empirical
results. In making this assumption, we trade-o the remaining scienti c uncertainty
against the bene ts of having point estimates that are not only purged of a enuation
bias but also interpretable as dose-response relationships for PM10.22 Should future
research produce new evidence that makes the exclusion restriction untenable, this
would call for a reassessment of this trade-o and might suggest the adoption of an al-
ternative IV strategy. Even in such a scenario, however, our empirical framework still
provides intent-to-treat estimates suitable for evaluating work days lost due to long-
range transport of desert dust, which might become more relevant as the problems of
global climate change and deserti cation worsen.23
A nal caveat to be addressed here concerns the measurement of foregone produc-
tion due to sick leaves. We have proposed two alternative measures. e rst measure
only counts sick leaves that were actually taken. is conservative approach likely
underestimates the true value of foregone production because it fails to account for
the detrimental e ects of presenteeism on productivity in the short run (sick workers
perform worse on the job; Neidell, 2017), in the medium run (through delayed conva-
lescence), and in the long run (not treating minor conditions can lead to more severe
health conditions, as is the case with asthma). Our second measure additionally counts
sick leaves that would have been taken if all workers had the maximum level of job
protection. is addresses the issue of presenteeism, but it might entail overestima-
tion of work days lost if workers with high job protection are more prone to moral
hazard (e.g., because high job security lowers the cost of shirking). Whether or not
22 e la er bene t would not arise if we used alternative IVs suggested in the literature which shi
several air pollutants at a time.
23We report intent-to-treat estimates for the main speci cations in Appendix Table 2.A.16.
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this maers empirically depends on the margin of shirking. If moral hazard a ects the
extensive margin, i.e., through more false sick leaves, this should not a ect the treat-
ment e ect we estimate because the higher baseline absence would be absorbed by
worker xed-e ects. In contrast, if workers are able to shirk by taking more sick days
for each sick leave, this would provide a competing explanation for observing stronger
sick-leave responses to air pollution in jobs with low employment risk. Disentangling
moral hazard and presenteeism is beyond the scope of this chapter and le as a topic
for future research.
Overall, our study has shown that administrative data on sick leaves is very useful
for closing an important gap in the empirical valuation of the health impacts of air
pollution. We expect that researchers will continue to use this valuable data resource
in future work, and nd e ective ways of dealing with the above-mentioned issues
that arise with this new outcome variable.
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Table 2.A.1: Correlation of pollution measures
PM10 SO2 CO O3 NO2
PM10 1
SO2 0.212 1
CO 0.383 0.283 1
O3 -0.119 -0.201 -0.353 1
NO2 0.439 0.191 0.503 -0.479 1
Table 2.A.2: Distribution of days per week by pollutant and percent of limit value
PM10 CO SO2 NO2 O3
[50; 75) 26.2 0.0 0.1 22.9 41.0
[75; 100) 11.5 0.0 0.0 14.9 23.3
[100; 125) 4.3 0.0 0.0 8.8 4.2
[125,∞) 3.1 0.0 0.0 9.0 0.3
Notes: Each column reports the percentage share of days per
week with ambient concentrations for dierent quartiles of
the daily limit value stipulated by the EU. Limit values refer
to either 24-hour averages (for PM10 and SO2) or maximum
8-hour averages (for CO and O3). For NO2, the bins refer to
daily averages evaluated against the annual limit value, as
the EU has not de ned a daily limit value. All limit values
are reported in Table 2.2.1.
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Table 2.A.3: Estimates for PM10 with lags
(1) (2) (3)
Weekly absence rate
PM10 exceedance 0.203 0.172 0.178
(0.063) (0.061) (0.063)
Lag: PM10 exceedance 0.153 0.146
(0.066) (0.064)
Lag 2: PM10 exceedance 0.030
(0.068)
Estimator IV IV IV
Mean outcome 2.785 2.785 2.785
Observations 97,999,958
𝑅2 0.165 0.165 0.165
First-stage 𝐹 statistic 77.619 52.400 0.794
Notes: Coecients scaled by a factor of 100 for be er readability. All
regressions control for individual xed e ects, age xed e ects, city-
year xed e ects, year-quarter xed e ects, u prevalence and include
linear and squared terms of eight weather variables. Robust standard
errors in parentheses are clustered by city and by week.
Table 2.A.4: Non-linear e ects of PM10
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Weekly absence rate
PM10 >50% 0.025 0.112
(0.010) (0.042)
PM10 >75% 0.058 0.131
(0.013) (0.042)
PM10 >100% 0.070 0.214
(0.016) (0.063)
PM10 >125% 0.053 0.371
(0.026) (0.107)
Estimator OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Mean outcome 2.791 2.791 2.791 2.791 2.791 2.791 2.791 2.791
Observations 100,739,754
𝑅2 0.165 0.165 0.165 0.165 0.165 0.165 0.165 0.165
First-stage 𝐹 statistic 131.104 252.482 79.861 38.481
Notes: Coe cients scaled by a factor of 100 for be er readability. All regressions control for individual xed
e ects, age xed e ects, city-year xed e ects, year-quarter xed e ects, u prevalence and include linear




Table 2.A.5: IV estimates for PM10 excluding Canary Islands
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Weekly absence rate




Estimator OLS IV OLS IV
Mean outcome 2.769 2.769 2.769 2.769
Observations 98,057,059
𝑅2 0.165 0.165 0.165 0.165
First-stage 𝐹 statistic 71.840 192.776
Notes: Coecients scaled by a factor of 100 for be er readability. All regres-
sions control for individual xed e ects, age xed e ects, city-year xed e ects,
year-quarter xed e ects, u prevalence and include linear and squared terms
of eight weather variables. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered
by municipality and by week.










Mean outcome 2.791 2.791
Observations 100,739,754
Efron’s 𝑅2 0.169 0.169
Notes: Coe cients scaled by a factor of 100 for bet-
ter readability. Mean marginal e ects evaluated at the
mean in brackets, multiplied by 100 to be comparable
to the linear regressions. All regressions control for in-
dividual xed e ects, age xed e ects, city-year xed
e ects, year-quarter xed e ects, u prevalence and in-
clude linear and squared terms of eight weather vari-
ables. Robust standard errors for the coe cients in
parentheses are clustered by city and by week.
95
CHAPTER 2. URBAN AIR POLLUTION AND SICK LEAVES
Table 2.A.7: Eects of PM10 on ICD-9 Diagnosis Groups
ICD-9 Chapter Number and Name Coe cient Mean
I Infectious and Parasitic Diseases 0.003 0.065
(0.006)
II Neoplasms 0.004 0.094
(0.004)
III Endocrine, Nutritional and Metabolic Diseases, 0.001 0.019
Immunity Disorders (0.001)
IV Diseases of the Blood and Blood-forming Organs -0.001 0.007
(0.000)
V Mental Disorders 0.037 0.294
(0.009)
VI Diseases of the Nervous System and Sense Organs 0.015 0.093
(0.006)
VII Diseases of the Circulatory System -0.000 0.088
(0.002)
VIII Diseases of the Respiratory System 0.001 0.134
(0.009)
IX Diseases of the Digestive System 0.009 0.098
(0.006)
X Diseases of the Genitourinary System -0.003 0.053
(0.004)
XI Complications of Pregnancy, Childbirth, 0.002 0.077
and the Puerperium (0.003)
XII Diseases of the Skin and Subcutaneous Tissue -0.001 0.025
(0.003)
XIII Diseases of the Musculoskeletal System 0.017 0.581
and Connective Tissue (0.018)
XIV Congenital Anomalies 0.000 0.006
(0.001)
XV Certain Conditions originating 0.000 0.001
in the Perinatal Period (0.000)
XVI Symptoms, Signs and Ill-de ned Conditions 0.041 0.274
(0.010)
XVII Injury and Poisoning 0.017 0.281
(0.011)
Observations 100,739,754
Notes: Each row comes from a separate regression. Coe cients scaled by a factor of 100 for be er readability. All
regressions control for individual xed e ects, age xed e ects, city-year xed e ects, year-quarter xed e ects, u
prevalence and include linear and squared terms of eight weather variables. Robust standard errors in parentheses
are clustered by municipality and by week.
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Table 2.A.8: Treatment eects by gender
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female Male
PM10 exceedance 0.077 0.259 0.062 0.173
(0.028) (0.088) (0.016) (0.053)
Estimator OLS IV OLS IV
Mean outcome 3.410 3.410 2.249 2.249
Observations 46,995,784 53,743,967
𝑅2 0.165 0.165 0.163 0.163
First-stage 𝐹 statistic 76.222 82.814
Notes: Coe cients scaled by a factor of 100 for be er readability. All regres-
sions control for individual xed e ects, age xed e ects, city-year xed ef-
fects, year-quarter xed e ects, u prevalence and include linear and squared
terms of eight weather variables. Robust standard errors in parentheses are
clustered by city and by week.
Table 2.A.9: Treatment e ects by age
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
≤ 34 > 34 & ≤ 45 > 45
PM10 exceedance 0.052 0.143 0.078 0.218 0.080 0.277
(0.018) (0.049) (0.020) (0.070) (0.034) (0.105)
Estimator OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Mean outcome 2.045 2.045 2.485 2.485 3.899 3.899
Observations 35,276,558 32,718,271 32,744,309
𝑅2 0.141 0.141 0.179 0.179 0.209 0.209
First-stage 𝐹 statistic 82.294 82.243 73.378
Notes: Coe cients scaled by a factor of 100 for be er readability. All regressions control for individ-
ual xed e ects, age xed e ects, city-year xed e ects, year-quarter xed e ects, u prevalence and
include linear and squared terms of eight weather variables. Robust standard errors in parentheses are
clustered by city and by week.
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Table 2.A.10: Treatment eects interacted with age
(1) (2)
Weekly absence rate
PM10 exceedance 0.070 0.212
(0.017) (0.065)
PM10 exceedance × age 0.002 0.006
(0.001) (0.003)
Estimator OLS IV
Mean outcome 2.791 2.791
Observations 100,739,754
𝑅2 0.165 0.165
First-stage 𝐹 statistic 37.167
Notes: Coe cients scaled by a factor of 100 for be er read-
ability. All regressions control for individual xed e ects, age
xed e ects, city-year xed e ects, year-quarter xed e ects,
u prevalence and include linear and squared terms of eight
weather variables. Robust standard errors in parentheses are
clustered by city and by week.
Table 2.A.11: Treatment e ects by household type
(1) (2) (3) (4)
No kids below 12 Kids below 12
PM10 exceedance 0.069 0.230 0.086 0.176
(0.017) (0.067) (0.024) (0.075)
Estimator OLS IV OLS IV
Mean outcome 2.866 2.866 2.561 2.561
Observations 75,836,283 24,902,425
𝑅2 0.184 0.184 0.182 0.182
First-stage 𝐹 statistic 77.394 86.277
Notes: Coe cients scaled by a factor of 100 for be er readability. All regres-
sions control for individual xed e ects, age xed e ects, city-year xed e ects,
year-quarter xed e ects, u prevalence and include linear and squared terms
of eight weather variables. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered
by city and by week.
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Table 2.A.12: Treatment eects by skill level
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High skilled Low skilled
PM10 exceedance 0.076 0.226 0.066 0.205
(0.021) (0.084) (0.019) (0.064)
Estimator OLS IV OLS IV
Mean outcome 2.022 2.022 3.042 3.042
Observations 24,822,994 75,916,027
𝑅2 0.150 0.150 0.171 0.171
First-stage 𝐹 statistic 70.057 82.737
Notes: Coe cients scaled by a factor of 100 for be er readability. All regres-
sions control for individual xed e ects, age xed e ects, city-year xed ef-
fects, year-quarter xed e ects, u prevalence and include linear and squared
terms of eight weather variables. Robust standard errors in parentheses are
clustered by city and by week.
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Table 2.A.14: Treatment eects by unemployment risk - split sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Low risk High risk
PM10 exceedance 0.095 0.278 0.043 0.152
(0.019) (0.083) (0.018) (0.053)
Estimator OLS IV OLS IV
Mean outcome 3.126 3.126 2.459 2.459
Observations 50,853,937 49,345,546
𝑅2 0.172 0.172 0.154 0.154
First-stage 𝐹 statistic 79.815 78.924
Notes: Coe cients scaled by a factor of 100 for be er readability. All regres-
sions control for individual xed e ects, age xed e ects, city-year xed ef-
fects, year-quarter xed e ects, u prevalence and include linear and squared
terms of eight weather variables. Robust standard errors in parentheses are
clustered by city and by week.
Table 2.A.15: Treatment e ects by health status
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Weekly absence rate
PM10 exceedance 0.074 0.157 0.076 0.163 0.085 0.189
(0.019) (0.084) (0.020) (0.088) (0.020) (0.090)
× absence share 0.579 2.488
(0.354) (0.710)
× absence max length 0.411 1.816
(0.283) (0.604)
× absence mean length 0.465 2.866
(0.478) (0.749)
Estimator OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Mean outcome 2.915 2.915 2.915 2.915 2.915 2.915
Observations 74,706,090
𝑅2 0.176 0.176 0.177 0.177 0.176 0.176
First-stage 𝐹 statistic 38.477 38.498 38.493
Notes: Coe cients scaled by a factor of 100 for be er readability. All regressions control for individual xed
e ects, age xed e ects, city-year xed e ects, year-quarter xed e ects, u prevalence and include linear and
squared terms of eight weather variables. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by city and by
week.
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Table 2.A.16: Reduced-form regression for main specications
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Weekly absence rate
Calima 0.0412 0.042 0.026 0.028 0.032
(0.0142) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016)
× unemployment risk -0.018
(0.006)
× absence share 0.438
(0.133)
× absence max length 0.434
(0.144)
× absence mean length 0.644
(0.171)
Mean outcome 2.791 2.798 2.915 2.915 2.915
Worker-by-week observations 100,739,754 100,199,483 74,706,090
𝑅2 0.165 0.165 0.176 0.177 0.176
Notes: Coe cients scaled by a factor of 100 for be er readability. All regressions are estimated by OLS and control
for individual xed e ects, age xed e ects, city-year xed e ects, year-quarter xed e ects, u prevalence and
include linear and squared terms of eight weather variables. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered
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Notes: Each bar represents the average percentage share of days in a given month classied as a Calima episode, based on data
from the Spanish Ministry for the Ecological Transition (2018).
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Excludes spells longer than 20 days.
Notes: e gure shows a histogram of the duration of sick leaves in days. Spells longer than 20 days are not depicted. Source:
Own representation based on data from the Spanish Ministry of Employment, Migration and Social Security (2018).
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Notes: e gure shows the shares of the 15 most common ICD-9 diagnosis codes for absence spells with a reported diagnosis.
Source: Own representation based on data from the Spanish Ministry of Employment, Migration and Social Security (2018).
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XV: Certain Conditions originating in the Perinatal Period
XIV: Congenital Anomalies
IV: Diseases of the Blood and Blood−forming Organs
III: Endocrine, Nutritional and Metabolic Diseases, and Immunity Disorders
XII: Diseases of the Skin and Subcutaneous Tissue
X: Diseases of the Genitourinary System
I: Infectious and Parasitic Diseases
XI: Complications of Pregnancy, Childbirth, and the Puerperium
II: Neoplasms
VII: Diseases of the Circulatory System
VI: Diseases of the Nervous System and Sense Organs
IX: Diseases of the Digestive System
VIII: Diseases of the Respiratory System
XVI: Symptoms, Signs and Ill−defined Conditions
XVII: Injury and Poisoning
V: Mental Disorders
XIII: Diseases of the Musculoskeletal System and Connective Tissue
Notes: e gure shows the shares of all ICD-9 diagnosis chapters for absence spells with a reported diagnosis. Source: Own
representation based on data from the Spanish Ministry of Employment, Migration and Social Security (2018).
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Figure 2.B.5: Geographic coverage
(a) Cities in the sample
(b) Location of air quality monitors




Non-anthropogenic sources, for example wildres, can in uence air quality negatively.
erefore, when determining whether current PM10 levels violate EU limit values, ob-
served air pollution may be adjusted downward to account for such e ects. In Spain
and Portugal, the most important natural factor augmenting PM10 is Saharan sand dust
advection, known as “Calima”. e magnitude of a Calima event, the PM10 discount,
may be subtracted from actual PM10 readings before determining whether an EU limit
value has been exceeded.
A consortium of research institutions (including the Spanish National Research
Council’s Institute of Environmental Assessment and Water Research, the Spanish
State Meteorological Agency, the Spanish Research Center in Energy, Environment
and Technology as well as the Nova University Lisbon and the University of Huelva)
generates annual reports which identify exceedances of the daily limit value of PM10
caused by Calima events and quantify the PM10 discounts. e magnitude of Calima
events is quanti ed using 29 rural background air quality monitors which are located
in nine di erent geographic regions covering Spain and Portugal and measure PM10
on a daily level.
e researchers of the consortium identify Calima episodes in each of the nine
regions and on each day based on sources like the European Center for Medium-Range
Weather Forecasts (ECMWF) or the dust forecast of the Barcelona Supercomputing
Center (DREAM). If a day and region is deemed to be a ected by a Calima event,
PM10 discounts are determined using measures from the rural background air quality
stations.
e discount can be interpreted as the deviation of PM10 on a givenCalima day from
concentrations observed on days una ected by Calima. e exact PM10 discount at
the rural background station is calculated as follows. Based on daily measurements of
ambient PM10, one determines the 40th percentile of PM10 in a moving time window of
30 days, where the current day lies in the center of the window and all days a ected by
Calima events are dropped24. e PM10 discount is the di erence between the current
day’s observation and the 40th percentile. In the case that the di erence is negative,
24 e 40th percentile is used because it was found to be the best predictor of local PM10 conditional
on the day not being a ected by sand dust.
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the PM10 discount is set to zero. A city then can reduce its compliance-relevant PM10
reading by the PM10 discount reported by the closest rural background station, but only
on days which were deemed to be aected by Calima events. In addition, we de ne a
daily Calima indicator which takes value one if on a given day a city’s applicable PM10
discount is strictly positive, and zero otherwise.
2.D Estimation of unemployment risk
We obtain estimates for individual unemployment risk by relating a worker’s observed
characteristics to the estimated impact of these characteristics on job loss. is ap-
proach is inspired by the labor literature. For example, Card (1996) uses predicted
wages as a proxy for skills in order to study the impact of unions on workers with
di erent skill levels. In contrast, we aim to quantify an individual’s probability of be-
coming unemployed.
To do so, we rst need to de ne a measure of job loss. As the MCVL contains only
limited information on unemployment status, we proxy for job loss bymissing employ-
ment entries in the dataset. at is, we de ne job loss by the absence of employment
information in the following month. Other than unemployment, there are two prin-
cipal reasons for why workers may have a missing employment entry in the dataset.
First, workers who retire will by de nition have no employment entry. erefore, the
estimation excludes all workers aged 65. Second, some workers exit the MCVL sam-
ple at the end of the year. To control for this, we include a dummy for the month of
December in the estimation of job loss probability.
We de ne unemployment risk in two steps. In the rst step, we regress observed
job loss on worker characteristics. In the second step, we use the estimated coe cients
to quantify the probability of job loss for each worker.
For step 1, we estimate a logistic regression model of the probability of job loss of
worker 𝑖 living in city (municipio)𝑚 at the end of year-month 𝑡 :




𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒 (𝑚) + 𝜖𝑖𝑚𝑡 )
(2.3)
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Since we expect that unemployment risk varies widely across sectors, we estimate
this equation separately for each one of nine sectors 𝑠 (agriculture, manufacturing,
construction, trade, information and communication, nance, professional services,
public, and other services; see Figure 2.A.13 for more detailed de nitions). Workers
who switch sectors will therefore also switch the estimation subset. e vector 𝑥𝑖𝑡
contains dummies for a temporary contract, being female, and for having Spanish na-
tionality. It further includes quadratic polynomials in the worker’s age, tenure in the
current rm, and total labor market experience. e coe cient \ captures the e ect
that workers might leave the MCVL at the end of the year for reasons unrelated to job
loss. Furthermore, the equation includes year e ects ` and province e ects𝜓 .
We quantify each worker’s individual unemployment risk by predicting her prob-
ability of job loss based on the sector-speci c coe cient estimates in Equation (2.3).
e prediction is evaluated using the rst week of data available for the worker, and
plugging the respective values of 𝑥𝑖𝑡 , year, and province, into the ed model for the
sector 𝑠 in which the worker is working. We constrain \̂ to be zero to obtain a mea-
sure of unemployment risk also for observations drawn from the month of December.
is results in a single measure of unemployment risk for each worker. We do not
re-estimate this measure for all the other weeks, but treat unemployment risk as a
xed worker-speci c measure. Hence, even if a worker changes sector, she will keep
her initial unemployment risk. Before using this variable for further analysis, we drop
all observations that were used to predict worker-level unemployment risk from the
sample.
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Chapter 3
e Bene ts and Costs
of Driving Restriction Policies:
e Impact of Madrid Central
on Congestion, Pollution
and Consumer Spending
Joint with Jose-Enrique Galdon-Sanchez, Ricard Gil, and Guillermo Uriz-Uharte
3.1 Introduction
By now, there is wide consensus both within and outside economics that air pollution
is harmful to people’s health. While part of the literature establishes the causal link
between air pollution and health outcomes (e.g. Chay and Greenstone, 2003b), much
ongoing research also studies the consequences of air pollution beyond health out-
comes. In fact, bad air quality has been associated with less cognitive development
(Bharadwaj et al., 2017), lower educational and schooling a ainment (Ebenstein et al.,
2016), crime (Carrillo et al., 2018), or lower productivity (Chang et al., 2016), among
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others.1 Given the evidence, it is not surprising that high air pollution levels across
the globe have driven the implementation of a wide array of policies and regulations
at dierent levels of government.
is chapter contributes to the policy debate on the bene ts and costs of such envi-
ronmental policies. A typical policy to improve local air quality are tra c restrictions,
which are an example of drastic command-and-control regulations with unevenly dis-
tributed costs and bene ts. While tra c restriction regulations have been found to be
e ective and reduce outpatient visits (Simeonova et al., 2019), ambulance calls (Zhong
et al., 2017), hospitalizations and mortality (He et al., 2019a), and pharmaceutical ex-
penditures (Rohlf et al., 2020), we know li le on the indirect e ect of these policies on
economic activity. Indeed, a reduction in economic activity may change the percep-
tion of these pollution-reducing policies by the public. On the one hand, measuring
the costs on economic activity allows regulators and policy makers to determine the
net gain of implementing these policies. On the other hand, the implementation of
these policies may a ect di erent stakeholders di erently by spatially redistributing
economic activity and potentially generating a division betweenwinners and losers. In
other words, xing a local pollution hot spot might require measures that impose dras-
tic costs borne by few individuals but generate bene ts for many others. is chapter
contributes to the discussion of the costs of environmental regulation by evaluating the
impact of a driving ban implemented in downtown Madrid, known as Madrid Central,
on tra c congestion, air pollution, and economic activity.
Madrid Central (“MC” herea er) is a Low Emission Zone in the city center of
Madrid aiming to reduce air pollution through a decline in tra c congestion, and to
raise air quality to European Union standards. To achieve this goal, the regulation re-
stricts entry of cars in the center of the city of Madrid (a zone that we will refer to
as “MC area”) to people living elsewhere. is policy raises a stark tradeo . Lower
emissions in the city center will be a direct bene t of these regulations. However, by
restricting access by car, transportation costs are likely to increase for those consumers
living outside the MC area, potentially discouraging consumption and retail sales in
1 e list of outcomes potentially a ected by air pollution goes beyond those listed here and reaches
out to infant mortality and other health outcomes in the developing world (Currie and Neidell, 2005;




businesses within the MC area. Our work empirically examines and documents this
tradeo between cleaner air and lower retail sales in two distinct sections.
First, using data from the European Environmental Agency and the city of Madrid
on air quality and vehicle tra c, we assess the direct e ect of the regulation on tra c
congestion and air pollution in downtown Madrid relative to other areas within the
city and its greater metropolitan area. We use di erence-in-di erence speci cations to
estimate the e ect of MC on congestion and pollution where the MC area zip codes are
treated and the period post-MC is the treatment period. Our ndings show signi cant
decreases in tra c volume and air pollution in the MC area zip codes relative to other
areas in Madrid. In particular, we nd that the number of cars per hour in the MC
area decreased by 14.7% and the concentration of nitrogen dioxide (NO2), a harmful
pollutant, decreased by 13.6% in the MC area. Moreover, we do not nd any evidence
of spillovers to areas adjacent to MC in terms of NO2 but a reduction in tra c in close-
by areas.
Second, we use data on credit card transactions to evaluate changes in retail spend-
ing within the MC area before and a er the implementation of MC. ese data on con-
sumer spending span from the rst week of 2015 to the tenth week of 2019, while MC
was introduced in the rst week of December 2018. e data set is unique in that it
details the date of each transaction, the zip code of residence of the credit card owner
(buyer’s zip code) and the zip code of the selling establishment (seller’s zip code). We
aggregate this information weekly for each buyer zip code–seller zip code pair. As
a result, we can e ectively measure “trade ows” between all zip codes within the
metropolitan area of Madrid before and a er the introduction of MC.
We use a triple di erences identi cation strategy in a gravity model, exploiting the
fact that MC only has a direct impact on those buyers who live outside theMC area and
make all or part of their purchases in the center of Madrid. Following this strategy, we
are able to estimate the impact of MC on consumers traveling to downtown Madrid
to do their shopping, (1) relative to the shopping of these same consumers in other
areas of the city not directly a ected by MC, and (2) relative to the shopping in the MC
area of consumers living within the MC area, as they are e ectively exempt from the
MC regulation. e exceptional granularity of our data allows us to mitigate threats
to identi cation by estimating a very demanding speci cation that controls for time-
varying supply and demand shocks in speci c areas of the city.
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We nd an 8.9% decrease in the value of brick-and-mortar spending and a 12.1%
increase in the value of online spending of buyers residing in zip codes outside the MC
area in establishments within the MC area. Moreover, it appears that the increase in
online spending is, statistically speaking, o se ing the decrease in brick-and-mortar
spending. is nding opens the possibility of a policy debate linking environmen-
tal and e-commerce regulation that favors e-commerce adoption by consumers, retail
establishments and small and medium-sized enterprises.
Additionally, our triple di erences strategy accounts for the possibility that MC
may not only have a ected transportation costs for a group of consumers but also in-
creased the a ractiveness of Madrid’s city center for all shoppers. Our speci cation
allows for seller-speci c shocks and compares the behavior of consumers living inside
and outside the MC area. is precludes the identi cation of the potential increase of
the a ractiveness of the MC area for all consumers. We can examine this pathway in
a simple di erence-in-di erence speci cation, comparing sales inside and outside the
regulated area. We nd no impact of MC on sales when using data aggregated at the
seller-zip code level. Together with the previous results, this suggests the a ractive-
ness of the MC area does not decrease.
Although a large number of papers investigate the health and air quality bene ts of
di erent versions of driving bans and low emission zones, only a few papers study the
e ects on economic outcomes such as labor supply decisions and local commerce. Most
recently, Blackman et al. (2018) and Blackman et al. (2020) use the contingent valuation
method based on surveys in Mexico City and Beijing to estimate the costs faced by
drivers due to driving restriction programs. Viard and Fu (2015) is the paper closest to
ours. e authors show that tra c restriction policies in Beijing reduced the number
of hours of labor supplied by a ected workers. Besides these works, research on the
impact of driving bans on economic outcomes is almost nonexistent. Our work di ers
from those in a number of ways. First, we present a well-founded and comprehensive
empirical analysis of the impact of a tra c restriction on economic activity. Second,
our credit card transaction data allow us to measure economic activity in a robust
manner as trade ows between zip codes within Madrid. ird, identi cation relies
on a well-de ned triple di erence strategy where we utilize geographical variation in
the application of the policy within the city of Madrid. Fourth and last, our data allow
us to separate brick-and-mortar from online transactions. erefore, we are also able
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to demonstrate that the diusion and adoption of e-commerce may dilute part of the
potentially negative impact of pollution-reducing policies on retail sales.
Our ndings also contribute to a sound literature on the causes and consequences of
air pollution, as well as that on the optimization and evaluation of pollution-reduction
policies (see reviews and papers by Parry et al., 2007; Gra Zivin and Neidell, 2013;
Currie and Walker, 2011, 2019). We examine a particular type of policy aiming to
reduce tra c congestion and air pollution by limiting the number of cars allowed to
circulate in a heavily congested part of a city. Madrid is not the rst city to implement
a program of this nature, and consequently ours is not the rst study evaluating the
e ciency and e cacy of such environmental policies. Examples of cities that have
implemented similar tra c-related policies and their respective studies are Mexico
City (Eskeland and Feyzioglu, 1997; Davis, 2008; Salas, 2010; Gallego et al., 2013;
Oliva, 2015), ito (Carrillo et al., 2016), Santiago de Chile (Gallego et al., 2013; Rivera,
2017; Barahona et al., 2020), San José – Costa Rica (Osakwe, 2010), London (Leape,
2006; ddus et al., 2007), Bogotá (Zhang et al., 2017), Stockholm (Simeonova et al.,
2019), Taipei (Chen and Whalley, 2012), Beijing (Chen et al., 2013; Viard and Fu, 2015;
Zhong et al., 2017), as well as a number of other Chinese (Lin et al., 2011; Li, 2016; Ye,
2017; Li et al., 2019) and German cities (Wol , 2014; Gehrsitz, 2017).
We view our ndings as novel within the existing literature, and important for
policy evaluation and future policy design. On the one hand, our results con rm that
pollution-reducing policies aiming at tra c control can be e ective. On the other hand,
our analysis considers the role of e-commerce a enuating potential back re of some of
these policies on economic activity. An implication of our results is that combining en-
vironmental friendly policies with regulation that helps retail and small and medium-
sized enterprises transition from brick-and-mortar to e-commerce could be socially
bene cial. Our results are also informative about the role that e-commerce may play
in shaping consumption spending and competition pa erns in modern cities.
e structure of this chapter is as follows. Section 3.2 describes in detail the regula-
tion. In Section 3.3, we describe the data. Section 3.4 evaluates whether the regulation
was e ective in reducing tra c congestion and pollution in the MC area. Section 3.5
examines changes in consumption spending pa erns due to the introduction of MC.
Section 3.6 concludes.
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Figure 3.2.1: Map of Madrid Central within the City of Madrid
Notes: e green line marks the part of Madrid’s city center subject to the regulations of Madrid Central.
3.2 Madrid Central
e city council of Madrid, Spain, enacted a city-speci c tra c regulation, known
as Madrid Central, on November 30, 2018. is regulation restricted access by car
to an area of 472 hectares located in the Madrid city center.2 Figure 3.2.1 shows the
extension of the a ected area, which is the historic center of Madrid as well as the
main commercial and leisure district of the city.3
WhenMCwent into e ect, local authorities noticeably restricted entry by car to the
a ected area, so access may only be granted under exceptional circumstances. ese
exceptions are based on the emission category of vehicles. All vehicles are classi ed in
2 e city of Madrid has a total surface of 60,400 hectares.





ve di erent categories according to their emission level (A, B, C, ECO and ZERO in
descending order of emissions).4 Accordingly, the city elaborated a list of exceptions
that we list as follows:
(i) Residents of the MC area can enter the MC area without restrictions. If they
were to buy a new car, it would need to belong to category B or cleaner to enter
without restrictions. All cars of category B or cleaner can enter if they park in a
public or private garage.5
(ii) Access of delivery vehicles is subject to time restrictions.
(iii) Commercial and industrial vehicles with a parking permit for residential areas
of the MC area are allowed to access the MC area. New permits are only handed
out for vehicles of category B or cleaner.
(iv) People with reduced mobility are not subject to restrictions.
(v) ZERO emission cars are not subject to restrictions.
(vi) ECO emission cars can enter to park for a maximum of two hours.
(vii) Taxis and ride-hailing vehicles can enter if they are of category B or cleaner.
(viii) Public transport vehicles are not subject to restrictions.
As a result, the population most a ected by these regulations is the non-residents of
theMC area. at segment of the population cannot access theMC area at all with their
own vehicles if they belong to category A, and can only access to park in a garage if
they belong to category B or cleaner. is implies, for instance, that non-residents are
not allowed to park in the street or access theMC area to pick up or drop o passengers
if their vehicles are not classi ed as ECO or ZERO.
e rst day of implementation of the MC regulations was November 30, 2018.
During its rst month, large tra c signals indicated the perimeter of the MC area and
the prohibition of entry. Moreover, local police monitored tra c and informed those
drivers in violation of the new regulation without imposing any nes. In January 2019,
4Category ZERO refers to electric and hybrid vehicles with a range of more than 40 km. Category
ECO refers to hybrid vehicles with a range of less than 40 km and gas vehicles. Category C refers to
gasoline vehicles registered a er 2006 (EURO 4, 5 and 6) and diesel vehicles registered a er 2014 (EURO
6). Category B refers to gasoline vehicles registered a er 2000 (EURO 3) and diesel vehicles registered
a er 2006 (EURO 4 and 5). Category A comprises all other vehicles.
5Owners and tenants of private garages need a permit. e plates of vehicles accessing public
garages are automatically registered.
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the local authorities introduced an automatic monitoring system based on cameras
installed at all access points of the MC area. e system registered license plates and
informed violating drivers by postal mail of the infraction, without imposing any nes.
FromMarch 16, 2019, violations were ned 90e. Our data and analysis cover this initial
period up to March 16, 2019.6 Once we have described in this section the regulation
and timing of MC, we proceed with our estimation of the impact of MC on tra c
congestion, air pollution, and retail sales.
3.3 Data
To perform our analysis, we combine two di erent sources of data. First, we use data
on tra c, local air pollution and meteorological conditions. Second, we gain access
to proprietary data on credit card spending at the transaction level that we can aggre-
gate up to pairs of zip codes for buyer-seller locations within the metropolitan area of
Madrid. While the former data allow us to quantify the direct bene ts from the driving
ban on tra c congestion and air pollution, the la er data will help us quantify indirect
costs of the driving ban on consumer spending.
We collected these data not only for the MC area but for the whole metropolitan
area of Madrid. Since there is no legal de nition for the metropolitan area of Madrid,
we de ne the metropolitan area of Madrid as the area that includes: (1) all zip codes
within the city of Madrid, and (2) all zip codes at least partially inside a bu er of 5
km around the perimeter of Madrid.7 We divide the city of Madrid into the MC area
and the rest of the city. Overall, the full metropolitan area comprises 126 zip codes (56
within the city of Madrid and 70 outside). As the credit card data span from the rst
week of 2015 to the tenth week of 2019, we obtain all other data for the same period.
6 is chapter investigates whether the policy had a dissuasive e ect during its initial phase and
nds a clear and robust reduction in car tra c as a result of the introduction of MC during our period of
analysis. While also interesting, our work does not examine whether compliance increased a er March
16, 2019, when nes became enforceable. Future research should pursue and answer that particular
question.
7We check the robustness of our ndings to alternative de nitions.
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3.3.1 Trac and pollution data
We obtain tra c data from the Madrid Department of Tra c Technology published
through the city’s open data portal.8 e majority of data comes mostly from tra c
lights, but also from other types of sensors. e raw data are reported in 15-minute
intervals. First, we drop erroneous observations and outliers in the 99.9th percentile.
en, we aggregate each monitor’s readings to the daily level if tra c is observed at
least 80 times during a given day. Finally, we aggregate all daily monitor data to the
weekly level, conditional on observing every day of the week. e resulting dataset is
an unbalanced panel of 4,152 tra c monitors across the city of Madrid. Tra c outside
Madrid city is unobserved.
Tra c is measured by the number of vehicles per hour, the share of time (in %) a
certain road section is occupied by a vehicle, and the share of road capacity utilized
(in %). Summary statistics in Table 3.3.1 show that tra c is denser in the city center of
Madrid where, on average, 28% of the road capacity is used during the week, compared
to 20% outside of the city center. Because highway M-30 is a major ring road that helps
intercity tra c bypass the center of Madrid as well as connect commuting tra c to
reach the city center, a signi cant number of tra c monitors are purposely located
on this major road, which explains the high number of vehicles observed at monitors
outside the city center.
Because EU regulation de nes limit values on NO2 and other pollutants,9 cities are
obliged to install air quality monitoring stations. e European Environmental Agency
(EEA) collects measures from all member countries and makes them publicly available.
ere are 33 stations reporting NO2 levels across the metropolitan area.10 Importantly,
one of these 33 stations is located inside the MC area. We use information from this
station to estimate treatment e ects, considering the rest of the stations as the control
group.
e limit value for the mean annual NO2 concentration speci ed by the EU reg-
ulation is 40 µg/m3. As any reading of a station whose daily average is higher than
8Retrieved from https://datos.madrid.es/portal/site/egob/menuitem.c05c1f754a33a9 e4b2e4b284f
1a5a0/?vgnextoid=33cb30c367e78410VgnVCM1000000b205a0aRCRD&vgnextchannel=374512b9ace9f
310VgnVCM100000171f5a0aRCRD&vgnextfmt=default
9Directive 2008/50/EU. See https://ec.europa.eu/environment/air/quality/standards.htm
10Appendix Figure 3.B.1 shows a map with locations of all pollution monitoring stations in Madrid,
represented by pink circles. Blue crosses in the map indicate the location of weather stations.
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40 µg/m3 contributes to the potential violation of this regulation, we create an indica-
tor that takes value one if a station’s daily average NO2 reading exceeds 40 µg/m3. We
aggregate all daily NO2 readings at the weekly level.11 Table 3.3.1 summarizes weekly
and annual mean NO2 levels and the percentage share of days with NO2 exceeding
40 µg/m3. One can see that both, at the station inside the MC area and at the stations
outside that area, NO2 levels are very high according to EU standards. e daily av-
erage concentration inside the MC area is 47 µg/m3, while it is 38 µg/m3 outside the
MC area. We also calculate the share of station-by-year observations that violate the
limit value imposed by EU regulation. Table 3.3.1 shows that, during the sample pe-
riod, the station inside the MC area exceeds the limit value every year. Moreover, other
stations outside the city center also violate the threshold. is happens in 47% of all
observations.
It is worth noting that meteorological conditions can heavily a ect air quality. For
example, sunlight is a key component in the decomposition of NO2. It is therefore im-
portant to control for local weather conditions when studying determinants of air qual-
ity (Au ammer et al., 2013). For this reason, we use data from the European Climate
Assessment Dataset (ECAD), which provides daily measures of several meteorological
variables across Europe. We match the pollution measurement data collected by each
pollution monitoring station in the city to its closest available weather measurements
from the ECAD dataset (represented with a blue cross in Appendix Figure 3.B.1). We
consider data on daily mean temperature, precipitation, cloud cover, humidity, pres-
sure, wind speed, and wind direction. All these weather variables could in uence the
complex chemistry of air quality and are commonly used in the literature on air quality.
Again, we aggregate all readings to the week-level. To account for the e ect of weather
on driving, we repeat this matching procedure for linking weather data to tra c mon-
itors. Table 3.3.2 shows summary statistics on key meteorological variables. Due to
the matching algorithm of weather conditions to air quality observations, the unit of
observation in Table 3.3.2 is the pollution monitor station level.12 In our data, tem-
perature is measured in degrees Celsius, precipitation in tenths of millimeters, cloud
11 e aggregation of pollution and meteorological control variables could introduce measurement
error. However, results on air pollution using daily observations including day-of-week xed e ects are
consistent with the weekly estimations. Daily results are available from the authors upon request.




Table 3.3.1: Descriptive statistics on trac and pollution levels
Mean SD Min Max Obs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Inside Madrid Central area
Tra c (101 stations)
Vehicles per hour 334.76 291.8 0 1,715.28 15,548
Time occupied [%] 10.65 9.73 0 98.51 15,544
Utilized capacity [%] 27.66 10.8 3.51 61.16 15,548
Pollution (1 station)
NO2 [µg/m3] 47.43 12.13 26.96 95.69 216
NO2 > 40 µg/m3 0.65 0.3 0 1 216
Yearly NO2 [µg/m3] 47.84 2.46 44.39 49.99 5
Yearly NO2 > 40 µg/m3 1 0 1 1 5
Outside Madrid Central area
Tra c (4051 stations)
Vehicles per hour 454 509.41 0 4,354.98 604,808
Time occupied [%] 6.51 7.28 0 98.33 604,557
Utilized capacity [%] 19.92 10.84 0 99.56 603,920
Pollution (32 stations)
NO2 [µg/m3] 38 16.96 3.82 133.44 6,971
NO2 > 40 µg/m3 0.4 0.35 0 1 6,971
Yearly NO2 [µg/m3] 40.05 10.95 14.93 76.14 160
Yearly NO2 > 40 µg/m3 0.47 0.5 0 1 160
Notes: e table shows descriptive statistics based on weekly station-level data.
cover in okta,13 daily sunshine in hours, pressure in hectopascal, humidity in percent-
age terms, wind speed in tenths of meters per second and wind direction is indicated
by eight equally sized bins.
3.3.2 Consumption spending data
e nal database contains data at the credit card transaction-level from a large Eu-
ropean bank.14 e original data set is unique in that it details the date of each trans-
130 okta indicates no clouds and 8 okta full cloud cover.
14For simplicity, we refer to credit card transactions, but these include both credit and debit card
transactions. e raw data includes all credit card transactions of consumers livingwithin themetropoli-
tan area of Madrid that are made, either online or o ine, in establishments within the metropolitan area
of Madrid with a credit card of the bank providing the data. Approximately, the data covers 15% of all
transactions in the area, and can be considered as a representative sample of the credit card purchasing
behavior in the overall population of the area. Galdon-Sanchez et al. (2020) provide a detailed description
of the database.
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Table 3.3.2: Descriptive statistics on weather conditions
Mean SD Min Max Obs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Temperature [°C] 15.68 7.69 1.23 30.87 7,187
Precipitation [0.1mm] 10.69 18.21 0 158.29 7,187
Cloud cover [okta] 3.42 1.77 0 7.71 7,187
Sunshine [h] 8.19 2.97 0.97 13.91 7,187
Pressure [hPa] 1,017.38 6.2 994.9 1,035.49 7,187
Humidity [%] 57.96 15.62 22.29 92.86 7,187
Wind speed [0.1 m/s] 22.56 10.36 1.71 80.14 7,187
0° ≤ Wind direction < 45° 0.22 0.22 0 1 7,187
45° ≤ Wind direction < 90° 0.14 0.18 0 0.86 7,187
90° ≤ Wind direction < 135° 0.09 0.13 0 0.86 7,187
135° ≤ Wind direction < 180° 0.05 0.1 0 0.57 7,187
180° ≤ Wind direction < 225° 0.12 0.16 0 1 7,187
225° ≤ Wind direction < 270° 0.2 0.2 0 1 7,187
270° ≤ Wind direction < 315° 0.11 0.15 0 1 7,187
315° ≤ Wind direction < 360° 0.07 0.12 0 1 7,187
Notes: e table shows descriptive statistics on weather conditions at each pollution monitoring
station, where weekly weather is obtained from the closest weather monitor.
action, the zip code of residence of the credit card owner (buyer-zip code) and the zip
code of the selling establishment (seller-zip code).15 Due to our con dentiality agree-
ment with the bank providing the data, we aggregate transaction information at the
weekly buyer-seller zip code level from the rst week of 2015 to the tenth week of
2019. Figure 3.3.1 shows all 126 zip codes in Madrid. Six zip codes belong to the MC
area, 50 zip codes to the rest of the city of Madrid, and 70 zip codes are outside the city
of Madrid but inside the metropolitan area of Madrid. ose zip codes (even partially)
inside the MC area appear in black, zip codes outside the MC area and inside the city
appear in orange, and purple zip codes are those outside the city of Madrid but inside
the greater metropolitan area.
Table 3.3.3 presents summary statistics for the main variables of our analysis ag-
gregated at the weekly seller-buyer zip codes level. e average value of “trade ows”
between zip codes is 2,087e coming from on average 54 transactions. e average
value of a transaction is 29e. A unique feature of our data is that we are able to sep-
arate transactions into two types: brick-and-mortar transactions (B&M in the tables)
and online transactions. is is an important feature because it allows us to test the
15A zip code in our context is comparable to a 5-digit zip code in the US.
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Figure 3.3.1: Map of zones and postal codes
Notes: e black lines mark zip codes subject to the regulations of Madrid Central. e orange lines mark unregulated zip codes
inside the city of Madrid. e purple lines mark unregulated zip codes outside the city of Madrid but in the greater metropolitan
area.
transportation cost mechanism given that transportation costs increase for brick-and-
mortar transactions and they do not for online transactions. Introducing this additional
level of heterogeneity enriches the substitution pa erns between zip codes within and
outside the MC area. On the one hand, when consumers’ demand for brick-and-mortar
transactions is elastic, higher transportation costs will prompt consumers residing out-
side the MC area to substitute their former purchases in the MC area for purchases in
other areas. On the other hand, those consumers with inelastic demand for products
from a speci c treated zip code may substitute to online transactions. is second sce-
nario is more likely when the retailer sells a di erentiated good and, therefore, it is
costly to nd a suitable brick-and-mortar transaction substitute outside the MC area.
e majority of ows are from 51 brick-and-mortar transactions with a total value of
1,955e, on average. e total value of online transactions is on average 132e, coming
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Table 3.3.3: Descriptive statistics on sales
Mean SD Min Max
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total value 2,087.29 9,644.52 0 606,469
B&M value 1,954.69 9,488.51 0 606,469
Online value 132.59 633.51 0 126,363
Total transactions 53.87 268.20 0 16,696
B&M transactions 51.13 264.92 0 16,605
Online transactions 2.73 14.08 0 701
Total transaction value 28.73 39.44 0.09 9,227.47
B&M transaction value 27.59 38.74 0.09 9,227.47
Online transaction value 16.18 72.46 0.12 31,539.1
Share of obs with 0 total value 0.22
Share of obs with 0 B&M value 0.23
Share of obs with 0 online value 0.71
Notes: e table shows descriptive statistics on sales at the weekly seller-buyer level.
from three online transactions. Additionally, 23% and 71% of weekly seller-buyer zip
codes observations are zero for brick-and-mortar and online transactions, respectively.
Table 3.3.4 presents basic summary statistics related to selling and purchasing pat-
terns across zip codes in Madrid. e top half of Table 3.3.4 details summary statistics
at the seller-zip code level. We can see how the share of revenue coming from online
sales changes across zip codes in di erent areas. While zip codes in the MC area pro-
duce 85.6% of their revenue from brick-and-mortar sales, the percentage increases for
zip codes in the rest of the city of Madrid and outside the city (90% and 95%). More-
over, the mean value of brick-and-mortar and online transactions also changes across
zip codes. Finally, the last two rows in the top half of the table show the share of sales
that establishments in the MC area are selling to di erent areas of Madrid. Not sur-
prisingly, we see that brick-and-mortar sales are tilted towards consumers in the local
zip code. Zip codes in the MC area sell, on average, 5.62% of their sales to each of the
zip codes in the MC area but only 0.21% to each of the zip codes outside the city of
Madrid. Geographical proximity also ma ers for online sales (as documented by Blum
and Goldfarb, 2006). On average, 1.84% of the online sales from zip codes in the MC
area go to each of the six zip codes in this area, 1.34% go to each of the 50 zip codes in
Madrid city and only 0.4% to each of the 70 zip codes outside of the city of Madrid.
e bo om half of Table 3.3.4 reports statistics on consumer behavior by buyer-
seller-zip code dyad. Consumers living in the MC area carry 45.2% of their brick-
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Table 3.3.4: Descriptive statistics on consumption
MC Area Madrid City OutsideMadrid City
(1) (2) (3)
Number of zip codes 6 50 70
Seller-zip code statistics
Share of revenue coming from B&M sales 85.6% 90% 95%
Mean value of B&M sales 38.28 36.75 41.1
Mean value of online sales 63.2 44.58 54.79
Mean share of B&M sales by zip codes
in Madrid Central to each of the zip codes in
MC, Madrid City, or outside Madrid City
5.62% 1.12% 0.21%
Mean share of online sales by zip codes
in Madrid Central to each of the zip codes in
MC, Madrid City, or outside Madrid City
1.84% 1.34% 0.40%
Buyer-zip code statistics
Share of B&M purchases in MC 45.2% 8.9% 4.3%
Share of online purchases in MC 20.3% 18.70% 14.80%
Share of B&M purchases in local zip code 27% 28.50% 38.70%
Share of online purchases in local zip code 13.10% 15.10% 14.3%
Notes: e table shows descriptive statistics on selling and purchasing pa erns at the weekly level.
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and-mortar purchases and 20.3% of their online purchases in establishments inside
their area. ese shares decrease monotonically with the distance to MC. Consumers
in other zip codes of the city of Madrid make, on average, 8.9% of their brick-and-
mortar purchases and 18.7% of their online purchases in establishments within the
MC area. For consumers living outside the city, these numbers decrease to 4.3% of
brick-and-mortar purchases and 14.8% of online purchases. e last two rows show
how much consumers living in di erent areas of Madrid spend within their local zip
code. As the share of brick-and-mortar sales that consumers make in their local zip
code is concerned, we see that consumers outside the city tend to spend more (38.7%
of their total brick-and-mortar expenditures) than consumers elsewhere. By contrast,
we do not see large di erences across areas in the propensity to buy online in the local
zip code (13.1% for consumers in MC, 15.1% for consumers in the city, and 14.3% for
consumers outside the city).
3.4 e e ect of Madrid Central on tra c
and air quality
e main goal of the regulation of MC is to reduce tra c in the city center of Madrid
and thereby lower air pollution. In this section, we study whether the policy achieved
that goal. MC focuses on the reduction of NO2, a pollutant mainly emi ed by vehicles,
as the city of Madrid repeatedly violated NO2 limit values de ned by European Union
environmental regulation. A er de ning our empirical strategy, we show our results
of the impact of MC on tra c and air pollution.
3.4.1 Research design
We estimate the e ect of MC on tra c or NO2 levels using the following regression
equation.
𝑌𝑠𝑤𝑦 = 𝛽𝑀𝐶𝑠𝑤𝑦 + 𝛿𝑋
′
𝑠𝑤𝑦 + `𝑠𝑤 + 𝜏𝑤𝑦 + 𝜖𝑠𝑤𝑦 (3.1)
𝑌𝑠𝑤𝑦 stands for the tra c or pollution outcome of interest at the tra c or air qual-
ity monitor station 𝑠 , week 𝑤 , and year 𝑦. It is important to note that the tra c and
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air quality monitors are not identical. e variable𝑀𝐶𝑠𝑤𝑦 is a dummy that takes value
one if station 𝑠 is inside the MC area in a year-week in which MC is in e ect. e
vector 𝑋 ′𝑠𝑤𝑦 includes controls for meteorological conditions at the location of station 𝑠 ,
week 𝑤 , and year 𝑦. erefore, the coe cient 𝛿 captures the e ect of weather on air
pollution levels.16 For example, these would control for the case that the introduction
of MC coincided with the wind blowing from a direction that induces lower pollution
levels in the MC area. Moreover, we include station-week xed e ects `𝑠𝑤 to control
for season-speci c pa erns at each monitoring station. is set of xed e ects con-
trols for instance for the case that during the Christmas season many shoppers go to
the city center, increasing tra c and pollution levels. e variable 𝜏𝑤𝑦 controls non-
parametrically for time trends and year-week-speci c shocks. is variable controls,
for example, for the celebration of speci c events a racting many visitors to the city
and a ecting pollution levels. e error term 𝜖𝑠𝑤𝑦 is potentially serially correlated, so
we cluster standard errors at the station level. By using this speci cation, we aim to
consistently estimate the e ect of MC on air pollution, captured by 𝛽 , while controlling
for possible confounding factors.
Our estimation strategy requires common trends in treated and untreated stations
once we account for all control variables. is could fail, for instance, if people living
in the MC area were substituting their old cars for electric vehicles at a faster pace than
people in other areas of Madrid were. To account for this, we also allow for station-
speci c trends. Our estimates could still be compromised if there were other policies
introduced at the same time as MC, a ecting tra c or pollution levels in speci c areas
of the city. If, for instance, a metro line covering the city center opens at the same time
as the introduction of MC, we could wrongly a ribute the metro’s positive e ect on
air quality to MC. We are not aware of any policy change or intervention of this type
during the time span of our data set.17
16 is includes second order polynomials of temperature, precipitation, cloud cover, humidity, pres-
sure and wind speed, as well as wind direction indicators interacted with station indicators.
17In January 2019, the City Council of Madrid reduced the speed limit on highway M-30 in order to
decrease pollution levels. As this route does not cross the MC area, if anything, we would expect the
policy to decrease pollution levels in the control group.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Madrid Central −48.500 −1.936 −5.679 −0.147 −0.178 −0.228
(12.130) (0.850) (0.776) (0.025) (0.050) (0.038)
Location-Week FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Week FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weather Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean dep. var. 456.300 6.571 20.190 5.648 1.493 2.905
N×T 597,221 596,895 596.328 597,031 592,874 571.518
N 3948 3948 3948 3948 3927 3823
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the station level. e variable Madrid Central takes value 1 when a station is located
within the MC area and the MC regulations are in place, and 0 otherwise. e weather controls are second order polyno-
mials of temperature, precipitation, cloud cover, humidity, pressure and wind speed, as well as wind direction indicators
interacted with station indicators.
3.4.2 Results
Table 3.4.1 presents the results of estimating Equation (3.1) for the three measures of
tra c, in levels and logs, with standard errors clustered at the station level. We nd
large e ects of MC on tra c. e average number of cars dropped by 48.5 (column 1),
or 14.7% (column 4). MC reduced the frequency of road segment usage by cars by 1.9
percentage points (column 2), or 17.8% (column 5). A decrease in these two measures
implies that roads are used less, in fact, road capacity utilized under MC decreased by
5.7 percentage points (column 3), or 22.8% (column 6). ese estimates are not only
statistically signi cant at the 1% level while clustering at the monitoring station level,
but also are economically signi cant magnitudes.
Because those that cannot enter the restricted area may park in areas close by, or
not drive to the center at all, MCmight generate spatial spillover e ects (either positive
or negative) in tra c levels to nearby areas. In fact, our initial regression speci cation
may be overestimating the decrease in tra c in the restricted area. To account for
the spillover, we include a dummy variable in Equation (3.1) that takes value one if
station 𝑠 is inside a 1.5 km bu er around the MC area in a year-week in which MC is
enforced.18 Appendix Table 3.A.2 shows that the net spillovers are positive, i.e. that
18Results are robust to de ning alternative bu ers around the MC area. ese are available upon
request.
128
3.4. THE EFFECT OF MADRID CENTRAL ON TRAFFIC AND AIR QUALITY
trac is also reduced in streets close to the regulated area. As expected, the magnitude
of the reduction is smaller than inside the MC area. One can also see that not account-
ing for positive spillover e ects leads to an underestimation of the absolute e ect on
tra c inside the MC area.
Table 3.4.2 presents the results on air quality. We cluster the standard errors in all
speci cations at the air qualitymonitor level. In column 1, we use the log of the average
weekly level of NO2 as the dependent variable. Our ndings suggest a decrease of 16%
in NO2 in the restricted area due to the introduction of MC. De ning the three closest
stations inside the 1.5 km bu er around the MC area (see Appendix Figure 3.B.1) as its
immediately adjacent area, the results in column 2 show that (i) the estimated reduction
in pollution levels in the MC area remains unchanged, and (ii) there is no evidence of
net spillovers to adjacent areas. is result could be due to the fact that the reduction
of tra c in the surroundings is not strong enough or because the composition of cars
outside the regulated area is una ected. We repeat the same exercise in column 3,
considering spillovers to any station within the city of Madrid. e e ect on the MC
area is now slightly smaller in magnitude, but we nd no evidence of spillovers neither
towards adjacent areas nor to areas in the rest of the city. ese estimates cannot be
compared to the results on tra c, as tra c outside the city of Madrid is unobserved.
In columns 4 to 6, we show results of running the same speci cationwith a di erent
dependent variable, the share of days of a week in which NO2 levels exceed 40 µg/m3.
Our ndings here are consistent with those in columns 1 to 3, suggesting a decrease of
12 percentage points in the days of a week in which NO2 levels exceed 40 µg/m3. is
represents a 25% reduction relative to the sample mean. ese results are con rmed by
Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood Poisson regressions in Appendix Table 3.A.3, where the
outcome is the number of days in a given week in which the limit value was exceeded.
3.4.3 Robustness checks
Our results appear to remain unchanged both qualitatively and quantitatively when
including station-speci c trends (Appendix Table 3.A.4). In a separate speci cation,
we also include the air quality monitoring stations located in Barcelona as a control
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Table 3.4.2: Eects on NO2 levels
Log NO2 NO2 > 40
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Madrid Central −0.162 −0.163 −0.136 −0.121 −0.122 −0.111
(0.017) (0.018) (0.038) (0.015) (0.016) (0.031)
Surroundings −0.008 0.018 −0.015 −0.004
(0.032) (0.046) (0.029) (0.030)
City of Madrid 0.036 0.015
(0.042) (0.034)
Station-Week FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Week FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weather Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean dep. var. 3.545 3.545 3.545 0.408 0.408 0.408
N×T 7187 7187 7187 7187 7187 7187
N 33 33 33 33 33 33
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the station level. e variables take value 1 when a station
is located in the indicated area and the MC regulations are in place, and 0 otherwise. e weather
controls are second order polynomials of temperature, precipitation, cloud cover, humidity, pres-
sure and wind speed, as well as wind direction indicators interacted with station indicators.
group and nd that results remain mostly unchanged, except for a small reduction in
the impact on the share of days exceeding 40 µg/m3 (Appendix Table 3.A.5).
Finally, as only a single station is treated and the number of clusters is relatively
small (33), we also implement the Synthetic Control Method to estimate the impact of
MC on air quality in downtown Madrid (Abadie et al., 2010). e station located inside
the MC area is matched to a number of monitors outside the MC area based on pre-
treatment data of air quality. Each control monitor receives a certain weight, such that
the weighted mean of the control monitors’ readings predicts air quality at the treated
monitor. e algorithm chooses weights to minimize the mean squared error of these
predictions. While one could try to nd optimal weights by predicting every single ob-
servation of air quality at the treated monitor prior to intervention, we only choose a
subset of NO2 readings to be matched. From the beginning of 2015 to mid-2018, i.e. the
25th week of 2018, we only consider air quality from every 20th week to avoid over t-
ting. A er that, we consider all readings until the 47th week of 2018. Treatment begins
in the 49th week of 2018. In addition, we also match on the pre-treatment average of
NO2. We do not make use of weather controls as additional matching variables since,
by construction, most stations face almost exactly the same weather conditions. Be-
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2015w1 2016w1 2017w1 2018w1 2019w1
Year-Week
Treated Controls
Notes: e gure plots synthetic control estimates. e black line marks the treated station, the gray lines the controls. All lines
plot the di erence between a actual measurement and a prediction based on controls stations. e vertical line indicates the
introduction of Madrid Central.
fore running the algorithm, we deseasonalize each station’s data. e matched stations
provide good predictions of pre-treatment NO2 concentrations at the station inside the
MC area with an R-squared of 0.88.
Figure 3.4.1 shows the e ect on the treated station (in black). It seems that, at
the beginning, MC was not yet e ective. However, a er some weeks, it decreased NO2
levels by close to 50%. We cannot calculate standard errors, but repeat the analysis with
a placebo treatment for each other monitor (in gray). Comparing the results from these
stations, we see that the 50% drop can be interpreted as an unusually large deviation.
Abadie et al. (2010) suggest that an e ect is signi cant if the estimated e ect of the
treated unit is unusually large compared to the distribution of placebo estimates. ey
propose that one should not simply compare mean squared prediction errors of treated
and placebo units in the post-treatment period, but scale these errors by the respective
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mean squared prediction errors in the pre-treatment period. In our case, we nd that
the ratio of mean squared prediction errors of the treated air quality station is larger
than the ratios of all 32 control stations.
3.5 e e ect of Madrid Central on consumption
spending
e results in Section 3.3 indicate that MC achieved its goal of reducing car tra c and
pollution levels in the city center of Madrid. However, this may come at the cost of
distorting citizens’ habits and market outcomes. One of the most salient and contro-
versial dimensions of these distortions is the possible impact that MC may have had
on consumption behavior. An increase in the cost of transportation to the MC area
can potentially discourage consumption in that area. In this section, we empirically
examine whetherMC actually a ected consumer behavior, and if so, how. Understand-
ing the costs of pollution-reducing policies is as important as evaluating their bene ts.
erefore, the results of this section may help policy makers derive conclusions for the
introduction of similar policies in the future.
Our theoretical framework yields predictions of the impact of an increase in trans-
portation costs (actual transportation costs or disutility through inconvenience) for
consumers living outside the MC area when they make purchases of goods and ser-
vices from businesses within MC area. In our context, changes in transportation costs
induced by MC should not directly a ect: (i) purchases of residents from the MC area
in businesses within the MC area; (ii) purchases of residents outside the MC area in
businesses outside the MC area, as the regulation only restricts tra c inside the MC
area; and (iii) purchases of residents from the MC area in businesses outside the MC
area. In other words, we are able to clearly de ne which “trade ows” are directly
a ected by the policy and which are una ected. erefore, the predictions from our
theoretical framework and our empirical analysis allow us to identify the impact of
the increase in transportation costs for those a ected, whilst controlling for demand
shocks and supply shocks at di erent zip codes.
Following this intuition, we aggregate transactions at the week level for each com-
bination of seller-zip code and buyer-zip code dyad available in the data. e resulting
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data set contains weekly information on how much consumers of each zip code are
buying from sellers of each zip code in Madrid.19
3.5.1 eoretical framework and research design
We build our identi cation strategy using a theoretical framework based on a standard
gravity model and the seminal work of Anderson (1979), Eaton and Kortum (2002)
and Baier and Bergstrand (2007). Assume a city with 𝑁 zip codes, and each zip code
has buyers and sellers. For simplicity, we consider buyers indexed by their zip code
𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑁 and sellers indexed by their zip code 𝑗 = 1, . . . , 𝑁 . e sellers in each
zip code sell an item di erentiated from all items sold in other zip codes. Buyers may
choose to buy items from any zip code, and sellers can sell to buyers from any zip
code. While this is e ectively a static model, we allow for multiple periods indexed
according to their week of the year𝑤 = 1, . . . ,𝑊 , and their year 𝑦 = 1, . . . , 𝑌 .
Consider then a representative consumer model with a CES demand function in
which the buyer residing in zip code 𝑖 , in week 𝑤 of year 𝑦, has to decide how much
to buy from each of the seller zip codes 𝑗 (𝑄𝑖 𝑗𝑤𝑦). ere is a seasonal (weekly) taste-
speci c shock \𝑖 𝑗𝑤 at the level of the buyer-seller-week. A seller of zip code 𝑗 cannot
price discriminate across di erent buyers and therefore sets a price 𝑃 𝑗𝑤𝑦 common to all
buyers. Moreover, buyers incur iceberg transportation cost 𝜏𝑖 𝑗𝑤𝑦 . Because we want to
study the impact of the introduction of MC on spending ows between zip codes, we
allow transportation costs to vary at the buyer-seller-week-year level. In our case, we
hypothesize that the introduction of MC will a ect the purchases in zip codes inside
the MC area from buyers in zip codes outside of MC area. erefore, the objective















19 is data structure is comparable to that found in the international trade literature for the esti-
mation of gravity equations (Head and Mayer, 2014; Atalay et al., 2019). Analogously to the trade
literature, our data allows us to study how “trade ows” between di erent geographical areas change
when transportation costs change exogenously.
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Each consumer maximizes her consumer surplus with respect to 𝑄𝑖 𝑗𝑤𝑦 taking prefer-
ences, prices and other parameters as given.
Let 𝑃𝑖𝑤𝑦 =
(∫
\𝑖 𝑗𝑤 (𝜏𝑖 𝑗𝑤𝑦𝑃 𝑗𝑤𝑦)1−𝜎𝑑 𝑗
) 1
1−𝜎 be the price index of buyer 𝑖 , in week 𝑤 of









be the total amount consumed by buyer 𝑖 ,
in week 𝑤 of year 𝑦. en, the total value of consumption by buyers residing in zip
code i, in establishments of sellers in zip code j, in week w of year y will be equal to
𝑃 𝑗𝑤𝑦𝑄𝑖 𝑗𝑤𝑦 = (𝑃𝜎𝑖𝑤𝑦𝑄𝑖𝑤𝑦) (𝑃1−𝜎𝑗𝑤𝑦 ) (\𝜎−1𝑖 𝑗𝑤 ) (𝜏−𝜎𝑖 𝑗𝑤𝑦)
Here we can see how an increase in transportation costs 𝜏𝑖 𝑗𝑤𝑦 , like the one induced
by the introduction ofMC, will reduce consumption levels.20 Moreover, this expression
can be mapped one-to-one (using logs) to the following equation that we will actually
estimate with our data,
𝑌𝑖 𝑗𝑤𝑦 = 𝛼𝑖𝑤𝑦 + 𝛾 𝑗𝑤𝑦 + 𝛿𝑖 𝑗𝑤 + 𝛽𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 𝑗𝑤𝑦 + 𝑢𝑖 𝑗𝑤𝑦 (3.2)
where𝑌𝑖 𝑗𝑤𝑦 measures (log) expenditures of residents in zip code 𝑖 in establishments
in zip code 𝑗 during week𝑤 of year 𝑦. e variable𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 𝑗𝑤𝑦 is a dummy variable
that takes value one if 𝑖 is a buyer-zip code outside the MC area, 𝑗 is a seller-zip code
inside the MC area, and we are in a week-year in which the MC regulations are in
e ect. Note this dummy is aimed to capture increases in transportation cost between
a zip code pair triggered by the introduction of MC, and that 𝛽 is the coe cient of
interest as it measures the e ect of MC on purchases of buyers from outside the MC
area in establishments inside the MC area once the policy is in e ect. Additionally,
20 e increase in transportation costs induced by the introduction of MCwill have a direct impact on
the level of purchases from buyer-zip codes outside of MC area in establishments inside the MC area. In
turn, if the reduction of consumption in MC area has spillovers in consumption levels in other zip codes,
these should be controlled for by the xed e ects structure. We will not be able to separate this indirect
e ect of the introduction of MC from aggregate shocks at the buyer-zip code level. However, note that
this impact should be economically small if the number of zip codes is large enough. We have 126 zip
codes, which should make our case comparable to the usual International Trade framework modeling
trade across countries.
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𝛼𝑖𝑤𝑦 is the buyer-by-week xed e ect, and 𝛾 𝑗𝑤𝑦 is the seller-by-week xed e ect.21
e variable 𝛿𝑖 𝑗𝑤 is the buyer-by-seller xed e ect speci c for each week of the year.
We allow this dyad-speci c xed e ect to vary by the week of the year to account for
seasonality pa erns (e.g. during Christmas time people living in the outskirts of the
city may disproportionately increase their shopping in the city center). Finally, 𝑢𝑖 𝑗𝑤𝑦
is the error term.
As a result, through Speci cation (3.2) we aim to identify the e ect ofMC on spend-
ing levels from buyers living in zip codes outside the MC area in establishments inside
the MC area, both relative to the shopping of these same consumers in other areas of
the city and relative to the shopping in downtown Madrid of consumers living within
MC area.
e coe cient of interest, 𝛽 , identi es the partial equilibrium e ect of the increased
transportation costs due to Madrid Central. Additionally, these cost changes also have
a general equilibrium e ect as a result of demand substitution. In the case of CES-
demand, this is captured by changes in the price index 𝑃𝑖𝑤𝑦 and, hence, they a ect
consumption spending of buyers located in zip codes outside of the MC area in all
seller-zip codes, both inside and outside of the MC area (Larch and Yotov, 2016; Pier-
martini and Yotov, 2016).22 In Equation (3.2), these changes in the price index 𝑃𝑖𝑤𝑦 are
captured by the set of buyer-by-week xed e ects 𝛼𝑖𝑤𝑦 .23
21 e buyer-zip code-week xed e ect 𝛼𝑖𝑤𝑦 and the seller-zip code-week xed e ect 𝛾 𝑗𝑤𝑦 would
correspond to the importer-period and exporter-period xed e ects in trade models. e parameter
𝛼𝑖𝑤𝑦 controls for changes over time in the average level of expenditures of people living in zip code 𝑖 .
e parameter 𝛾 𝑗𝑤𝑦 controls for changes in the a ractiveness of shopping in zip-codes inside the MC
area.
22A similar mapping exists for a logistic speci cation of demand to our estimates (e.g. Berry, 1994).
23Arguably, in addition to the increase in transportation for consumers living outside of the MC
area, the tra c ban also changed the a ractiveness of the MC area (e.g. because walking in that area is
nicer a er the introduction of MC). In our model, that would imply that \𝑖 𝑗𝑤 increases for all buyer-zip
codes 𝑖 when buying in zip codes 𝑗 that are in MC area a er the regulation came into e ect. Because
this is a general e ect for all buyer-zipcodes, its impact would be fully captured by the seller-by-week
xed e ect 𝛾 𝑗𝑤𝑦 . Our baseline speci cation will not allow us to separate this potential change in the
a ractiveness of seller-zip codes in the MC area from other supply shocks taking place simultaneously
in those places that are also captured by the seller-by-week xed e ect. To study whether there are
changes in the a ractiveness of the MC area, we show di -in-di results in Table 3.5.4.
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3.5.2 Results
We proceed next with our “gravity-like” methodology. Because the outcome variables
in this section are measured in logs and the spending ows between two zip codes in
a given week can be zero, we add the value one to the dependent variable of interest
throughout this section.24
We estimate 𝛽 from Speci cation (3.2) and show results of the triple di erence
estimation in Table 3.5.1. In columns 1 and 2, we use total transaction revenue as the
dependent variable and ndwith a statistically insigni cant decrease of 3% in spending
in the MC area by a ected consumers. Columns 3 to 6 examine the impact of MC on
brick-and-mortar and online transactions separately. While MC decreases brick-and-
mortar spending between 4.7 and 8.9%, it increases online spending between 9.4 and
12.1%. All four columns show statistically signi cant ndings. erefore, these results
suggest that, upon the increase in transaction costs due to the implementation of MC,
consumers in zip codes outside the MC area switched consumption spending from
brick-and-mortar to online transactions. Note that we show in Appendix Table 3.A.6
that mean transaction values for all, brick-and-mortar, and online transactions did not
statistically change due to the introduction of MC. Additionally, Appendix Table 3.A.7
regresses the share of online revenue and the share of online transactions per buyer-
seller zip codes dyad and nds results consistent with those in Table 3.5.1, as well as no
statistical change in the relative size of brick-and-mortar to online transaction values.
Estimates in Table 3.5.1 correspond to the partial equilibrium impact of Madrid
Central, as explained in Section 3.5.1. is means that the changes in consumption of
a ected consumers shopping inside the MC area are expressed relative to their total
consumption. In a general equilibrium context, this total consumption can also adjust
because of substitution e ects. For instance, the 9% decrease in brick-and-mortar con-
sumption in the MC area by a ected consumers is relative to the total consumption
of these consumers, which might change in general equilibrium. If substitution e ects
are only small, our estimates should also be close to the total e ects. If they are large,
the total e ect would be smaller than 9%. Because only ve out of 126 zip codes were
directly a ected by Madrid Central, we anticipate that general equilibrium responses
24Up to 14.1% of the dyad-week ows are zero in our sample. is is substantially lower than in usual
setups of country trade ows where there are around 50% of zeros (Helpman et al., 2008).
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Table 3.5.1: Baseline Results
Total B&M Online
Rev Trans Rev Trans Rev Trans
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment −0.039 −0.029 −0.090 −0.047 0.121 0.094
(0.038) (0.024) (0.040) (0.025) (0.061) (0.044)
Buyer-week-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Seller-week-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Buyer-seller-week FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,460,968 3,460,968 3,460,968 3,460,968 3,460,968 3,460,968
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the buyer-seller pair level. e dependent variable is log of revenue and
log of number of transactions for all transactions, brick-and-mortar and online transactions at the seller-zip
code by buyer-zip code level in a given week. e variable Treatment takes the value one when (1) a seller-zip
code is within the MC area and the MC regulations are in place, and (2) the buyer-zip code is outside the MC
area, and 0 otherwise.
do not play a large role. is clari cation does not a ect the result that aggregate
spending in the MC area by a ected consumers is unchanged, as we nd no e ect, but
it could ma er when we qualify the observed decrease in brick-and-mortar spending
and the increase in online spending.
An interesting departure from Speci cation (3.2) is one where we split the dummy
of interest,𝑀𝐶𝑖 𝑗𝑤𝑦 , into two: one for those buyers living in zip codes within the limits
of the city of Madrid (and outside theMC area), and one for those zip codes located out-
side the city of Madrid and still inside the metropolitan area of Madrid. is alternative
speci cation accounts for potential di erences in the set of available transportation op-
tions to the center of the city of Madrid. Because the policy restricts driving into the
city center, consumers now could consider other means of transportation. ose liv-
ing in zip codes closer to the MC area are more likely to be able to switch at low costs
by walking or taking public transport. By contrast, consumers living further away
from the MC area might nd it more di cult to substitute their car for other means of
transportation, as they are not able to walk to the city center and their access to public
transport is less convenient. In Appendix Table 3.A.8 we use estimates on travel times
from the Google Maps Distance API to show that the relative time loss when switching
from car to public transport is indeed larger for zip codes located farther away from
the city center. erefore, one would expect the impact of MC on consumers living
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Table 3.5.2: Heterogeneous eects
Total B&M Online
Rev Trans Rev Trans Rev Trans
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Zip codes city -0.0376 -0.0299 -0.0804 -0.0399 0.049 0.0763
(0.0394) (0.0251) (0.0418) (0.0261) (0.0629) (0.0454)
Zip codes out of city -0.0391 -0.0285 -0.0959 -0.0524 0.172 0.107
(0.041) (0.0254) (0.0441) (0.0265) (0.064) (0.0451)
Buyer-week-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Seller-week-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Buyer-seller-week FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
p-val equal e ects 0.956 0.921 0.581 0.4 0.00155 0.0699
Observations 3,460,968 3,460,968 3,460,968 3,460,968 3,460,968 3,460,968
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the buyer-seller pair level. e dependent variable is log of revenue and log of
number of transactions for the full sample, brick-and-mortar and online transactions at the seller-zip code by buyer-zip
code level in a given week. e variable Zip codes city takes value one when (1) the seller-zip code is within the MC area
and the MC regulations are in place and (2) the buyer-zip code is outside the MC area but within the city of Madrid, and 0
otherwise. e variable Zip codes out of city is de ned in the same way but for buyer-zip codes outside the city of Madrid.
farther away from the city to be more severe than for those living closer to the MC
area.
e results of this exercise are reported in Table 3.5.2. Columns 1 and 2 show that
MC did not have a statistically signi cant impact on total revenue or the number of
transactions, neither from Madrid city zip codes nor from zip codes outside of Madrid.
ese ndings are consistent with those shown in Table 3.5.1.
Next, we examine spatial heterogeneity of the impact of MC on brick-and-mortar
revenues and number of transactions. e results in columns 3 and 4 show that brick-
and-mortar revenues and transactions decrease across the board. e magnitude of the
decrease in revenues and transactions is larger for buyer-zip codes outside the city of
Madrid, although we cannot statistically reject the hypothesis that they are the same.
Interestingly, we nd opposite ndings regarding online transactions. Columns 5 and 6
show that online revenues and transactions increased across the board. e magnitude
of the increase is larger for revenues and transactions in buyer-zip codes outside the
city of Madrid, where the increase in transportation cost to the MC area is likely to be
largest. Moreover, we can reject the null hypothesis that the e ects on online transac-
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Table 3.5.3: Gravity
Total revenue B&M revenue Online revenue Share online revenue
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log distance
between zip codes -1.722 -1.767 -0.608 2.080
(0.0196) (0.0196) (0.0157) (0.0792)
Buyer-week-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Seller-week-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,460,968 3,460,968 3,460,968 3,460,968
Notes: Dependent variable: Log of revenue for all transactions, B&M and online transactions separately and percentage share
of online revenue. Standard errors are clustered at the buyer-seller pair level. e dependent variable is the log of revenue
for all transactions, brick-and-mortar and online transactions at the seller-zip code by buyer-zip code level in a given week
(cols. 1-3), and the percentage share of online revenue for that seller-buyer-week triple (col. 4). e independent variable is
the log of distance measured in km between the centroid of the seller-zip code and the centroid of the buyer-zip code. In all
columns, we control for seller-week-year speci c FE and buyer-week-year speci c FE.
tions are equal for buyer-zip codes inside and outside the city of Madrid.25 Again, this
indicates a substitution between brick-and-mortar and online consumption due to the
increase in transportation costs for residents living outside the MC area.
We have made two important observations. First, transportation costs ma er as
MC a ects consumer behavior. e increase in transportation decreases consumer
spending in brick-and-mortar establishments. Second, when transportation costs in-
crease, there is a switch from brick-and-mortar to online spending. We examine these
general mechanisms in Table 3.5.3 and nd that, indeed, consumption exhibits gravity.
Spending decreases with distance for both brick-and-mortar and online consumption.
But relatively, the impact of distance is greater for brick-and-mortar consumption such
that the share of online purchases increases with distance. is is important for two
distinct purposes. On the one hand, we show that transportation costs within a city
ma er. On the other hand, we con rm the need to control for seller-buyer zip codes
pair xed e ects to clear problems of endogeneity. e existence of gravity implies
that those buyers located furthest away from the MC area were buying li le in the MC
area to begin with. Consequently, the introduction of MC increased transportation
costs of those buyers located further away from the MC area to a greater extent. is
25Note that these ndings also provide an alternative way of testing the impact of MC on online
consumption levels of consumers living outside the city of Madrid by using as a control group online
consumption levels of consumers inside the city of Madrid and outside the MC area.
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means that we must include buyer-seller zip code xed e ects to avoid negative bias
in the estimation of the e ect of MC on consumption spending.26
As mentioned earlier, MC might not only a ect transportation costs for a group
of consumers but also increase the a ractiveness of Madrid’s city center for all shop-
pers. e triple di erences strategy accounts for this confounding factor by including
seller-speci c xed e ects and by comparing the behavior of consumers living inside
and outside the MC area. When including such xed e ects, our results show that con-
sumers living outside the MC area do not decrease their consumption in the MC area
relative to those living inside. However, this strategy precludes the quanti cation of
the potential increase of the a ractiveness of theMC area for all consumers. We can ex-
amine this pathway in a simple di erence-in-di erence speci cation, comparing sales
inside and outside the regulated area. Nevertheless, such a speci cation cannot con-
trol for unobserved supply shocks in di erent areas and demand shocks for di erent
groups of consumers. us, we should be careful in drawing strong conclusions from
a di erence-in-di erence speci cation of sales.
Aggregating Equation (3.2) to the seller-zip code level, we obtain the following
di erence-in-di erences speci cation.
𝑌𝑗𝑤𝑦 = 𝛼𝑤𝑦 + 𝛾 𝑗 + \ 𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽𝑀𝐶 𝑗𝑤𝑦 + 𝑢 𝑗𝑤𝑦 (3.3)
e outcome𝑌𝑗𝑤𝑦 measures howmuch sellers in zip code 𝑗 sell in week𝑤 of year𝑦. e
variable𝑀𝐶 𝑗𝑤𝑦 is a dummy that takes value one if seller 𝑗 is in a zip code inside the MC
area and in a week-year in which MC is in e ect. e parameter 𝛽 is the coe cient of
interest as it measures the e ect of MC on sales of establishments within the MC area
once the policy is in e ect. e parameter 𝛼𝑤𝑦 is the week-year xed e ect, 𝛾 𝑗 is the
seller-zip code xed e ect, and \ 𝑗𝑡 is a seller-zip code speci c time trend. erefore,
the identi cation of the e ect occurs conditional on the seller-zip code speci c level
and its trend. Finally, 𝑢 𝑗𝑤𝑦 is the usual error term.
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3.5.4 show an insigni cant increase of 5% in sales and a 6%
increase in transactions, which is signi cant at the 5% level. Note that this is a rather
convenient result for policy makers confronted with opposition by local business in
26Appendix Table 3.A.9 replicates Table 3.5.1 without buyer-seller-zip code xed e ects and shows
the importance of controlling for the underlying variation across zip code pairs.
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Table 3.5.4: Seller-zip code sales
Total B&M Online
Rev Trans Rev Trans Rev Trans
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Madrid Central 0.054 0.060 0.059 0.044 −0.026 0.068
(0.044) (0.027) (0.047) (0.028) (0.142) (0.163)
Week-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Seller FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Seller trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 27,594 27,594 27,594 27,594 27,594 27,594
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the seller-zip code level. e dependent
variable is the log of revenue for total transactions, brick-and-mortar and online
transactions at the seller-zip code level in a given week. e variable Madrid Cen-
tral takes value 1 when a seller-zip code is within the MC area and the MC regu-
lations are in place, and 0 otherwise.
the MC area: MC reduced tra c congestion and air pollution with no statistically
signi cant impact on economic activity. In columns 3 to 6, we split the revenue and
number of transactions at the seller-zip code level into brick-and-mortar and online
transactions but nd no signi cant e ects. Together with the previous results, this
could suggest a potential increase of the potential a ractiveness of the MC area.27
3.5.3 Robustness checks
A concern with our triple di erence speci cation is the potential existence of di erent
pretrends. erefore, di erent trends in the propensity of di erent buyer-zip codes
to buy in each seller-zip code could invalidate the results in Table 3.5.1. To address
this concern, in Table 3.5.5, we present results from a falsi cation test. We de ne
an additional falsi cation variable which assumes that the introduction of MC took
place approximately one month and a half before it actually did (it was introduced in
week 49 of 2018 and we assume it was introduced in week 43).28 We would expect to
observe some e ect if di erential trends play a role. is is not the case. is result
also allows us to rule out the existence of potential anticipatory e ects that might
induce consumers to bring forward consumption inMC area as a result of the imminent
increase in transaction costs.
27Appendix Table 3.A.10 shows that excluding zip code-speci c time trends yields no qualitatively
di erent results except for online sales.
28 e ndings in Table 3.5.5 are robust to using other placebo starting dates such as 4 or 8 weeks
before week 49 of 2018. ese results are available upon request.
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Table 3.5.5: Falsication Test
B&M Online Total
(1) (2) (3)
Treatment -0.0895 0.121 -0.0385
(0.0409) (0.0606) (0.038)
Falsi cation 0.00509 0.000127 0.0437
(0.048) (0.102) (0.0482)
Buyer-week-year FE Yes Yes Yes
Seller-week-year FE Yes Yes Yes
Buyer-seller-week FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,460,968 3,460,968 3,460,968
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the buyer-seller pair level. e de-
pendent variable is log of revenue and log of number of transactions for the
full sample, brick-and-mortar and online transactions at the seller-zip code by
buyer-zip code level in a given week. e variable Treatment takes value 1
when (1) a seller-zip code is within the MC area and the MC regulations are in
place, and (2) the buyer-zip code is outside the MC area, and 0 otherwise. e
variable Falsi cation is de ned in the same way but assumes that MC was in-
troduced six weeks earlier.
Another potential concern arises from the incidence of zeros in trade ows between
some zip code pairs. So far, we have adopted the traditional solution of adding one to
the dependent variable of interest to avoid dropping observations once we take logs.
Table 3.5.6 shows an alternative approach using Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood.
is method accommodates zero trade ows with no transformations of the dependent
variables since these are in levels (Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006). Column 1 shows
very similar results for the e ects on brick-and-mortar revenues. Column 2 nds a
positive impact of MC on online revenues. Column 3 shows that the impact on total
revenues is smaller in magnitude and statistically insigni cant. is set of results is
consistent with the main ndings in Table 3.5.1.
A third set of robustness checks is concerned with the fact that di erences in trans-
portation costs may have changed di erently across zip codes at the same physical dis-
tance. Table 3.5.7 presents further evidence consistent with the fact that an increase
in transportation costs drives the substitution between brick-and-mortar and online
consumption. Using the Google Maps Distance API, we calculate travel times by car
and public transport from the centroid of each zip code to the geographic centroid of
the MC area. We divide zip codes between those above and below the median of the
increase in travel time. We observe that, although the decrease in brick-and-mortar
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Table 3.5.6: Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood
B&M Online Total
(1) (2) (3)
Treatment -0.0797 0.0668 -0.0286
(0.031) (0.0246) (0.0299)
Buyer-week-year FE Yes Yes Yes
Seller-week-year FE Yes Yes Yes
Buyer-seller-week FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,460,968 3,460,968 3,460,968
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the buyer-seller pair level. e depen-
dent variable is revenue for brick-and-mortar, online and total transactions at
the seller-zip code by buyer-zip code level in a given week. e variable Treat-
ment takes value 1 when (1) a seller-zip code is within the MC area and the MC
regulations are in place, and (2) the buyer-zip code is outside the MC area, and
0 otherwise. Estimation by Poisson Maximum Likelihood.
sales is not statistically signi cant for zip codes with high and low travel time incre-
ments, those zip codes with a high increase in travel times drive the increase in online
purchases.
We also test a number of alternative speci cations. Appendix Table 3.A.11 shows
results of dividing buyer zip codes into two groups, closer and farther than 6 km from
theMC area, as well as results from dropping observations more than 15 km away from
the MC area. Appendix Table 3.A.12 includes speci cations where buyer-zip codes are
weighted by their volume of sales. It also includes other speci cations with week-year
xed e ects interacted with the distance between each zip code and the center of the
MC area to control for changes over time in spending behavior which correlate with
geographic consumer location. Our results are qualitatively robust to these alternative
speci cations.
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Table 3.5.7: Heterogeneity by Increase in Travel Time
B&M Online Total
(1) (2) (3)
Zip codes low increase -0.0915 0.0906 -0.0546
(0.0418) (0.0635) (0.0387)
Zip codes high increase -0.0876 0.148 -0.0239
(0.0448) (0.0641) (0.042)
Buyer-week-year FE Yes Yes Yes
Seller-week-year FE Yes Yes Yes
Buyer-seller-week FE Yes Yes Yes
p-val equal eects 0.893 0.151 0.276
Observations 3,460,968 3,460,968 3,460,968
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the buyer-seller pair level. e dependent
variable is level of revenue for brick-and-mortar, online and total transactions at
the seller-zip code by buyer-zip code level in a given week. e variable Zip codes
low increase takes value onewhen (1) the seller-zip code is within theMC area and
the MC regulations are in place and (2) the buyer-zip code faces a low travel time
increase, and 0 otherwise. e variable Zip codes high increase takes value one
when (1) the seller-zip code is within the MC area and the MC regulations are in
place and (2) the buyer-zip code faces a high travel cost increase, and 0 otherwise.
3.6 Conclusion
is chapter analyzes the bene ts and costs of the introduction of constraints to vehi-
cle circulation in the center of Madrid. By restricting access by car, transportation costs
increase for those consumers living outside the area a ected by the policy, potentially
discouraging consumption spending in that particular area. We show that the regu-
lation had the intended e ect of reducing tra c congestion in the a ected area, and
consequently we observe a signi cant decrease in air pollution. is rst set of results
clearly states direct bene ts from the implementation of MC in the city of Madrid.
However, our data allow for further investigation on the impact of the policy on
economic activity. In particular, we use credit card transaction data from a large bank
to examinewhether consumers a ected by the regulation reduced consumption spend-
ing in the city center of Madrid as a result of the increase in transportation costs. e
granularity of our data grants the identi cation of purchases of all possible pairs of
buyer zip codes and seller zip codes in the city of Madrid. Our ndings show that there
was not a statistically signi cant impact on total spending and number of transactions
due to the policy. Yet, when we separate brick-and-mortar and online transactions,
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we nd that brick-and-mortar spending and transactions by the directly a ected con-
sumers decreased while online spending and transactions by the a ected consumers
increased. e e ect of the policy is larger for those zip codes where buyers face larger
transportation constraints. is shows that when consumers face larger transportation
costs, they switch from brick-and-mortar to online consumption spending.
Driving bans impose a cost on consumers by making shopping in brick-and-mortar
establishments less a ractive. While air quality improvements are signi cant and pro-
vide large bene ts, brick-and-mortar commerce can be negatively a ected. Our re-
sults show that, on aggregate, consumers substitute to online purchases, which could
compensate the loss in brick-and-mortar spending. However, these substitutions are
usually made at di erent types of sellers so that a driving ban might have unintended
distributional e ects on smaller businesses.
us, our work contributes to the literature in that it provides evidence of the im-
pact of environmental policies on economic activity, more speci cally, on spending and
number of transactions of consumers in establishments directly a ected by the policy.
Most importantly, we o er evidence that these e ects are not homogeneous and vary
along di erent dimensions. A novel result in our analysis is the potential role played
by e-commerce in a enuating the impact of environmental regulation, and its implica-
tion for policy makers regarding e-commerce and online transactions. Future research
on the impact of environmental policies, regardless of the type of pollution regulated,
should aim to provide direct evidence of their cost through diminished economic ac-
tivity. Similarly, understanding the distributional e ects of such policies is a crucial
part of the information necessary for the design of future environmental regulations
and their respective policy implementations. Furthermore, our results speak about the
relevant role that e-commerce may play in smoothing the impact of increases in con-
sumer transportation costs generated by other factors than environmental regulations.
For instance, future research should study how consumers resorted to online purchas-
ing during lockdown periods through the Covid-19 pandemic and how e-commerce
adoption allowed establishments to weather such critical situation.
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Table 3.A.1: Descriptive statistics on weather conditions
Mean SD Min Max Obs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Temperature [°C] 15.63 7.74 3.39 30.87 616,297
Precipitation [0.1mm] 10.43 17.78 0 131.43 616,297
Cloud cover [okta] 3.45 1.76 0 7.57 616,297
Sunshine [h] 8.2 2.92 1.13 13.41 616,297
Pressure [hPa] 1017.25 6.09 998.21 1035.54 616,297
Humidity [%] 58.29 14.54 26.29 90.29 616,297
Wind speed [0.1 m/s] 19.73 8.46 0.43 75.43 616,297
0° ≤ Wind direction < 45° 0.19 0.19 0 1 616,297
45° ≤ Wind direction < 90° 0.17 0.18 0 0.71 616,297
90° ≤ Wind direction < 135° 0.1 0.14 0 0.86 616,297
135° ≤ Wind direction < 180° 0.05 0.1 0 0.57 616,297
180° ≤ Wind direction < 225° 0.1 0.14 0 0.86 616,297
225° ≤ Wind direction < 270° 0.22 0.21 0 1 616,297
270° ≤ Wind direction < 315° 0.12 0.15 0 0.86 616,297
315° ≤ Wind direction < 360° 0.06 0.1 0 0.86 616,297
Notes: e table shows descriptive statistics on weather conditions at each tra c station, where
weekly weather is obtained from the closest weather monitor.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Madrid Central -52.63 -1.987 -6.043 -0.153 -0.179 -0.241
(12.14) (0.85) (0.777) (0.0247) (0.0496) (0.0379)
Surroundings -25.51 -0.318 -2.248 -0.0375 -0.00897 -0.0899
(3.741) (0.171) (0.199) (0.00623) (0.0171) (0.0109)
Station-Week FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Week FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weather Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean dep. var. 456.3 6.571 20.19 5.648 1.493 2.905
N×T 597,221 596,895 596,328 597,031 592,874 571,518
N 3,948 3,948 3,948 3,948 3,927 3,823
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the station level. e variables take value 1 when a station is located in the indicated
area and the MC regulations are in place, and 0 otherwise. e weather controls are second order polynomials of temper-




Table 3.A.3: Eects on Air Pollution Levels: Poisson Regressions
NO2 > 40
(4) (5) (6)




City of Madrid 0.0308
(0.06)
Station-Week FE Yes Yes Yes
Year-Week FE Yes Yes Yes
Weather Controls Yes Yes Yes
Mean dep. var. 0.46 0.46 0.46
N×T 6,381 6,381 6,381
N 33 33 33
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the station level. e vari-
ables take value 1 when a station is located in the indicated area and
the MC regulations are in place, and 0 otherwise. e weather con-
trols are second order polynomials of temperature, precipitation,
cloud cover, humidity, pressure and wind speed, as well as wind di-
rection indicators interacted with station indicators. Estimation is
done by Poisson regression.
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Table 3.A.4: Regression of NO2 levels with station-specic trends
Log NO2 NO2 > 40
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Madrid Central -0.158 -0.157 -0.146 -0.135 -0.136 -0.130
(0.0157) (0.0173) (0.0398) (0.0165) (0.0168) (0.0301)
Surroundings 0.0149 0.0254 -0.00735 -0.00172
(0.0299) (0.0467) (0.0618) (0.066)
City of Madrid 0.0146 0.0078
(0.044) (0.0318)
Station-Week FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Week FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weather Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean dep. var. 3.545 3.545 3.545 0.408 0.408 0.408
N×T 7,187 7,187 7,187 7,187 7,187 7,187
N 33 33 33 33 33 33
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the station level. e variables take value 1 when a station is located
in the indicated area and the MC regulations are in place, and 0 otherwise. e weather controls are second
order polynomials of temperature, precipitation, cloud cover, humidity, pressure and wind speed, as well as
wind direction indicators interacted with station indicators.
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Table 3.A.5: Regression of NO2 levels including Barcelona
Log NO2 NO2 > 40
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Madrid Central -0.157 -0.147 -0.167 -0.103 -0.0847 -0.0723
(0.0154) (0.023) (0.0185) (0.0127) (0.0185) (0.0181)
Surroundings 0.0182 -0.00232 0.0339 0.0464
(0.0315) (0.0278) (0.0256) (0.0264)
City of Madrid -0.0391 0.0239
(0.0471) (0.0398)
Station-Week FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Week FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weather Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean dep. var. 3.563 3.563 3.563 0.418 0.418 0.418
N×T 8,708 8,708 8,708 8,708 8,708 8,708
N 40 40 40 40 40 40
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the station level. e variables take value 1 when a station is located
in the indicated area and the MC regulations are in place, and 0 otherwise. e weather controls are second
order polynomials of temperature, precipitation, cloud cover, humidity, pressure and wind speed, as well as
wind direction indicators interacted with station indicators.
Table 3.A.6: E ects on Transaction Values
Total B&M Online
(1) (3) (5)
Treatment -0.00942 -0.0423 0.0265
(0.0267) (0.0288) (0.0461)
Buyer-week-year FE Yes Yes Yes
Seller-week-year FE Yes Yes Yes
Buyer-seller-week FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,460,968 3,460,968 3,460,968
Notes: Dependent variable: Log of mean transaction value for all transactions,
B&M and online transactions. Standard errors are clustered at the buyer-seller
pair level. e dependent variable is log of the mean transaction value (calcu-
lated as the ratio between total revenue over number of transactions) for all
transactions, brick-and-mortar and online transactions at the seller-zip code
by buyer-zip code level in a given week.
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Table 3.A.7: Online Shares
Share online revenue Share online transactions Ratio transaction values
(1) (2) (3)
Treatment 3.380 1.434 -0.0141
(0.675) (0.495) (0.143)
Buyer-week-year FE Yes Yes Yes
Seller-week-year FE Yes Yes Yes
Buyer-seller-week FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,460,968 3,460,968 3,460,968
Notes: Dependent variable: Percentage share of online revenue, online number of transactions and ratios between online and
B&M transaction values. Standard errors are clustered at the buyer-seller pair level.
Table 3.A.8: Changes in Travel Time
Change in travel time when
choosing public transport (minutes)
(1)
Zip codes out of city 12.40
(2.46)
Observations 126
Notes: e change in travel time is the di erence between using public trans-
port and or a car for traveling from a zip code centroid to the MC area. We
regress the di erence between travel time to MC by public transportation and
car on a dummy if a zip code is out of city.
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Table 3.A.9: No buyer-seller pair specic FE
Total B&M Online
Rev Trans Rev Trans Rev Trans
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment -1.835 -1.909 -2.007 -1.994 -1.360 -0.779
(0.158) (0.161) (0.163) (0.163) (0.133) (0.0932)
Buyer-week-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Seller-week-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Buyer-seller-week FE No No No No No No
Observations 3,460,968 3,460,968 3,460,968 3,460,968 3,460,968 3,460,968
Notes: Dependent variable: Log of revenue and log of number of transactions for all transactions, B&M and online transac-
tions. Standard errors are clustered at the buyer-seller pair level. e dependent variable is log of revenue and log of number
of transactions for all transactions, brick-and-mortar and online transactions at the seller-zip code by buyer-zip code level in
a given week. e variable Treatment takes value 1 when (1) a seller-zip code is within the MC area and the tra c restriction
is in place, and (2) the buyer-zip code is outside the MC area, and 0 otherwise. In all columns we control for buyer-week-year
speci c FE, and seller-week-year speci c FE.
Table 3.A.10: Seller-zip code sales without trends
Total B&M Online
Rev Trans Rev Trans Rev Trans
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment -0.0987 0.00298 -0.123 0.0302 -0.284 -0.419
(0.148) (0.0604) (0.160) (0.0606) (0.118) (0.0786)
Week-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Seller FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Seller trends No No No No No No
Observations 27,594 27,594 27,594 27,594 27,594 27,594
Notes: Dependent variable: Log revenue and log transactions for all, B&M and online transactions.
Standard errors are clustered at the seller-zip code level. e dependent variable is the log of rev-
enue for brick-and-mortar, online and total transactions at the seller-zip code level in a given week.
e variable Treatment takes value 1 when a seller-zip code is within the MC area and the traf-
c restriction is in place. In all columns we control for week speci c FE, and seller zip code FE. In
columns 2, 4, and 6 we further include seller-zip code speci c trends and trends squared.
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Table 3.A.11: Robustness Results I
All Sample Zip codes within 15km
B&M Online Total B&M Online Total
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Zip codes < six km -0.0719 0.0185 -0.0463 -0.0612 0.04 -0.0312
(0.0436) (0.0668) (0.0407) (0.0423) (0.071) (0.0398)
Zip codes > six km -0.0948 0.152 -0.0361 -0.0939 0.147 -0.0387
(0.0422) (0.062) (0.0393) (0.0416) (0.0698) (0.0395)
Buyer-week-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Seller-week-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Buyer-seller-week FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
p-val equal eects 0.413 0.0015 0.707 0.259 0.0291 0.792
Observations 3,460,968 3,460,968 3,460,968 1,575,050 1,575,050 1,575,050
Notes: Dependent variable: Log of revenue. Standard errors are clustered at the buyer-seller
pair level. e variable Zip codes < six km takes value 1 when (1) the seller-zip code is within
the MC area and the MC regulations are in place and (2) the buyer-zip code is outside the MC
area but within six km of the MC area, and 0 otherwise. e variable Zip codes > six km takes
value 1 when (1) the seller-zip code is within the MC area and the MC regulations are in place
and (2) the buyer-zip code is further than six kms from the MC area, and 0 otherwise. In all
columns, we control for buyer-week-year speci c FE, seller-week-year speci c FE and buyer
by seller by week of the year FE.
Table 3.A.12: Robustness Results II
Weights Extra Controls
B&M Online Total B&M Online Total
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Zip codes city -0.0788 0.0413 -0.049 -0.0831 0.105 -0.0442
(0.0338) (0.0647) (0.0322) (0.0419) (0.0628) (0.0395)
Zip codes out of city -0.138 0.186 -0.0847 -0.101 0.284 -0.0525
(0.0357) (0.0694) (0.0337) (0.0444) (0.0639) (0.0414)
Buyer-week-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Seller-week-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Buyer-seller-week FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week-year FE × zip code distance No No No Yes Yes Yes
p-val equal e ects 0.0124 0.000946 0.115 0.519 0.00000444 0.766
Observations 3,460,968 3,460,968 3,460,968 3,460,968 3,460,968 3,460,968




Figure 3.B.1: Map of stations
Notes: emap displays the locations of the 33 air quality monitoring stations within the city of Madrid. e pollutionmonitoring
stations appear with pink circles in the map whereas weather stations appear in blue crosses.
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from Birth to School
Joint with Hannah Klauber, Nicolas Koch, Nico Pestel, Nolan Ri er, and Alexander
Rohlf
4.1 Introduction
Poor air quality is a major public health concern worldwide. Various policy inter-
ventions have curbed ambient air pollution considerably over recent decades (Shapiro
and Walker, 2018). To further improve air quality, policymakers in high-income coun-
tries increasingly focus on clean air programs in urban areas where motor vehicles
are the major source of emissions. For instance, more than 200 European cities with
already moderate pollution levels have implemented Low Emission Zones (LEZs) ban-
ning emission-intensive vehicles from entering city areas to achieve additional air pol-
lution reductions. However, this raises questions about the returns to investments in
such ancillary clean air regulations which impose signi cant costs while the speci c
health bene ts from slight improvements in air quality remain uncertain. In particular,
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important latent health eects are likely to remain undetected. First, it is di cult to
isolate causal e ects in the presence of a health stock that changes slowly over time (Al-
mond and Currie, 2011; Currie et al., 2014). Estimates of contemporaneous pollution
impacts may substantially underestimate “fully formed” health bene ts. Few studies
address this issue indirectly by connecting pollution exposure at birth to productivity
and earnings in adulthood (Isen et al., 2017). However, quasi-experimental evidence for
the longer-term dose-response relationship between air pollution and physical health
is missing. Second, in contexts characterized by a combination of high baseline popu-
lation health, universal access to health care, and comparatively low pollution levels,
health bene ts are likely to take subtle forms that are hard to detect in the most widely
used health measures such as low birth weight, hospitalizations, or mortality.
In this chapter, we examine the persistence of the impact of early-life exposure to
air pollution on children’s health stock from birth to school enrollment. Using quasi-
experimental variation in the roll-out of LEZs in Germany and administrative health
insurance data covering one third of the entire population, we test whether children
born just before and just a er policy-induced reductions in particulate ma er concen-
trations exhibit persistent di erences in rarely studied medication usage for up to ve
years a er treatment. We characterize how health bene ts accumulate over the course
of pre-school childhood and disentangle immediate from longer-term health e ects in
response to lower pollution levels. By doing so, this work provides novel evidence on
the adjustment trajectory of the health stock in the “middle years” between birth and
school enrollment that have not been studied before (Almond et al., 2018). Our nd-
ings suggest that moderate improvements in air quality due to the adoption of LEZs
persistently reduce the number and cost of prescriptions for respiratory diseases.
Our work draws on a data set and a se ing which allow us to gain insight into
whether pollution reductions below levels that are already low by the standards of
high-income countries have lasting health bene ts.1. Using medical records provided
by Germany’s largest public health insurer (AOK), we track children from birth to
school enrollment andmove beyond the usual measures of infant health. Our preferred
outcome variables are the cumulative number and the cumulative costs of prescrip-
tions for pharmaceuticals. Prescriptions are a sensitive, real-time, and monetizable
1Notably, even prior to LEZ implementation, the annual mean concentration of particles smaller
than 10 µm (PM10) of 26.4 µg/m3 is close to the corresponding WHO guideline level of 20 µg/m3
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health measure that captures subtle eects, e.g. slightly reduced medication require-
ments manifesting only over a prolonged time frame. Because medication alleviates
morbidity, its e ects are likely undetectable when using the usual indicators such as
hospitalizations. e German context is well suited for the analysis of pharmaceu-
tical prescriptions because Germany’s universal public health care system covers all
prescription costs without any deductibles for minors. Mandatory insurance coverage
implies that we observe health care for the general population rather than for a speci c
group with insurance, as is the case in pioneering studies using pharmaceutical data
for the U.S. (Deschênes et al., 2017; Williams and Phaneuf, 2019; Deryugina et al.,
2019) and China (Barwick et al., 2018).
e identi cation of causal e ects rests on the staggered implementation of LEZs
across 49 counties in Germany. De facto, LEZs constitute a ban of old, emission-
intensive diesel vehicles from city areas.2 Previous research has shown that LEZs are
robust predictors of statistically signi cant reductions in local concentrations of par-
ticulate ma er smaller than 10 µm (PM10), which are however moderate in magnitude
(Wol , 2014; Gehrsitz, 2017; Pestel and Wozny, 2019; Margaryan, 2021). us, we
exploit the staggered policy introduction as an instrumental variable for exogenous
variation in PM10 exposure from motor vehicles. To isolate health e ects, we follow
Isen et al. (2017) and compare cohorts of children born just before and just a er the
policy-induced improvements in air quality. at way, cohorts experience di erent
levels of pollution exposure in early life but the same levels throughout subsequent
years. Our sample is limited to children from “non-a ainment” counties that violated
EU air quality standards regarding PM10. While treated counties introduce LEZs, con-
trol counties comprise late-adopters and not-to-date-adopters.
Our research design accommodates important methodological advances in
di erence-in-di erences (DID) se ings with staggered policy introduction (Goodman-
Bacon, 2018). We implement a “stacked DID” estimator (Fadlon and Nielsen, 2019;
Deshpande and Li, 2019) that deals with the challenge of heterogeneous treatment
e ects inherent in the standard two-way xed e ect DID estimator. e stacked
design aligns treatment events by event-time not calendar time. erefore, it allows
2Restrictions are generally based on the Euro emission standards for gasoline and diesel vehicles.
However, German LEZs have banned very few gasoline vehicles because of the prevalence of catalytic
converters that transform pollutants into less toxic gases (Cyrys et al., 2014).
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us to exploit a richer xed e ect structure: We remove (i) event-time trends caused by
policymakers relying on local pollution or socio-economic trends in the years prior
to the policy introduction as criteria to decide whether or when to introduce an LEZ,
and (ii) time-invariant unobservables that may in uence outcomes and the decision if
or when to introduce an LEZ. Using this design, we demonstrate that pre-trends run
parallel for all outcomes studied.
We produce three key ndings. First, we present evidence that the number of pre-
scriptions for children decreases signi cantly over early childhood in response to a
moderate air quality improvement caused by the adoption of LEZs. A one µg/m3 re-
duction in the concentration of PM10 in utero and in the rst year of life decreases the
total number of prescriptions for respiratory diseases over the ve pre-school years
by about 0.55 or by 3.9% in relative terms. e number of prescriptions decreases by
up to 6.8% when analyzing the subgroup of pharmaceuticals closely tied to asthma. A
decreasing share of children diagnosed with asthma (i.e. the extensive margin) drives
the total reduction of asthma drug prescriptions and, thereby, also reduces prescrip-
tions for respiratory diseases in general. However, we also nd that children su ering
from any kind of respiratory disease require less medication. is additional e ect at
the intensive margin suggests positive e ects on children’s respiratory health beyond
asthma. Unconditional quantile regressions (Firpo et al., 2009) reveal suggestive evi-
dence for substantial heterogeneity at the intensive margin. With a point estimate of
2.8 fewer prescriptions, childrenwho su ermost from respiratory diseasesmay bene t
nearly ves times as much from LEZs as the average su erer.
Second, when analyzing prescriptions for each pre-school year separately, we nd
that contemporaneous reductions in medication needs account for only about 6–20%
of the cumulative savings over the rst ve years of life. For asthma, the contempo-
raneous e ect remains statistically insigni cant. It is only from the second year of
life that the initially latent health response materializes in fewer children diagnosed
with asthma and, thus, fewer total prescriptions. is nding is consistent with the
common notion of a health stock that adjusts slowly to changes in pollution levels
which has rarely been documented because of a lack of real-time health measures. e
observed delay in adjustment may also explain why prior studies on LEZs could not
provide evidence for improved infant health measured by low birth weight (Gehrsitz,
2017; Pestel and Wozny, 2019). We corroborate this conjecture by using hospital data
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on fetal development disorders as alternative outcome variables for which treatment
eects remain statistically insigni cant.
ird, the identi ed health bene ts yield economically meaningful cost savings for
public health insurers. We nd that a reduction of one µg/m3 PM10 reduces costs by
10.54 e per child in their rst ve years of life. LEZs reduce PM10 levels by 1.37 µg/m3
so that cost savings are 14.44e per child. With average pre-treatment costs of 218.62e
per child, LEZs cause an economically relevant relative cost reduction of 6.6%. With
1,836,434 children protected by LEZs in their in utero period and their rst year of
life, treatment reduces pharmaceutical spending for children born between 2008 and
2017 over their pre-school years by approximately 26.5 million e, or 42.4 million e
when accounting for positive spillover e ects. Because all children bene t from LEZs
from their second year of life onward, cost savings originate from a single life year
with slightly improved air quality. While these savings represent only a fraction of the
total policy bene ts, they already account for about 22% (or 35% when accounting for
spillovers) of the up-front costs of owners of vehicles that fail to meet LEZ standards
calculated by Rohlf et al. (2020). Finding considerable health bene ts, even at overall
low pollution levels, suggests that reducing pollution can have large positive e ects
on children’s respiratory health in many se ings.
is work makes several contributions. First, our study is an important step for-
ward in credibly estimating the sustained health bene ts of lower exposure to air pol-
lution in early life. ere is robust evidence for particularly severe impacts of con-
temporaneous air pollution on infant and fetal health (Chay and Greenstone, 2003a,b;
Currie and Neidell, 2005; Currie et al., 2009a; Sanders and Stoecker, 2015; Kni el
et al., 2016). Motivated by the “fetal origins hypothesis,” a few papers investigate the
persistent e ects of early-life exposure to air pollution on economic outcomes such
as human capital formation (Sanders, 2012; Bharadwaj et al., 2017) and labor mar-
ket outcomes (Isen et al., 2017) in the long-run. Relatedly, Simeonova et al. (2019)
exploit the sequential introduction of Stockholm’s congestion charge to demonstrate
that health bene ts increase with the duration of exposure to cleaner air. In comparison,
we present evidence for the persistence of health bene ts from exposure to cleaner air
in a xed period of time, i.e. the period before age one. By doing so, we provide a rst
quasi-experimental estimate for the longer-term dose-response relationship between
PM pollution and physical health. We reveal a slowly adjusting health response over
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the middle years between birth and school that suggests that commonly used contem-
poraneous infant health measures may be too rough to detect health benets frommild
air quality improvements in the context of already low pollution levels.
Second, we provide the rst quasi-experimental study that linksmoderate improve-
ments in air quality from banning high-emission vehicles to health bene ts across the
child population. e few seminal papers on the health impact of tra c pollution focus
on rare health outcomes (infant mortality, Kni el et al., 2016) and more disadvantaged
populations (children living next to highway toll stations, Currie and Walker, 2011).
Alexander and Schwandt (2019) exploit the dispersion of emissions-cheating diesel cars
in the U.S. to quantify the morbidity costs of diesel pollution for a broader population
of children. Given the low single-digit diesel share in U.S. passenger vehicles (only 1.5%
of all light duty vehicles in 2014, U.S. DOT, 2015) it is unclear whether their estimates
are generalizable. In contrast, we examine the link between child morbidity and diesel
pollution in the context of German cities where (i) diesel vehicles are pervasive (45.9%
in 2016, KBA, 2017) and a major source of PM, and (ii) initial pollution levels are low.
Both characteristics are widespread in Europe and unaccounted for in prior work.3
e third feature that sets this study apart is its focus on the use and the costs of
pharmaceuticals. Guided by the medical literature (Fanta, 2009) and a seminal paper
by Deschênes et al. (2017), we argue that direct morbidity and mortality conditions are
a function of pollution and compensatory adaptation in terms of drug therapy. Failing
to account for the pharmaceutical expenditures means to underestimate the bene ts of
clean air policies. With the notable exceptions of Deschênes et al. (2017), Williams and
Phaneuf (2019), and Deryugina et al. (2019), the e ect of air quality on defensive phar-
maceutical expenditures remains largely unevaluated. In our se ing in Germany with
universal health care access, our nding of signi cant longer-term reductions in defen-
sive spending is relevant from a public nance perspective. Reduced pharmaceutical
expenditures may lower insurance contributions, lower labor costs for employers, and
increase net income for households.4 e quanti ed policy bene ts in terms of persis-
tently lower defensive spending for children’s medication are a complement to recent
3He et al. (2019a) provide a careful study in the context of exceptionally high pollution levels, show-
ing a decrease in hospitalizations a er the opening of a beltway diverting diesel trucks from passing
through São Paulo.
4Presently, health care contributions are set to 14.6% of gross wages equally shared between em-
ployers and employees.
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estimates of Pestel and Wozny (2019) and Margaryan (2021), indicating that LEZs also
lead to contemporaneous reductions in hospital treatments and ambulatory care claims
related to cardiovascular and respiratory diseases for all age groups. While hospital-
izations and outpatient treatments of adults may also reect medical histories linked to
pollution exposure and confounding in uences in the distant past, such confounders
can be ruled out for infants observed from birth onward.
4.2 Low Emission Zones as a research design
In Europe, LEZs are the main instrument for cities to meet EU air quality standards
which are among the strictest worldwide. To improve air quality and protect pub-
lic health, the EU enacted several directives that set legally binding limits for criteria
pollutants. Since 2005, for example, the annual mean of PM10 pollution must not ex-
ceed 40 µg/m3. Moreover, daily PM10 readings must not exceed 50 µg/m3 more than
35 times per year at any measuring station (Directive 2008/50/EC). For PM2.5, the EU
implemented legally binding limits only in 2015. EU Member States that violate these
limits face considerable nes. In Germany, the 16 federal states are responsible for
compliance with the EU air quality standards. In case of violations, state governments
are obliged to develop city-speci c Clean Air Plans (Lu reinhaltepläne). e imple-
mentation of LEZs is by far the most tangible compliance strategy the Clean Air Plans
o er. LEZs explicitly target PM10 pollution. To date, 65 counties implemented them in
a staggered process where the time of introduction of each individual LEZ depended
on several idiosyncratic factors. First, the decision-making process usually involves
the respective city administrations and city councils as well as other stakeholders, but
state governments ultimately have to approve local Clean Air Plans.5 ey may over-
rule the decisions of local authorities and force cities to implement LEZs. Because
of o en con icting interests between state and local policymakers, the length of the
decision-making process regarding the introduction of an LEZ varies. Second, NGOs
and private citizens frequently appeal to the courts to advocate against air quality
regulations which creates further plausibly exogenous variation in the timing of LEZ
5At the federal level, regulations rst had to (1) establish vehicle emission categories and (2) desig-
nate an o cial road sign for LEZs. is was done in late 2007.
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introductions. Court rulings based on EU air quality legislation have generally sped
up the adoption of LEZs.6
Figure 4.2.1 shows that almost every year since 2008 there have been waves of new
LEZ introductions. Some LEZs cover entire counties while others rather ban emission-
intensive vehicles from inner-cities. To secure access to LEZs, a vehicle must display
an appropriately colored windscreen sticker based on EU-wide tailpipe emissions cat-
egories. e most emission-intensive diesel vehicles up to Euro1 standards (equivalent
to 0.14g PM10 per km) are banned from LEZs. Petrol-driven vehicles are banned if they
do not have a catalytic converter, which is very rare in Germany. erefore, LEZs are
de facto bans of old, emission-intensive diesel vehicles.7 Police and local public order
authorities enforce the policy with penalties for its violation of currently 100e.
We exploit the temporal and spatial variation in the introduction of LEZs to break
well-known sources of endogeneity in the link between health and pollution. For
instance, local economic conditions not only a ect ambient air pollution (Chay and
Greenstone, 2003b) but also infant health (Dehejia and Lleras-Muney, 2004; Lindo,
2011). erefore, we instrument changes in PM10 with the implementation of LEZs.
Prior research nds that LEZ implementation decreased local PM10 concentrations by
4 – 9% (Wol , 2014; Malina and Sche er, 2015; Gehrsitz, 2017; Pestel and Wozny,
2019; Margaryan, 2021). Our approach of using a policy intervention as an instrumen-
tal variable is similar to the identi cation strategy by Chay and Greenstone (2005);
Bento et al. (2015); Isen et al. (2017) who use county a ainment status under the
U.S. Clean Air Act as an instrument for changes in pollutant concentrations.
To address concerns that LEZs are not introduced randomly but in areas where
air quality is deteriorating, we follow Wol (2014) and include in our sample only
non-a ainment counties, that failed to meet the PM10 limits. Of these counties (i) 65
implemented an LEZ and (ii) 63 have not implemented an LEZ to date despite non-
6Examples from Wiesbaden and Halle shed light on the di erent paths leading to the introduction
of LEZs. In late 2010, Wiesbaden’s city council proposed the introduction of an LEZ which the state
government of Hesse rejected. A er the appeal of an environmental interest group, Wiesbaden’s ad-
ministrative court ruled that the state government had to approve the LEZ in order to comply with
air quality standards as fast as possible (Wiesbadener Tagbla , 2011). In contrast, the city of Halle ap-
pealed plans by the state government of Saxony-Anhalt to implement an LEZ. e city council decided
to abandon their case against an LEZ a er it was made clear that the EU would otherwise penalize the
city almost a million e per day (Mi eldeutsche Zeitung, 2011).
7Less emission-intensive vehicles with Euro2 and 3 standard are eligible for red or yellow stickers
while cars that meet Euro4 standards are eligible for green stickers.
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Figure 4.2.1: e Staggered Implementation of LEZs
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Berlin, Hannover, Köln, Landkreis Heilbronn, Ludwigsburg, Mannheim, Ostalbkreis, Reutlingen, Stuttgart, Tübingen
Bochum, Bottrop, Dortmund, Duisburg, Essen, Frankfurt, Gelsenkirchen, Mühlheim, München, Oberhausen, Recklinghausen
Böblingen, Bremen, Düsseldorf, Enzkreis, Heilbronn, Karlsruhe, Pforzheim, Ulm, Wuppertal
Augsburg
Neu-Ulm




Hagen, Heidenheim, Herne, Rems-Murr-Kreis
Erfurt










Notes: e gure depicts introduction dates for all counties with an LEZ. e eleven implementation waves considered in this
work are marked in gray.
compliance. Only the 49 counties that implement their LEZ until 2012 count towards
the treated because we want to be able to follow children a er LEZ implementation for
ve years. From the sample of non-a ainment counties, we construct for each group
of treated counties that introduces LEZs in a given year-quarter a di erent “clean”
control group consisting of later-adopting counties and not-to-date-adopters (see Sec-
tion 4.3.2). Our identifying assumption is that in the absence of LEZ introduction, air
pollution and health outcomes in treated counties would have evolved similarly to the
control counties.
To test the validity of our identifying assumption, we use a dynamic di erence-in-
di erences design that aligns treatment events by event-time and not calendar-time,
which allows for a richer xed e ect structure (see Section 4.3.2). First, we can remove
LEZ wave-speci c time trends that may result if policymakers use local pollution or
socio-economic trends in the years prior to implementation as criteria for introducing
LEZs in a given year-quarter. Second, we are able to remove time-invariant di er-
ences between treatment and control groups from each wave of LEZ implementation
that could be driving outcomes and selection into LEZ adoption and earlier or later
adoption. Conditional on our xed e ects, we consistently show that there are no dif-
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ferences in the trends of air pollution and health outcomes across the treatment and
control groups before LEZ implementation.
4.3 Methodology
4.3.1 Isolating early-exposure eects
Our goal is to estimate the causal e ect of PM exposure in the in utero period and the
rst year of life on later life health outcomes measured before school enrollment. Due
to rapid cell proliferation and an intense phase of epigenetic programming, children
in the prenatal and immediate postnatal development period are especially vulnera-
ble to the toxicological e ects of pollution (Holt, 1998; Šrám et al., 2005; Gluckman
et al., 2008; Baccarelli and Bollati, 2009). While the staggered introduction of LEZs
provides us with an instrument to address concerns regarding the endogeneity of pol-
lution exposure, the additional empirical challenge is to isolate the long-term e ect of
PM exposure before age one from any exposure throughout the subsequent lifetime.
We want to compare individuals who are exposed to di erent levels of PM pollution
up to age one but who are exposed to the same levels of PM pollution therea er.
To this end, we resort to a cohort study design as proposed by Isen et al. (2017).
Our analysis compares di erences in health outcomes of children born just before and
just a er LEZ implementation relative to the di erence in health outcomes between
children from the control group born at the same times. We restrict our sample so that
within each county all children experience the same pollution levels a er age one.
Of the cohorts born a er LEZ implementation we include all those born at least four
quarters post-treatment. LEZs protect these children from conception onward. Of the
cohorts born pre-treatment we include the cohort born exactly four quarters prior to
LEZ implementation. ese children are not protected before age one but they are
protected therea er (see Figure 4.3.1). We exclude children born in the three quarters
prior or post to LEZ implementation from the sample because they are partly treated
in utero or during their rst year of life. Note that to ensure equal exposure a er age
one, we would need to exclude all cohorts born more than four quarters prior to LEZ
implementation. To avoid limiting ourselves to a single pre-treatment observation of
the treated counties, we keep the two cohorts born ve and six quarters prior to LEZ
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Figure 4.3.1: Isolating early-exposure eects
Notes: e gure shows which cohorts are included in a given implementation wave. e numbers on the timeline measure years
with respect to the introduction date de ning the implementation wave of interest. e green marks indicate the post-treatment
cohorts while the red mark indicates the pre-treatment cohort.
implementation in our sample and ensure that this does not in uence our results in a
robustness check.
4.3.2 Stacked di erence-in-di erences design
In what follows, we describe our research design that combines the cohort data with
the staggered introduction of LEZs as an instrumental variable. To this end, we use a
stacked di erence-in-di erences (stacked DID) design (Deshpande and Li, 2019; Cen-
giz et al., 2019; Fadlon and Nielsen, 2019) that is well suited to deal with the challenge
of heterogeneous treatment e ects in se ings with staggered policy introductions.
Of the 65 counties that implemented LEZs, 49 adopted them at some point between
2008 and 2012. We estimate treatment e ects for these 49 counties to ensure that we
can follow children born a er the implementation of the ban for at least ve years. e
16 other counties that adopt LEZs a er 2012 are potential controls.
For the period between 2008 and 2012, there are 11 distinct LEZ implementation
waves, i.e. year-quarters in which at least one county implemented an LEZ. Subscript 𝑗
denotes these unique implementation waves. We create an individual data set for each
implementation wave.
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Counties that introduce LEZs in the year-quarter dening the respective implemen-
tation wave count towards the treatment group. Of these counties we include cohorts
of children born in the pre- and post-treatment periods de ned in Figure 4.3.1.8
Counties that do not introduce an LEZ in implementation wave 𝑗 , either because
they do so at a di erent point in time or never, are eligible for the control group. Be-
cause we expect that the LEZ treatment e ect on PM concentrations levels o one year
a er implementation9 and because we want to have a balanced control group (see dis-
cussion in Section 4.5.5), we de ne an exclusion window to further re ne the selection
of control counties. Given our choice of an event time window of up to three years
prior and ve years subsequent to LEZ implementation in the event study speci ca-
tion, we determine the exclusion window to start one year earlier (-4 to +5 years). For
the control group, we keep only the counties that do not implement an LEZ within
this period. us, our control group only holds LEZ-counties that implement the pol-
icy measure at least four years before or ve years a er treatment wave 𝑗 . For instance,
the county Mainz serves as a control unit for Mannheim because it implements its own
LEZ more than ve years later, in 2013. Likewise, Mannheim serves as a control unit
for the county Hagen because it implemented its own LEZ already four years earlier
(see Figure 4.2.1). We stack the data sets for the 11 implementation waves 𝑗 for a pooled
regression.
e selected event time window of three years pre-treatment and ve years post-
treatment is subject to an important trade-o . e longer the time window, the longer
we can observe deviations from the parallel trend assumption and e ects of LEZs post
implementation. e shorter the time window the higher the statistical power. How-
ever, the event timewindow also determines the length of our exclusionwindowwhich
de nes our control group. A shorter event time window, thus, also means that a higher
number of LEZ adopters serve as control observations. Our preferred choice of the
event time window is based on the dates of the implementations of the LEZs, the avail-
ability of data, and the observation of cumulative bene ts over ve years. To rule out
that this choice drives our results, we provide estimates for alternative time-window
speci cations in the robustness analysis.
8 e number of included cohorts varies across implementation waves because our sample only
comprises children born between 2006 and 2012.
9Results are almost identical if we instead exclude all already-treated from the control group to
allow for persistent dynamics. See Figure 4.B.1 in the Appendix.
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Our stacked DID design addresses concerns about bias arising from the com-
bination of potentially heterogeneous treatment eects and the weighting implied
by the two-way xed e ects regression in DID se ings with staggered policy in-
troduction (Goodman-Bacon, 2018; Athey and Imbens, 2018; de Chaisemartin and
d’Haultfoeuille, 2020). Goodman-Bacon (2018) shows that the two-way xed e ect
DID estimator consists of comparisons between all combinations of early treated, late
treated, and untreated units. Each comparison is weighted by the size of the subgroup
and the variance of treatment. If treatment occurs either early or late, this results
in lower treatment variance and, hence, a lower weight. us, units that are treated
in the middle of the study period have higher weights in the regression than those
treated at the beginning or at the end. Because the e ectiveness of treatment may
vary across implementation waves 𝑗 , e.g. early adopted LEZs may be more e ective
at reducing PM emissions than the later adopted as the stock of old diesel vehicles
decreases over time, we have to ensure that the weighting of cohorts does not bias
our average treatment e ect.
Our stacked DID design aligns treatment events by event-time, not calendar time.
is results in a se ing that is equivalent to one where the treatment events occur
all at the same time instead of in a staggered fashion. is prevents the unintended
weighting of events driven by the variance of treatment (see also Abraham and Sun,
2020). Regression weights nowmainly depend on the size of the subgroup. In addition,
the stacked DID design prevents potential bias from using units as controls that have
been treated shortly before and might yet be on di erential trends.
4.3.3 Estimation equations
First-stage estimation e rst-stage regression of the instrumental variable (IV)
estimator is a stacked DID regression model speci ed as





𝑡 𝑗 + _ 𝑗𝐷𝑐 𝑗 +𝑊 ′𝑐𝑡 𝑗𝜌 + 𝑋 ′𝑐𝑡 𝑗𝜋𝑡 + 𝛾𝑐 + [𝑠𝑡 + a𝑐𝑡 𝑗
(4.1)
where the dependent variable 𝑃𝑐𝑡 𝑗 is the mean PM10 exposure in µg/m3 during the rst
quarter of life of a cohort born in county 𝑐 and year-quarter 𝑡 for treatment wave 𝑗 . e
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binary variable𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑐 𝑗 is equal to 1 if county 𝑐 introduces an LEZ in implementation
wave 𝑗 . 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 𝑗 is a binary variable equal to 1 if quarter 𝑡 is aer the implementation
quarter of wave 𝑗 . For every implementation wave, the indicators 𝐷𝜏
𝑡 𝑗
are equal to 1 if
quarter 𝑡 is 𝜏 quarters before or a er the quarter of LEZ implementation 𝑗 , where 𝜏 ∈
{−6,−5,−4, 4, 5, 6, . . . , 19} (see Section 4.3.1).10 Every wave 𝑗 also has its own indicator
𝐷𝑐 𝑗 which is equal to 1 if county 𝑐 introduces an LEZ speci cally in that implementation
wave. e vector𝑊 ′𝑐𝑡 𝑗 comprises weather controls in the county of birth 𝑐 . Weather
controls are exogenous and, thus, included for every year of life. e county xed
e ects𝛾𝑐 control for time-invariant, unobserved determinants of pollution exposure for
children born in county 𝑐 . e xed e ects [𝑠𝑡 account for time-varying determinants
of pollution exposure that are common to all children born in state 𝑠 in year-quarter 𝑡 ;
we refer to them as birth state–birth quarter xed e ects.11 e coe cient 𝛼 provides
a di erence-in-di erences estimate of the impact of LEZ implementation on quarterly
PM10 levels at the county level.
In some speci cations, we also include pre-treatment controls for socio-economic
characteristics (e.g. population density, employment, income, and transfers) interacted
with year-quarter xed e ects denoted by 𝑋 ′
𝑐𝑡 𝑗
. We generate these controls by inter-
acting year-quarter dummies with terciles of the variables measured in 𝑡 = 2007, the
year prior to the rst LEZ implementations (Barrot and Sauvagnat, 2016).12 Observing
that the estimated treatment e ect changes signi cantly a er allowing for these trends
that vary with the levels of the exogenous covariates would suggest that the results
are driven by di erential trends in pollution across socio-economic characteristics (see
Jaeger et al. (2020) and Hoynes et al. (2016) for similar approaches).
Our stacked DID design enables us to remove important unobservables that may si-
multaneously drive treatment selection and outcomes. First, the indicators𝐷𝜏
𝑡 𝑗
in Equa-
tion (4.1) remove LEZ wave-speci c unobservables that appear in event-time rather
than calendar-time. is eliminates trends that emerge, for instance, if policymak-
10For instance, 𝜏 = 4 refers to the fourth quarter a er LEZ implementation. Similarly, 𝜏 = −4 refers
to the fourth quarter prior to LEZ implementation.
11Note that the counties of Berlin, Hamburg, and Bremen are states in their own right. Including
state–quarter xed e ects absorbs the variation explained by the treatment in these counties. erefore,
we allocate these three counties to neighboring states, i.e. we assign Berlin to Brandenburg, Hamburg
to Schleswig-Holstein, and Bremen to Lower Saxony. We ensure that this allocation does not determine
the results by estimating alternative speci cations.
12Appendix 4.D.1 holds a detailed description of the control variables.
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ers use local pollution or socio-economic trends in the years prior to implementation
as decision criteria whether and when to introduce LEZs. Accommodating calendar
time eects will not eliminate such pre-trends. One could restrict the e ect of the
wave-speci c event-time binary variables 𝐷𝜏
𝑡 𝑗
to be equal across treatment waves, that
means replacing 𝛿𝜏
𝑗
by 𝛿𝜏 . However, we would then only remove the variation in event-
time pooled over all implementation waves. Second, by including 𝐷𝑐 𝑗 and allowing its
e ect to vary by implementation wave, we remove time-invariant di erences between
treatment and control groups for each LEZ implementation wave 𝑗 and between di er-
ent implementation waves.13 is accounts for time-invariant unobservables that may
drive outcomes and selection into LEZ adoption and earlier or later adoption. In case
we only included one wave-unspeci c binary variable 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑐 𝑗 , we would only con-
trol for these di erences between the pooled treatment and the pooled control group.
Second-stage estimation In the second stage, predicted values for PM10 from Equa-
tion (4.1) serve as an explanatory variable in
𝐻𝑐𝑡 𝑗 = 𝛽𝑃𝑐𝑡 𝑗 +
∑︁
𝜏
𝜎𝜏𝐷𝜏𝑡 𝑗 +𝜓 𝑗𝐷𝑐 𝑗 +𝑊 ′𝑐𝑡 𝑗^ + 𝑋 ′𝑐𝑡 𝑗`𝑡 + 𝛾𝑐 + [𝑠𝑡 + 𝜖𝑐𝑡 𝑗 (4.2)
where the coe cient of interest 𝛽 describes the marginal e ect of a one µg/m3 LEZ-
driven increase in PM10 exposure on the average health outcome 𝐻𝑐𝑡 𝑗 of a cohort born
in county 𝑐 and year-quarter 𝑡 . e health outcome is accumulated over the rst ve
years of a child’s life and is averaged over the children in cohort 𝑐𝑡 . We obtain the
health outcome through an auxiliary regression that exploits the available information
at the level of the individual child (i.e. gender and area of residence within a county
at the ve-digit zip code), which controls for some of the observed heterogeneity in
individual health when aggregating the data.14 All regressions are weighted by the
number of children in a cohort (see Appendix 4.C). We cluster standard errors at the
county level, the level at which the treatment is assigned.
13 e la er is only true because we include 𝐷𝜏
𝑡 𝑗
as well.
14Aggregating individual level data via auxiliary regressions and conducting regressions on the ob-
tained aggregates is a common approach in the literature (e.g. Baker and Fortin, 2001; Shapiro, 2006;
Albouy, 2009a,b; Angrist and Lavy, 2009; Currie et al., 2015; Isen et al., 2017; Notowidigdo, 2020)
and asymptotically equivalent to using the individual level data itself (e.g. Donald and Lang, 2007). We
provide a detailed description of the procedure in the Appendix 4.C.
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e unbiasedness of 𝛽 depends on two crucial assumptions. First, LEZs need to
be a strong instrument for changes in particulate ma er pollution. We subsequently
present evidence for a strong rst-stage, showing that PM10 levels decline signi cantly
and persistently in response to LEZ implementation. Second, for consistency, it must
be the case that LEZ introduction a ects health outcomes only via its impact on air
pollution and not, for instance, through changes in the population’s composition or
behavior. Given that our results are largely insensitive to the choice of controls, and
conditional on the full set of xed e ects, we believe that the exclusion restriction
holds. While we cannot conclusively show its validity, we conduct various indirect
tests. First, we comprehensively assess whether LEZs shi the composition in the
underlying population in LEZ counties but nd no evidence thereof. Second, we re-
estimate our IV model for medical conditions unrelated to air pollution. ese placebo
tests provide further evidence in favor of the validity of our IV design. ird, we ex-
plore the unlikely possibility that the compliance costs of LEZs reduce industrial ac-
tivity and, thereby, emissions of other health-damaging local pollutants, most notably
sulfur dioxide (SO2). We nd no evidence for any statistically signi cant e ects on
SO2. Finally, the exclusion restriction may be violated if LEZs a ect pollutants other
than PM10 that also have a direct impact on respiratory health (see discussion in Sec-
tion 4.5.5). is is a potential threat to all analyses in which a single instrument could
a ect multiple pollutants. In fact, we show that LEZs reduce both PM and NO2. How-
ever, we also show that the policy exclusively a ects these pollutants and argue that
our identi cation strategy su ces to identify the health e ects of pollutants from mo-
tor vehicles rather than of PM10 in particular. Similarly, other studies a ribute esti-
mated IV-e ects to air pollution more generally rather than to a particular pollutant
(Chay and Greenstone, 2003a; Currie and Neidell, 2005; Arceo et al., 2016; Kni el
et al., 2016; Deryugina et al., 2019; Sager, 2019; Colmer et al., 2020).
Event-study speci cation We estimate event-study speci cations of our stacked
DID model to assess the parallel trends assumption. To this end, we expand the pre-
treatment window of our sample to include all observations up to three years prior to
LEZ implementation. Furthermore, we include observations from the three quarters
before and the three quarters a er LEZ implementation, so that 𝜏 ∈ {−12, . . . , 19}.
To gain precision and prevent noise potentially linked to estimating 32 quarter coe -
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cients, we group the event study coecients at the year level throughout this chapter.




\𝜐 (𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑐 𝑗 ×𝐷𝜐𝑡 𝑗 ) +
∑︁
𝜏
𝛿𝜏𝐷𝜏𝑡 𝑗 +_ 𝑗𝐷𝑐 𝑗 +𝑊 ′𝑐𝑡 𝑗𝜌 +𝑋 ′𝑐𝑡 𝑗𝜋𝑡 +𝛾𝑐 +[𝑠𝑡 +𝜔𝑐𝑡 𝑗 (4.3)
with 𝜐 = b𝜏4c
e parameter of interest is \𝜐 . It captures the marginal e ect of LEZs on the mean
PM10 concentration in year 𝜐 prior or post to treatment. We set \0 = 0 so that the year
prior to LEZ implementation is the reference category. e gures presented in the fol-
lowing sections plot the \𝜐 estimates in event time. e main di erence between the
standard two-way xed e ect event study and our dynamic estimator in Equation (3)
is that we eliminate time-invariant unobservables both within and between LEZ im-
plementation waves by including 𝐷𝑐 𝑗 as well as wave-speci c event-time trends that
do not appear in calendar time by including 𝐷𝜏
𝑡 𝑗
.
We also estimate an event study speci cation that explores the treatment e ect dy-
namics for the long-run health outcomes. Replacing the dependent variable in Equa-
tion (4.3) with 𝐻𝑐𝑡 𝑗 results in a reduced-form event study model. is speci cation
allows us to examine how LEZs a ect long-run health depending on a child’s age at
the time of exposure. Because the year prior to LEZ implementation is the reference
category, we essentially test for di erential e ects of exposure relative to exposure at
age one and older.
4.4 Data
Air pollution andLEZdata eGerman Environment Agency (UBA) provides data
on air pollution for the years 2006 through 2013 for 128 counties that violated EU-wide
limits for PM10. Speci cally, monitoring stations record daily concentrations of regu-
lated air pollutants particulate ma er (PM10), nitrogen dioxide (NO2), ozone (O3), and
sulphur dioxide (SO2). For the sample period, there is no consistent data on ne partic-
ulate ma er (PM2.5) concentrations available from UBA because there were no legally
binding thresholds for PM2.5 before 2015. Stations located at the roadside primarily
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measure peak pollution exposure from trac, while the remaining stations measure
the permanent exposition to pollution in residential areas (UBA, 2019). We combine
measurements from both types of stations and interpolate the point measures into
county space using Inverse Distance Weighting (Currie and Neidell, 2005; Karlsson
and Ziebarth, 2018). Based on the daily records, we construct a weighted average of
quarterly levels of PM10, NO2, O3, and SO2. Following recent studies (i.e. Chay and
Greenstone, 2003a; Isen et al., 2017), we use weights proportional to the number of
monitor observations within a quarter and limit our data to stations with at least 60
measurements per quarter (see Appendix 4.D.2 for a detailed description). UBA also
provides data on the exact dates at which LEZs are implemented.
Health care data e health data comes from Germany’s largest public health in-
surer AOK and is at the level of the individual child and the individual quarter. It
provides us with information on pharmaceutical prescriptions and in-hospital doc-
toral care.15 We obtained access to the anonymized data through the “AOK Research
Institute” (WIdO). e data holds information on about a third of all children born
in Germany, approximately 200,000 annually. e sample includes the full medical
records of all children born between January 1, 2006, and December 31, 2012 until the
end of 2017, exploiting the full range of data available at WIdO when conducting this
research. is allows for observing all children in the sample from birth until age ve.
Because our analysis focuses on early childhood pollution e ects, we exclude children
from our sample who move out of their birth county within the rst year of life. Like-
wise, we exclude children who are not continuously insured with AOK until the age
of ve. Overall, our sample holds observations on about 1.1 million children across
all counties in Germany. e sample of counties underlying our analysis that either
implement or consider implementing an LEZ comprises 550,000 children.
e focal point of our analysis are respiratory health outcomes. It is well estab-
lished in the medical literature (e.g. Li et al., 2003) that PM pollution causes in amma-
tions in the respiratory tract that may irreversibly reduce lung growth and function. In
consequence, a ected children aremore vulnerable to su er from respiratory problems
in general and are at a higher risk of developing severe chronic diseases such as asthma
later in life. Because respiratory diseases are primarily treated with pharmaceuticals,
15Note, that we only observe stationary hospital treatments that accommodate overnight cases.
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we restrict themain analysis to prescriptions. Pharmacies electronically provide health
insurers with data on prescriptions (Swart et al., 2005). ese data hold information on
costs and pharmaceutical substances classi ed according to the ATC-Code system.16
In Germany’s universal public health care system, all prescription costs are covered by
the insurance without any co-payments for children. is applies to over-the-counter
drugs as well, as public insurances are legally obligated to bear the expenses for chil-
dren up to the age of 12 (§34 Abs. 1 Satz 5 SGB V).
Prescription data are not linked to ICD-10 codes17 that reveal the diagnoses for
which pharmaceuticals are prescribed. erefore, it is necessary to identify the rele-
vant pharmaceutical substances for the therapy of respiratory diseases. To this end,
we follow two di erent approaches. First, we use a publication akin to the Red Book
(“Gelbe Liste”) to link pharmaceuticals and diagnoses for more than 120,000 drugs.
is provides us with a broad group of pharmaceuticals used to treat respiratory dis-
eases. Second, we consider the 20 most o en prescribed substances for asthma and
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (ATC R03) in a given year. is returns a small,
strict subset of the pharmaceuticals identi ed in the rst approach. Appendix 4.D.3
describes the procedures in detail. Costs of prescriptions are in real values normalized
to the fourth quarter of 2017 and account for market price changes, such as expiring
patents (see Appendix 4.D.3).
We complement the analysis of respiratory health outcomes with placebo tests. To
this end, we consider three outcomes that are independent of air pollution but corre-
lated with socio-economic status: hospital treatments of injuries of the head (S00-S09),
the arm (S40-S49), or several body parts (T00-T07). Additionally, we use hospital data
on pregnancy duration and fetal growth (ICD-10 codes P05, P07, and P08) in our anal-
ysis of common infant health measures.18 On the insured themselves, the medical
16 e Anatomical erapeutic Chemical (ATC) classi cation system categorizes drugs based on their
active ingredients according to the organ or the system on which they act as well as their therapeutic,
pharmacological, and chemical properties. It is compiled by the World Health Organization (WHO) and
adapted to the German market on an annual basis (Swart et al., 2005).
17 e ICD-10-Code is an international system for the statistical classi cation of diseases and related
health problems provided by the WHO. Germany uses the extended version ICD-10-GM. Outpatient
and inpatient physicians are legally required (§§295 and 301 SGB V) to classify diagnoses accordingly.
18In accordance with common practice, we consider the discharge diagnosis as the main reason for
hospitalization (Swart et al., 2005).
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Table 4.4.1: Summary Statistics of Pollution and Health Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
mean sd min max N
Air pollution
PM10 (µg/m3) 23.7 6.2 9.0 57.3 3,584
Prescriptions for respiratory diseases
Number of prescriptions over ve years per child 12.7 2.8 4.4 23.8 3,584
Prescription expenditures over ve years per child (e) 195.8 54.1 63.6 635.3 3,584
Share of su erers per cohort (%) 76.1 7.5 38.3 94.6 3,584
Prescriptions for asthma
Number of prescriptions over ve years per child 2.0 0.8 0.1 6.1 3,584
Prescription expenditures over ve years per child (e) 62.2 33.9 1.6 489.8 3,584
Share of su erers per cohort (%) 18.3 6.1 1.3 50.6 3,584
Number of children per cohort 159.3 171.6 10 1,593 3,584
Notes: e table reports summary statistics of PM10 pollution (measured in µg/m3) and of cumulative prescriptions
over the ve pre-school years linked to a broad group of respiratory diseases and asthma speci cally. e variables
are de ned for our study period from 2006 to 2012 and our sample of 128 German counties that violated EU-wide lim-
its for PM10. Cumulative prescriptions are calculated based on data until 2017. Health measures are in terms of the
number or the costs of prescriptions per child. Costs of prescriptions are in real values normalized to the fourth quar-
ter of 2017. e share of su erers re ects the share of children in the cohort that require at least one prescription for
a respiratory disease or asthma, respectively.
records additionally o er information about the birth dates, gender, and the precise
location of residence within a county at the ve-digit zip code.
Table 4.4.1 provides summary statistics of the prescription data for respiratory dis-
eases and pollution levels at the county and quarter level. Overall, the cross-sectional
dimension of our data covers 128 counties, while the longitudinal dimension covers 28
quarters from 2006 to 2012. A detailed description is provided below the table.
Additional data on weather and county characteristics Weather is a strong cor-
relate of pollution and health (Karlsson and Ziebarth, 2018). erefore, we obtain data
from the German Weather Service (DWD) on a ba ery of weather phenomena at the
level of the individual weather station as well as in an interpolated grid format. We
combine weather, pollution, and health data at the county level. In the regressions,
we include linear and quadratic terms of precipitation as well as 12 temperature bins19
19Temperature bins count the number of days with temperatures above 0, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 29, 30, 31,
32, 33 and 34 degrees Celsius.
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in addition to mean temperature, sunshine duration, relative humidity, pressure, and
wind speed. We include additional control variables from the Federal Institute for
Research on Building, Urban Aairs and Spatial Development (BBSR) such as socio-
economic and demographic characteristics aswell as information on the age ofmothers
giving birth. We use pre-treatment measures of these variables in 2007 and categorize
them into terciles. For a detailed description see Appendix 4.D.1.
4.5 Results
4.5.1 Ambient air pollution
First, we present evidence that the relationship between LEZ implementation and par-
ticulate ma er levels is strong. Table 4.5.1 shows estimates of the e ect of LEZ intro-
duction on average quarterly PM10 concentrations following Equation (4.1) for three
di erent sets of control variables that increase in stringency from le to right. All
regressions include birth county and birth state–birth quarter xed e ects. Standard
errors clustered at the county level are in parentheses. e reported mean outcomes
represent weighted averages for the dependent variable in the pre-treatment period
over all treated counties with weights equal to the number of children per county.
Our most stringent speci cation shows that the presence of an LEZ reduces mean
quarterly PM10 concentrations by about 1.37 µg/m3. is estimate is statistically sig-
ni cant at the 0.1% level and robust across control sets. e stability of our treatment
e ect estimates a er including heterogeneous trends that vary with the pre-treatment
levels of the socio-economic controls (see Section 4.3.3) suggests that the LEZ e ect
is not driven by di erential trends in pollution across socio-economic characteristics.
Compared to the mean pollution exposure of 26.44 µg/m3, an LEZ decreases particu-
late ma er by about 5.2%, which is in line with the LEZ literature. An 𝐹 -statistic of
20.14 provides evidence for a fairly strong rst stage relationship. To accommodate
remaining concerns about potential bias from weak instruments (Andrews et al., 2019;
Lee et al., 2020), we subsequently also report robust Anderson-Rubin (AR) con dence
intervals for our IV-estimates.
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Table 4.5.1: e E ect of LEZ Implementation
on PM10 Concentrations
First Stage Estimation
PM10 Pollution in µg/m3
(1) (2)
LEZ treatment -1.30 -1.37
(0.34) (0.30)
Mean outcome 26.44 26.44
First stage F-statistic 14.25 20.14
Weather controls x x
Socio-economic controls x
Notes: is table reports coe cients from two variants of the rst
stage regression in Equation (4.1). e dependent variable is the quar-
terly mean PM10 concentration in a given county and year in µg/m3.
Both columns include birth county, birth state–birth quarter, LEZ
wave–event time, and LEZ wave–treated xed e ects. Weather and
socio-economic controls are added sequentially moving from le to
right. e regressions are weighted by the birth county–birth quarter
cell size. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the county
level. e sample size is 9, 609.
Figure 4.5.1 plots the event-study results for the e ect of LEZs on PM10.20 e post-
treatment pa erns suggest that LEZs cause a level shi to persistently lower PM10
concentrations with a strong immediate e ect. Moreover, coe cients prior to treat-
ment are close to zero and statistically insigni cant, which is in line with common
trends in LEZ and non-LEZ counties in the years preceding the policy interventions.
Recall that our reported event study coe cients exploit a rich xed e ect structure
to remove (i) event-time trends caused by policymakers relying on local pollution or
socio-economic trends as criteria to decide whether and when to introduce an LEZ
and (ii) time-invariant unobservables that may drive outcomes and selection into LEZ
adoption and earlier or later adoption.
4.5.2 Medication of respiratory diseases
In the following, we show the persistent e ects of lower PM10 pollution on the med-
ication of respiratory diseases. Our analysis comprises two groups of prescriptions
to detect health e ects of varying severity. To comprehensively capture respiratory
health e ects, we consider a broad group of pharmaceuticals. To capture e ects re-
20Table 4.A.1 in the Appendix provides the full regression results.
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Figure 4.5.1: Event-study Estimates of the Eect of LEZ Implementation on PM10 Con-
centrations





before treatment with treatment
Years relative to LEZ introduction
treatment effect
Notes: e gure presents event-study coe cients from Equation (4.3) that show how LEZs a ect the quarterly mean PM10
concentration in µg/m3 in the years before and a er LEZ implementation. e gray shaded area indicates the pre-treatment
period. e coe cient in the year prior to implementation is normalized to zero. e regression includes county xed e ects,
state–quarter xed e ects, LEZ wave–event time xed e ects, LEZ wave–treated xed e ects as well as weather and socio-
economic controls. It is weighted by the county–quarter cell size. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Con dence
intervals refer to the 5% level of signi cance.
lated to asthma speci cally, we consider a subset of pharmaceuticals that is closely
linked to the therapy of this chronic disease. For both groups of prescriptions, we
provide reduced form estimates that indicate the health e ect of LEZ implementation
(upper panel) and IV estimates representing the health e ect of a one µg/m3 increase
in PM10 levels (lower panel) in Table 4.5.2. e dependent variable is either the number
of prescriptions (le side) or their costs in e (right side) that accumulate on average
over the rst ve years of a child’s life.
All regression estimates show that LEZs bene t child health. e magnitude of our
results is robust and statistically signi cant across control sets. For the broad group of
respiratory diseases the most stringent IV estimate in column (2), for instance, shows
that an LEZ-caused decrease in pollution of one µg/m3 in utero and in the rst year of
life reduces the number of medical prescriptions by about 0.55 per child, on average.
With a standard error of 0.17, the estimate is statistically signi cant at the 1% level. Re-
lating the treatment e ect to the pre-treatment average of 14.14 prescriptions per child
reveals a relative reduction of 3.9%. Likewise, the coe cient in column (4) shows that
the costs of prescriptions decrease by 10.54e (4.8%) over the rst ve years of a child’s
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Table 4.5.2: e E ect of Early-Life PM10 Exposure on Medication of Respiratory Dis-
eases throughout Early Childhood
A. Number of prescriptions B. Costs of prescriptions (e)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Reduced Form Estimation
Respiratory diseases -0.65 -0.75 -10.98 -14.41
(0.17) (0.18) (3.58) (4.32)
Mean outcome 14.14 14.14 218.62 218.62
Asthma -0.21 -0.23 -6.34 -8.01
(0.07) (0.08) (2.57) (3.22)
Mean outcome 2.5 2.5 73.27 73.27
IV Estimation
Respiratory diseases 0.50 0.55 8.46 10.54
(0.16) (0.17) (3.36) (3.97)
Mean outcome 14.14 14.14 218.62 218.62
Asthma 0.16 0.17 4.88 5.86
(0.06) (0.07) (2.19) (2.74)
Mean outcome 2.5 2.5 73.27 73.27
First stage F-statistic 14.25 20.14 14.25 20.14
Weather controls x x x x
Socio-economic controls x x
Notes: is table reports reduced form estimates that indicate the health e ect of LEZ implementation (upper
panel) and IV estimates from Equation (4.2) representing the health e ect of a one µg/m3 increase in PM10 levels
during the in utero period and the rst life year (lower panel). e dependent variable is either the number of pre-
scriptions per child (le side) or their costs in e per child (right side) that accumulate over the rst ve years of
a child’s life on average. It refers to either prescriptions for respiratory diseases in general or asthma speci cally.
e dependent variable is composition-adjusted for the birth county–birth quarter cell. All regressions include
birth county, birth state–birth quarter, LEZ wave–event time, and LEZ wave–treated xed e ects. Weather and
socio-economic controls are added sequentially moving from le to right. e regressions are weighted by the
birth county–birth quarter cell size. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the county level.
life on average. e relative reductions are even higher inmagnitudewhen considering
the subset of prescriptions for asthma. While the number of prescriptions decreases
by about 6.8%, the costs decrease by about 8.0% on average. Moreover, comparing the
estimated coe cients for respiratory diseases in general and asthma speci cally, we
nd that about 56% (5.86/10.54) of the cost savings accrue due to changes in chronic
asthma diseases, while about 31% (0.17/0.55) of the reduction in the number of pre-
scriptions is a ributable to asthma. AR con dence intervals (CIs) for the IV-estimates
reported in Table 4.A.2 of the Appendix corroborate that all average e ects are positive
and signi cantly di erent from zero.
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Based on the reported results we approximate the total cost savings from LEZ pro-
tection during the in utero period and the rst year of life. e most recent birth
statistics tell us that 1,836,434 children are protected by LEZs in utero and in the 12
months a er birth. Multiplying this number with 14.41e in cost savings per child, the
rst reduced form coe cient in column (4), we nd that treatment reduces long-run
pharmaceutical costs by approximately 26.5 million e in children born until 2017.21
Similarly, the calculation linked to asthma medication highlights cost savings of about
14.7 million e.
ese speci c savings represent an important component for a cost-bene t analy-
sis of the policy but only a fraction of the total health bene ts that need to be included.
In particular, our study considers only new-born children rather than the whole popu-
lation, only physical rather than behavioral e ects, and only prescriptions rather than
doctor visits, hospitalizations, and fatalities. Moreover, the estimated savings derive
exclusively from early-exposure e ects measured until school enrollment. Bene ts
that persist over half a decade, however, are unlikely to cease suddenly with enroll-
ment. Nonetheless, the estimated 26.5 million e already account for about 22% of the
up-front costs of owners of vehicles that fail to meet LEZ standards calculated by Rohlf
et al. (2020). In combination with other empirically identi ed LEZ-bene ts, namely re-
duced hospitalizations (Pestel and Wozny, 2019), ambulatory care claims (Margaryan,
2021), and prescriptions (Rohlf et al., 2020) in the general population, it is realistic to
conclude that LEZ-costs can be recovered within a few years. Our IV estimates may
also serve to approximate the counterfactual situation of implementing the WHO’s
PM10 guideline of 20 µg/m3 already in 2008. Holding constant health bene ts at 10.54e
per child per µg/m3 and assuming all children born into LEZ-counties until 2017 had
bene ted, the 6.4 µg/m3 PM10 reduction from the annual mean of 26.4 µg/m3 could
potentially have reduced longer-run pharmaceutical costs by about 6.4 × 10.54 e ×
2, 301, 305 children ≈ 155 million e.
Figure 4.5.2 plots the event-study results for the number and the costs of prescrip-
tions for respiratory diseases.22 ey allow us to examine how LEZs a ect long-run
health depending on a child’s age at the time of exposure. Because the year prior to
21 is back-of-the envelope calculation does not account for potential di erences between those
insured with AOK and the general population and is based on the assumption that children born a er
2012 bene t equally from the policy.
22Table 4.A.1 in the Appendix provides the full regression results.
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Figure 4.5.2: Event-study Estimates of LEZ Eects on Medication for Respiratory Dis-
eases
(a) Number of prescriptions






before treatment with treatment
Years relative to LEZ introduction
treatment effect
(b) Costs of prescriptions





before treatment with treatment
Years relative to LEZ introduction
treatment effect
Notes: e gure presents event-study coe cients based on the speci cation in Equation (4.3) that show how LEZs a ect the
medication of respiratory diseases depending on the time between birth and LEZ implementation in years. e dependent variable
is the number of prescriptions per child (Panel A) or their costs ine per child (Panel B) that accumulate over the rst ve years of a
child’s life on average. e gray shaded area indicates the pre-treatment period. e coe cient in the year prior to implementation
is normalized to zero. e regression includes county xed e ects, state–quarter xed e ects, LEZ wave–event time xed e ects,
LEZ wave–treated xed e ects as well as weather and socio-economic controls. It is weighted by the county–quarter cell size.
Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Con dence intervals refer to the 5% level of signi cance.
LEZ implementation is the reference category, we essentially test for di erential ef-
fects of exposure relative to exposure at age one and older. erefore, the signi cant
post-treatment decrease in the number and the costs of prescriptions suggests addi-
tional bene ts of exposure to cleaner air between conception and age one relative to
exposure at age one and later. Also note that children born two (three) years prior
to implementation are treated no later than from age two (three) onward. erefore,
signi cant pre-treatment coe cients could indicate di erential bene ts from exposure
beginning at age two or three relative to exposure at age one. However, they could also
indicate that the common trends assumption is violated. e fact that pre-treatment
coe cients are close to zero, suggests that neither of the two scenarios apply. e
event-study plots for asthma prescriptions are similar to the ones for respiratory dis-
eases in general (see Figure 4.B.2 in the Appendix).
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Disaggregation by year of life Using outcomemeasures that aggregate medication
over the rst ve years of life neither reveal whether health e ects are persistent nor
whether their intensity is constant over time. To gain further insights in how early
pollution exposure propagates through early life, we analyze the pharmaceuticals pre-
scribed in each of the ve years separately in Panel A of Table 4.5.3. Because numbers
and costs of prescriptions have shown to exhibit very similar behavior with respect to
LEZ implementation, we focus on the number of prescriptions from here on.
With regards to respiratory diseases in general, the reduced form and the IV es-
timations consistently reveal that early pollution exposure persistently and statisti-
cally signi cantly a ects medication. For instance, the IV estimates indicate that a
one µg/m3 decrease in PM10 exposure in utero and in the rst year of life decreases
the average number of prescriptions per child in each of the ve pre-school years.
However, the coe cient in year ve is statistically signi cant only at the 10% level.
Contemporaneous reductions in medication needs in the rst year of life account for
only about 20% of the cumulative savings on prescriptions over the rst ve years of
life (0.11/0.55). With regards to asthma related prescriptions, this share reduces to 6%
(0.01/0.17). Moreover, the contemporaneous e ect on asthma medication remains sta-
tistically insigni cant and e ects occur only from the second year on. is suggests
that it requires time for improvements in chronic diseases to materialize. Note that
the sum of the coe cients estimated for each individual pre-school year is identical to
the cumulative e ect over all ve years presented previously and presented again in
column (1) of Table 4.5.3.
Disentangling the extensive from the intensive margin We assess how the ex-
tensive and the intensive margin drive the overall treatment e ect in Panel B and C
of Table 4.5.3. e dependent variable in Panel B is the share of children in the cohort
that require at least one prescription for either a respiratory disease or asthma speci -
cally (i.e. extensive margin). e dependent variable in Panel C is the average number
of prescriptions a child diagnosed with any respiratory disease or asthma speci cally
requires (i.e. intensive margin).
For respiratory diseases in general, our IV estimate shows that a one µg/m3 de-
crease in PM10 pollution in utero and in the rst year of life reduces the share of suf-
ferers by 1 percentage point (column 7). is nding is statistically signi cant at the
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5% level. In addition, the lower pollution level decreases the number of prescriptions
in children diagnosed with any kind of respiratory disease on average by about 0.42
over the ve pre-school years (column 13). For asthma speci cally, we nd a 1 percent-
age point reduction in the share of children newly diagnosed with asthma (column 7).
e prescription requirements of children su ering from asthma, however, are not af-
fected in a statistically signi cant way (column 13), which may re ect that existing
chronic diseases need constant treatment. Because the medication of respiratory dis-
eases comprises that of asthma and because we nd clear treatment e ects at the inten-
sive margin for respiratory diseases in general, our ndings suggest that lower PM10
levels have positive e ects on children’s respiratory health beyond asthma. While we
cannot positively identify these e ects, we are able to make tentative inferences. For
example, Bea y and Shimshack (2014) nd that air pollution a ects upper respiratory
infections such as sinusitis and lower respiratory infections such as acute bronchitis
or acute bronchiolitis.
Note that the estimated coe cients for the extensive and intensive margin con rm
the overall e ect presented in column (1) of Table 4.5.3. For instance, for asthma the
overall e ect given by the IV-coe cient in column (1) is approximated by the sum of
the product of the extensive margin coe cient in column (7) and the pre-treatment
mean at the intensive margin in column (13) and the product of the intensive margin
coe cient in column (13) and the pre-treatment mean at the extensive margin in col-
umn (7) (0.01×11.32+0.24×0.22 ≈ 0.17).23 Moreover, analyzing the health e ects at the
extensive and intensive margin for each year separately, we mostly observe initially
latent e ects that become prominent only a er the rst year of life. is nding once
more suggests that the health stock adjusts slowly. Overall, our results are robust to
controlling the false discovery rate following Benjamini and Hochberg (1995) for the
76 hypotheses we test (Table 4.A.11 in the Appendix).
Because the degree of su ering may vary substantially among children a icted by
respiratory diseases, we deepen our analysis of heterogeneous treatment e ects at the
intensive margin by applying unconditional quantile regressions (Firpo et al., 2009) at
the level of the individual child. For computational tractability, the estimation is based
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CHAPTER 4. KILLING PRESCRIPTIONS SOFTLY
Figure 4.5.3: Unconditional antile Treatment E ects of LEZs on Medication for
Respiratory Diseases




before treatment with treatment
Percentiles
Prescriptions
Notes: e gures present coe cients from unconditional quantile regressions (Firpo et al., 2009) at the level of the individual
child (Appendix 4.E for further information). e dependent variable is the number of prescriptions for respiratory diseases that
accumulate over the rst ve years of a child’s life. e severity of su ering increases from le to right. e bars indicate the 95%
con dence interval.
on a reduced-form standard DID.24 Our estimates in Figure 4.5.3 provide suggestive
evidence that childrenwho su er worst from respiratory diseases may bene t themost
from LEZs. For example, with 2.8 fewer prescriptions, point estimates for children in
the 99th percentile indicate that theymay bene t nearly ves times as much from LEZs
as the average su erer with 0.58 fewer prescriptions (Table 4.5.3).25
Comparison to the literature To provide context for the magnitude of our nd-
ings, we compare our estimates to related epidemiological and economic research that
focuses on asthma.
In a meta-study, Khreis et al. (2017) summarize the available epidemiological re-
search on the impact of early life exposure to air pollution on the prevalence of asthma
in children. Overall, the research suggests odds ratios of 1.025 for associations between
24For further information on the unconditional quantile estimator see Appendix 4.E.
25Table 4.A.3 in the Appendix features all coe cients and standard errors.
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PM10 and asthma at any age. Taking the odds ratio as an approximation of relative risk,
we can compare the magnitude of our estimates for the share of suerers to these re-
sults. Our estimate for asthma in column (7) in Table 4.5.3 implies a risk ratio of 1.045
at the mean, which is outside the meta-study’s 95% con dence interval for studies that
consider children from age three to young adults up to age 21. However, odds ratios
from analyses limited to the ages three to six come very close to our estimates (Clark
et al. (2010): 1.068, Deng et al. (2016): 1.048, Liu et al. (2016): 1.029).
Economic studies focus on contemporaneous improvements in child health. Using
the case of the Stockholm congestion charge, Simeonova et al. (2019) show that per-
sistently lower PM10 exposure reduces asthma-related hospital admissions of children
below six years of age with an implied elasticity of 3.7. e elasticities we estimate for
asthma drug prescriptions (1.8), expenditures (2.1), and the share of su erers (1.2) are
smaller.26 is di erence could be a ributed to the fact that Simeonova et al. (2019)
examine contemporaneous bene ts of persistently improved air quality over a longer
time period, while we study longer run health bene ts from exposure to cleaner air in
a single year.
Other economic studies consider short-run variations in air pollution exposure, but
mainly focus on PM2.5.27 Alexander and Schwandt (2019) study the impact of emissions
cheating by car manufacturers on PM2.5 and child health outcomes. eir estimates
imply that a one µg/m3 increase in PM2.5 increases asthma related hospital admissions
of children aged four and younger by 0.42 per 1, 000. Evaluated at the reported means,
the elasticity is 3.01. Barwick et al. (2018) study changes in health-related consumption
in China for PM2.5 using data on bank card transactions. ey estimate that a 10 µg/m3
decrease in PM2.5 reduces health spending in children’s hospitals by 1.13%, implying
an elasticity of 0.06.
26 e calculations are based on the IV estimates for asthma in columns (2) and (4) of Table 4.5.2 and
in column (7) of Table 4.5.3, respectively. ese point estimates are then multiplied with the mean PM10
exposure and divided by the mean of the outcome to obtain elasticities.
27Bea y and Shimshack (2014) is a notable exemption. Based on data from young children in Eng-
land, they relate respiratory treatments for children tomonthly PM10 exposure. e estimated coe cient
on PM10 is, however, statistically insigni cant but would imply an elasticity of only 0.1.
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Table 4.5.4: Severe Eects of Exposure to PM10 During the Perinatal Period on Fetal
Development
IV Estimation




and low birth weight
long gestation period
and high birth weight
(1) (2) (3)
Mean PM10 (µg/m3) -0.03 1.50 0.12
(0.61) (2.49) (0.39)
Mean outcome 2.93 50.22 1.14
Weather controls x x x
Socio-economic controls x x x
Notes: is table reports coe cient estimates from three variants of the IV regression in Equation (4.2). e dependent vari-
able is the number of stationary hospital treatments of three di erent disorders linked to abnormal fetal development per 1,000
children. It is the composition-adjusted average for a birth county–birth quarter cell. All regressions include birth county,
birth state–birth quarter, LEZ wave–event time, and LEZ wave–treated xed e ects. Weather and socio-economic controls are
added sequentially moving from le to right. e regressions are weighted by birth county–birth quarter cell size. Standard
errors in parentheses are clustered at the county level. e rst stage 𝐹 -statistic is 24.39. e sample size is 9,609.
4.5.3 Common infant health measures
Health e ects may be subtle if changes in pollution exposure are small and health ef-
fects may be latent if the health stock only adjusts slowly. Our results indicate that
this could be the case in the context of LEZ implementation. To assess this hypoth-
esis further, we estimate the e ect of a one µg/m3 decrease in PM10 exposure during
the prenatal period on fetal development. e outcome variables are postpartum sta-
tionary hospitalization due to abnormal birth weight, unusual pregnancy duration,
and fetal malnutrition.28 e estimated treatment e ects in Table 4.5.4 remain statisti-
cally insigni cant. Given our ndings for respiratory health, this indicates that infant
health measures revolving around hospitalizations immediately postpartum may be
too coarse or too focused on the short-term to detect health e ects. Moreover, it might
explain why prior studies on LEZs could not provide evidence for improved infant
health measured in the form of low birth weight (Gehrsitz, 2017; Pestel and Wozny,
2019).
28As before, the sample comprises three cohorts born prior to and all cohorts born up to ve years
subsequent to LEZ implementation. However, we exclude the rst three cohorts born a er implemen-




Di erent mechanisms may explain the e ects of LEZs on pollution and health. First,
overall tra c could have decreased because of mode switching to public transport.
Second, individuals could have substituted their banned vehicles with “greener” vehi-
cles. To assess these two potential channels we draw on additional annual data at the
county level provided by the Federal Highway Research Agency (BAST) and the Ger-
man Federal Motor Transport Authority (KBA). e BAST data provides information
on the number of passing vehicles on all freeways (Autobahnen) and federal roads (Bun-
desstraßen) recorded by tra c monitors. e KBA data provides information on the
number of registered private and commercial passenger vehicles by fuel type (diesel
and gasoline) and emission class.
Table 4.5.5 shows that LEZ implementation has no statistically signi cant e ect on
the tra c volume on an average day (column 1).29 However, it reveals a shi in the
composition of the vehicle eet. As expected, we observe a signi cant 20% decrease
(𝑒0.18 − 1) in the number of old diesel vehicles classi ed as Euro1 and lower that are
banned by the LEZs (column 2). Even vehicles with emission classes Euro2 through
Euro4 decrease signi cantly (column 3). e banned vehicles seem to be replaced by
used gasoline vehicles with the emission standards Euro2 through Euro4 (column 6).
We nd no signi cant changes in the number of the newest diesel and gasoline cars
(column 4 and 6).
In combination, these ndings provide tentative evidence on the emission source
of the policy-induced PM10-reduction. Because overall tra c is not a ected, particles
from wear and tear of brakes, tires, and road surfaces are unlikely to have changed
upon LEZ implementation. e “de-dieselization” of the vehicle eet, however, sug-
gests that a er implementation the same amount of tra c is caused by fewer dirty
diesel vehicles and more cleaner gasoline vehicles.30 us, diesel exhaust may be the
main driver of the observed PM10-reductions. Toxicological and epidemiological stud-
ies suggest that PM from diesel exhaust is particularly harmful because it mainly con-
29Given that LEZs usually cover city centers, it is possible that tra c from within the LEZ shi s to
other, unregulated areas of the county. While the data from BAST do not allow a closer examination,
Wol (2014) and Gehrsitz (2017) provide evidence against this hypothesis.
30Diesel vehicles with Euro1 may emit up to 140 µg tailpipe PM10 per km. Gasoline vehicles with
Euro2-4 emit about 1-2 µg PM10 per km according to HBEFA.
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Table 4.5.5: e E ect of LEZ Implementation on Tra c Volume and the Vehicle Fleet





and be er Euro1 Euro2-4
Euro5
and be er
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
LEZ treatment -0.01 -0.18 -0.03 -0.01 0.04 0.02 -0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.05) (0.06) (0.01) (0.15)
Sample size 5,584 6,514 6,514 5,418 6,514 6,514 5,418
Weather controls x x x x x x x
Socio-economic controls x x x x x x x
Notes: e dependent variable is the number of motor vehicles counted over the 24 hours of an average day in column (1), the
number of vehicles with a diesel engine in the emission class Euro1 or worse in column (2), in emission class Euro2 through
Euro4 in column (3), and in emission class Euro5 or be er in column (4), and the number of vehicles with a gasoline engine
in emission class Euro1 in column (5), in emission class Euro2 through Euro4 in column (6), and in emission class Euro5 or
be er in column (7). e sample in column (4) and (7) is limited to the period a er 2008 because the emission class Euro5 was
only introduced in 2009. All outcome variables are transformed with the inverse hyperbolic sine function. Accordingly, the
percentage change in the outcome variable is given by (𝑒𝛽 − 1) · 100. All regressions include county, state–year, LEZ wave–
event time, LEZ wave–treated xed e ects, as well as weather and socio-economic controls. e weather variables comprise
only precipitation, temperature, and sunshine duration because they are available for the entire period in which we observe
the BAST and KBA data. e regressions are weighted by the average cohort size. Standard errors in parentheses are clus-
tered at the county level.
sists of small particles that can penetrate far into the human body (Krzyżanowski et al.,
2005; HEI, 2010).
4.5.5 Robustness checks
Alternative control groups Changes in the composition of the control group do not
alter our results. Our baseline estimates rely on a control group that comprises coun-
ties that implement LEZs at some point and counties that violate EU PM10 standards
but have no LEZ to date. Neither of the event-study plots in Figure 4.5.1 or 4.5.2 point
to di erential trends in air pollution and health outcomes across the treatment and
control groups before policy introduction. is alleviates concerns that LEZ adoptions
are determined by any omi ed local conditions or shocks that simultaneously a ect
air pollution and health outcomes. Nonetheless, we additionally restrict our sample
to counties that actually introduce LEZs to ensure that our results are not determined
by deliberate selection of counties into treatment. Recall that our full sample com-
prises 128 counties of which 65 actually implement LEZs; 49 between 2008 and 2012.
Figure 4.B.3 in the Appendix shows event-study estimates based on the sample of the
65 ever-adopter counties. Although the restriction to ever-adopters nearly slashes our
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sample in half, the event-study plots for the rst stage and the reduced form continue
showing well-behaved pa erns that are similar to those in Figure 4.5.1 and 4.5.2.
In our preferred DID se ing, we observe cohorts born up to ve years a er treat-
ment and exclude all cohorts from counties that implement LEZs in this time period
from the control group in each of the stacked data sets. By choosing a ve-year time
window a er treatment, we are able to identify longer-run e ects of LEZ introduction.
However, the length of the time window has implications for the composition of the
control group. e shorter the window, the more comparable are the control and the
treatment group. is is because more control units that introduce an LEZ with close
proximity in time are eligible to the control group. In Table 4.A.4 in the Appendix
we show that treatment e ects remain robust when shortening the time window a er
treatment sequentially from ve to two years.
Spillover e ects Some of the counties in our control group directly neighbor
counties implementing an LEZ. ese counties may be subject to positive or negative
spillovers. is would bias our estimated e ects on pollution and health. In particular,
we are concerned that drivers may change their routes to circumnavigate the LEZ
such that tra c would merely be displaced. In this case, LEZs would have worsened
air pollution in neighboring counties and our estimates would overestimate the
policy‘s e ectiveness. To address this concern, Table 4.5.6 replicates the estimations
from Tables 4.5.1 and 4.5.2. e only di erence is that we include a binary variable
that takes on a value of 1 if a neighboring county implements an LEZ.31
We nd negative but statistically insigni cant policy e ects in neighboring coun-
ties with regard to either PM10 pollution, prescriptions for respiratory diseases, or
asthma. In line with these ndings, Wol (2014) and Gehrsitz (2017) show that treat-
ment e ects on pollution measuring stations outside of the LEZs are negative but in-
signi cant. However, when controlling for neighboring counties, the e ect of LEZs
on air pollution within LEZ counties is −2.18 (Table 4.5.6) while our main estimate
is −1.37 (Table 4.5.1). e reduced form e ects of LEZs on the number and costs of
prescriptions are also higher when controlling for neighboring counties compared to
31In alternative tests, we exclude all neighboring counties from each treatment wave in the sample
and account for the number of neighboring LEZs when estimating spillover e ects. In either case, the
results remain almost identical.
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our preferred estimates in Table 4.5.2, the only exception being the coecient for the
number of prescriptions for asthma. However, the IV e ects remain almost unchanged
given that the di erence in the estimated e ects on pollution and health are of similar
proportion.
While we cannot recover statistically signi cant e ects on neighboring counties,
the higher magnitude of the reduced form treatment e ects when controlling for
neighboring counties indicates that positive spillover e ects are likely present. is
conjecture is corroborated when testing whether the policy-induced “de-dieselization”
of the vehicle eet identi ed in Section 4.5.4 expands across county borders. In line
with Wol (2014), we nd that neighboring counties also exhibit a statistically
signi cant reduction (−0.04, 𝑡 = −2.06) in the number of banned diesel cars classi ed
as Euro1 and lower. is e ect can be plausibly linked to the fact that LEZs cover city
centers where many workplaces and points of interest are located. Individuals living
in the neighboring counties have an incentive to ensure that their vehicles allow
access.
Overall, the ndings alleviate concerns about overestimating and instead mark our
main analysis as conservative. In fact, when accounting for positive spillover e ects
the estimated e ectiveness of the policy could be considerably greater. While in Sec-
tion 4.5.2 we estimate that treatment reduces long-run pharmaceutical costs by approx-
imately 26.5 million e in children born until 2017, the estimates in Table 4.5.6 suggest
cost savings of 42.4 million e (1, 836, 434 children × 23.10 e).
Accounting for changes in population characteristics A potential threat
to identi cation in our IV design is that improved air quality might change the
composition of the cohorts in LEZ counties, leading to changes in the unobservable
characteristics of the children born there. is occurs if the implementation of LEZs
changes how individuals move in and out of the county which would invalidate
the exclusion restriction. For example, if LEZs either a ract good health risks or
induce bad health risks to locate to other counties, improvements in child health
may result from the changed socio-economic structure of counties rather than from
reduced pollution. While there exists no evidence in the literature that LEZs a ect
the socio-economic structure of counties, we nevertheless report a range of additional
estimates that strengthen our con dence that the exclusion restriction holds.
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Table 4.5.6: Air Pollution and Health Eects on Neighboring Counties
PM10 Pollution Number of prescriptions Costs of prescriptions
µg/m3 Respiratory diseases Asthma Respiratory diseases Asthma
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A. Reduced Form Estimation
LEZ e ect on
LEZ-counties -2.18 -1.09 -0.24 -23.10 -14.34
(0.53) (0.28) (0.12) (6.38) (5.39)
LEZ e ect on
neighbor-counties -0.41 -0.16 -0.03 -1.56 -0.54
(0.25) (0.13) (0.07) (3.56) (2.83)
B. IV Estimation
PM10 Pollution - 0.49 0.11 10.34 6.38
(0.15) (0.06) (3.47) (2.73)
Weather controls x x x x x
Socio-economic controls x x x x x
Notes: is table replicates the rst stage regression in Table 4.5.1 and the reduced form and IV regressions in Table
4.5.2. In addition, the treatment e ect on counties adjacent to those that implement an LEZ is estimated. All regressions
include birth county, birth state–birth quarter, LEZ wave–event time, and LEZ wave–treated xed e ects, as well as
weather and socio-economic controls. e regressions are weighted by the birth county–birth quarter cell size. Stan-
dard errors in parentheses are clustered at the county level. e sample size is 7,665.
First, we analyze whether LEZ implementation signi cantly a ects how individu-
als migrate in and out of counties (Appendix Table 4.A.5) and we conduct placebo tests
(Appendix Table 4.A.6). To estimate treatment e ects on mobility pa erns we consider
net migration in the overall county population, net migration among families, and the
fraction of AOK-insured children moving out of their birth county. As placebo health
outcomes we use hospital treatments of injuries of the head, the arm, and of other
body parts. All outcomes are typical health issues in children and strongly correlated
with socio-economic status (e.g. Faelker et al., 2000; Birken and MacArthur, 2004;
Yates et al., 2006), while the air pollution literature does not indicate a relationship.
Table 4.A.5 and Table 4.A.6 in the Appendix do not reveal any statistically signi cant
policy e ects on migration pa erns and placebo outcomes. However, because the co-
e cients are estimated imprecisely, we turn to another indirect test on changes in the
socio-economic composition of cohorts.
If unobservable population characteristics adjust gradually over time, comparing
treated and untreated cohorts will su er less bias the closer they are in the time dimen-
sion. erefore, we reuse our previous robustness analysis in which we sequentially
reduced the ve-year time window a er treatment to two years. It is unlikely that
population characteristics change markedly within just two years. In the absence of
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Table 4.5.7: e E ect of LEZ Implementation on Di erent Pollutants
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PM2.5 NO2 O3 SO2
LEZ treatment -0.30 -3.27 -0.04 -0.12
(0.12) (1.07) (0.56) (0.25)
Mean outcome 15.51 40.81 39.27 4.3
First stage F-statistic 5.79 9.44 0.01 0.24
Weather controls x x x x
Socio-economic controls x x x x
Notes: is table reports coe cient estimates for the e ect of LEZs on four
di erent air pollutants. e dependent variable is either the mean concentra-
tion of PM2.5, NO2, O3, or SO2 in µg/m3. All regressions include birth county,
birth state–birth quarter, LEZ wave–event time, and LEZ wave–treated xed
e ects as well as weather and socio-economic controls. e regressions are
weighted by the birth county–birth quarter cell size. Standard errors in paren-
theses are clustered at the county level. e sample size is 3, 466 in column
(1) and 9, 609 in columns (2) through (4).
gradual changes in unobserved characteristics, the estimates for the limited samples
should be close to those in the main analysis. Table 4.A.4 in the Appendix shows that
treatment e ects remain indeed robust as the post-treatment time window decreases.
E ect on other air pollutants We use PM10 as a measure for PM exposure. By
de nition, PM10 includes particles below 10 µm, including the ner PM2.5 particles. We
rely on PM10 because policymakers in Europe are highly focused on this pollutant, and
LEZs explicitly target PM10. Moreover, the EU only set legally binding limits for PM2.5
in 2015. To evaluate whether LEZs also decrease PM2.5, in a rst robustness check, we
resort to satellite-based PM2.5 estimates from van Donkelaar et al. (2019).32 is data
is available on a ne resolution grid (0.01 degrees) but only at the annual level.33 us,
we lose quarterly observations and the corresponding xed e ects. Table 4.5.7 shows
that the introduction of LEZs reduces mean PM2.5 concentrations by about 2%. e
relatively modest magnitude compared to that for PM10 may re ect a enuation bias
from non-classical measurement error.
32Data from the German air monitoring network for PM2.5 is very limited. We have about 70% fewer
observations for PM2.5 than for PM10.
33van Donkelaar et al. (2019) merge satellite measurements of aerosol optical depth with a particulate




Our second robustness check is motivated by the fact that diesel vehicles emit sig-
nicant quantities of nitrogen oxides. In fact, road tra c emissions of nitrogen dioxide
(NO2), which serve as an indicator for di erent nitrogen oxides, are caused primarily
by diesel vehicles.34 erefore, we assess whether LEZ implementation also leads to
notable changes in ambient NO2 concentrations using our data from the German air
monitoring network. Table 4.5.7 shows that LEZs signi cantly reduce NO2 by about
3.27 µg/m3 (8.0%) on average. is nding is consistent with the fact that LEZs are de
facto bans of old diesel vehicles.
Because LEZs reduce both PM and NO2, we cannot conclusively infer that PM10
determines our observed health e ects alone. erefore, we caution against interpret-
ing our IV results as a causal estimate of the health e ects of PM10 as a stand-alone
pollutant. Instead, we argue that our IV results represent health e ects linked to air
pollutants from diesel vehicles. Similarly, other papers generalize their results to air
pollution e ects (c.p. Chay and Greenstone, 2003a; Currie and Neidell, 2005; Arceo
et al., 2016; Kni el et al., 2016; Deryugina et al., 2019; Colmer et al., 2020). We sub-
sequently show that the policy does not a ect other pollutants.
First, we examine whether LEZs have unintended e ects on ozone (O3) concen-
trations. O3 is negatively correlated with other local air pollutants, in particular with
NO2 which is one of its precursors. erefore, we may be concerned that the imple-
mentation of LEZs increases O3 concentrations. However, Table 4.5.7 does not provide
evidence for an unintended increase in O3.
Second, environmental regulation can have adverse impacts on rm output and
productivity. erefore, we may be concerned that LEZs decrease industrial activity
and, thereby, reduce emissions of industrial pollutants, most notably SO2. To rule out
that health e ects are subject to this channel, we also estimate e ects for SO2 con-
centrations. Table 4.5.7 does not reveal any statistically signi cant e ects. Because
transport only accounts for about 2% of total SO2 emissions, this robustness check
also serves as a placebo test, suggesting that our rst-stage results are not driven by
confounding factors.
34In Germany, about 72.5% of NO2 emissions from on-road tra c are from diesel vehicles (UBA,
2017).
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Accounting for treatment dierences a er the rst year of life In our main
analysis, we compare children who experience di erent pollution exposure levels in
utero and over their rst year of life but the same exposure levels a erwards. A strict
implementation of this comparison requires that we restrict ourselves to cohorts born
exactly four quarters prior to LEZ implementation. However, to avoid limiting our-
selves to a single pre-treatment observation of the treated, we additionally include
the two cohorts born ve and six quarters prior to treatment in our main analysis. e
drawback of this approach is that it neglects potentially di erent exposure levels in the
second year of the children’s lives. However, our event-study estimates in Figure 4.5.2
do not indicate additional bene ts from exposure at age one relative to exposure at
age two and three. As a further robustness check, we limit pre-treatment observations
to cohorts born four quarters before implementation. e results in Table 4.A.7 in the
Appendix show that our ndings are robust with respect to this sample restriction.
e reduced form and the IV point estimates are very similar in magnitude to the ones
reported in Table 4.5.2.
Accounting for increases in policy stringency Our treatment estimate identi es
the e ect of LEZ introduction. Upon implementation, LEZs ban the most emission-
intensive diesel vehicles with tailpipe emission category Euro1 or lower (no sticker).
However, LEZs become more stringent over time so that they eventually also ban
vehicles with Euro2 (red sticker) and Euro3 (yellow sticker) standards. is gradual
adoption of more stringent restrictions raises the concern that children born a er LEZ
implementation bene t from cleaner air for longer throughout their pre-school years
than children born just before LEZ implementation. is would imply that children
in our pre- and post-treatment comparison di er not only in exposure during their
in utero period and their rst year of life. Reassuringly, our event-study results for
the number and the costs of prescriptions in Figure 4.5.2 provide no evidence that dif-
ferences in exposure a er age one have any additional health bene ts. If there were
di erential bene ts from exposure beginning at age two or three relative to exposure at
age one, we would expect positive pre-treatment coe cients. Instead, we observe sta-
tistically insigni cant coe cient estimates close to zero. As a further robustness check









𝑐𝑦 , where 𝑓 𝐸𝑢𝑟𝑜2𝑐𝑦 (𝑓 𝐸𝑢𝑟𝑜3𝑐𝑦 ) is equal to
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one if Euro2 (Euro3) vehicles are banned in year of life 𝑦 of cohort 𝑐 . ese dummy
variables should absorb potential additional health bene ts in year of life two through
ve linked to the two more stringent LEZ regimes banning Euro2 and Euro3 vehicles,
respectively. If there were additional bene ts from Euro2 and 3 vehicle bans, we would
expect post-treatment coe cients to decrease in event time.35 However, Figure 4.B.4
in the Appendix exhibits very similar pa erns to our event study in Figure 4.5.2 that
lacks the additional dummies capturing changes in stringency. is suggests there are
no additional bene ts from the increasing stringency of LEZs.
Two-way xed e ect DID estimation We also estimate the two-way xed e ect
equivalent of our stacked di erence-in-di erences estimator. e coe cient estimates
in Table 4.A.8 show similar, robust e ects of PM10 on child health. However, they tend
to be lower in magnitude. For instance, the IV coe cient for respiratory diseases is
0.55 in the stacked DID estimation in column (2) of Table 4.5.2 while it is only 0.39
in the two-way xed e ect DID estimation in Table 4.A.8. We expect that part of this
a enuation stems from the weighted aggregation of heterogeneous treatment e ects
revealed in Goodman-Bacon (2018). It may also indicate violations in common trends
that result from including already-treated units in the control groups for the newly
treated, although they are on di erential trends from prior treatment. Also note that
it is impossible in the two-way xed e ect setup to include xed e ects that absorb
implementation wave-speci c unobservables in event-time and time-invariant di er-
ences between treatment and control groups within and across implementation waves.
Functional form We also test the robustness of our results with respect to the func-
tional form. e outcome variables in our baseline speci cations are in levels. Using
per capita prescriptions as outcome, we implicitly assume that prescriptions per child
would have evolved with the same absolute changes in the absence of treatment. How-
ever, if prescriptions per child changed at the same rate in the absence of any LEZ
intervention instead, the parallel trends assumption would be violated. Although our
event-study plots do not reveal pre-trends that di er in a statistically signi cant man-
ner, we re-estimate our main results with logged outcome variables in Table 4.A.9 in
35We do not expect shi s in post-treatment pa erns because the timing of Euro2 and 3 vehicle bans
varies across counties relative to the implementation date.
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the Appendix. We nd that the estimated relative e ects are nearly identical to the
ones derived from Table 4.5.2.
4.6 Conclusion
is chapter provides a quasi-experimental study that links moderate improvements
in air quality in a single year from banning emission-intensive vehicles to substantial
health bene ts across children’s pre-school years. e context of our study are urban
counties in Germany, where motor vehicles are a major source of air pollution. Yet,
average pre-treatment pollution levels are low. ese characteristics are widespread
in Europe, so that our results are most likely generalizable. Exploiting unique public
health insurance data at the patient level on one million children, we examine whether
individuals born just before and just a er reductions in PM concentrations caused by
the adoption of Low Emission Zones exhibit persistent di erences in rarely studied
medication use up to ve years a er treatment. We focus on children’s pharmaceutical
prescriptions as a sensitive, real-time health measure that overcomes the challenge of
capturing health e ects that may be both subtle if changes in pollution exposure are
moderate and initially latent if the health stock adjusts slowly.
We present strong evidence that the cumulative number and the cumulative costs
of pharmaceutical prescriptions over early childhood decrease signi cantly a er LEZ
implementations improve air quality. For instance, the number of prescriptions for
asthma decreases by 6.8% and their costs decrease by about 8.0% on average for ev-
ery one µg/m3 reduction in PM10 concentration. Our ndings provide strong support
for the notion of health as a stock that changes relatively slowly over time. It is only
from the second year of life that the initially latent health response materializes in
fewer children diagnosed with asthma and, thus, fewer total prescriptions. Contem-
poraneous reductions in prescriptions of asthma medication account for less than 6%
of the cumulative savings over the rst ve years of life. is highlights that estimates
of contemporaneous pollution impacts may substantially underestimate ‘fully formed’
health bene ts. We identify economically meaningful cost savings for public health
insurers. With 1,836,434 children protected by Low Emission Zones in utero and dur-
ing their rst year of life, treatment reduces costs for prescriptions in children born
between 2008 and 2017 for respiratory diseases by about 26.5 million e over their pre-
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school years, or 42.4 million e when accounting for positive spillover eects. Because
we compare children who di er only in their pollution exposure during their in utero
period and their rst year of life, these cost savings originate from a very short period
with slightly improved air quality.
Our results inform contentious policy debates. Across Europe, vintage- and fuel-
speci c driving bans are a widespread and ever more stringent policy intervention.
Major metropolitan areas, including Paris, Madrid, and Rome, are even commi ed to
full diesel bans by 2025. Yet, opponents of driving restrictions prominently question
whether a narrow focus on diesel bans is a rational choice to e ectively improve air
quality and public health. Our study seeks to provide rst answers by quantifying
an important fraction of the reduction in the public health burden accomplished by
LEZs - Germany’s agship policy at the local level to complywith air quality standards
set by the EU clean air directives. Finding meaningful health improvements, even
at low pre-treatment pollution levels, suggests that vintage-speci c driving bans that
target particularly old and emission intensive diesels can have large and long-lasting
positive e ects on children’s respiratory health in many se ings.
Our study cannot assess whether additional restrictions for newer vehicles would
yield further health improvements. is is an important policy question for future
research. Another research question is how treatment e ects progress through life. In
our study, health e ects are latent in the rst year before materializing. It is far from
obvious whether health e ects persist permanently and how they impede cognitive or
non-cognitive skill formation. To address the progression of e ects, we would need to
follow the children in our study and rerun our estimations at later points in time, for
example at the end of elementary school, at the end of high school, and some years
into their professional lives.
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Table 4.A.1: Event-study Estimates –e E ect of LEZ Implementation on PM10 Con-
centrations and Health Outcomes by Year
PM10 Pollution (µg/m3) Number of prescriptions Costs of prescriptions
(1) (2) (3)
LEZ treatment (\ = −2)) 0.026 -0.079 -3.094
(0.411) (0.137) (3.659)
LEZ treatment (\ = −1)) 0.007 0.034 -0.455
(0.284) (0.116) (3.694)
LEZ treatment (\ = 1)) -0.896 -0.304 -8.006
(0.254) (0.122) (2.969)
LEZ treatment (\ = 2)) -1.269 -0.480 -10.13
(0.249) (0.166) (3.969)
LEZ treatment (\ = 3)) -1.613 -0.674 -14.897
(0.289) (0.189) (3.852)
LEZ treatment (\ = 4)) -2.040 -0.675 -12.34
(0.387) (0.17) (3.967)
LEZ treatment (\ = 5)) -1.929 -0.788 -14.192
(0.388) (0.200) (4.243)
Weather controls x x x
Socio-economic controls x x x
Notes: is table reports estimated event-study coe cients underlying Figure 4.5.1 and Figure 4.5.2. e depen-
dent variables are the average PM10 level in µg/m3, the number or the costs in e of prescriptions that accumu-
late over the rst ve years of a child’s life on average, respectively. e dependent variables are composition-
adjusted for the birth county–birth quarter cell. All regressions include birth county, birth state–birth quarter,
LEZ wave–event time, and LEZ wave–treated xed e ects as well as weather and socio-economic controls.
e regressions are weighted by the birth county–birth quarter cell size. ey are based on an expanded pre-
treatment window including all observations up to three years prior to LEZ implementation. Furthermore, ob-
servations from the 3 quarters before and the 3 quarters a er LEZ implementation are included. e resulting
sample size is 19, 290. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the county level.
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Table 4.A.2: Anderson Rubin Condence Sets
A. Number of prescriptions B. Costs of prescriptions (e)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Respiratory diseases
𝐶𝑆𝐴𝑅 [0.25 - 1.03] [0.28 - 1.04] [3.01 - 19.31] [4.07 - 22.07]
𝐹𝐴𝑅 15.11 16.72 9.41 11.10
p-value 0.0001 0.0000 0.0022 0.0009
Asthma
𝐶𝑆𝐴𝑅 [0.06 - 0.33] [0.06 - 0.34] [1.05 - 11.44] [1.20 - 13.48]
𝐹𝐴𝑅 8.83 9.04 6.07 6.18
p-value 0.0030 0.0026 0.0138 0.0129
Weather controls x x x x
Socio-economic controls x x
Notes: is table reports weak-instrument-robust inference for the IV-estimates in Table 4.5.2. e AR-con dence
sets (𝐶𝑆𝐴𝑅 ) provide robust con dence intervals with a coverage probability of 95%. e F-distributed AR-statistic
(𝐹𝐴𝑅 ) and its p-value test the null hypothesis that the coe cient of the endogenous variable PM10 in the struc-
tural equation is equal to zero.
Table 4.A.3: Unconditional antile Regression Estimates of the E ect of Early-Life
Exposure to LEZs on Respiratory Prescriptions throughout Childhood
Q-5 Q-10 Q-15 Q-20 Q-25 Q-30 Q-35
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
LEZ treatment −0.166 −0.310 −0.406 −0.470 −0.514 −0.547 −0.597
(0.065) (0.106) (0.129) (0.135) (0.146) (0.161) (0.176)
Q-40 Q-45 Q-50 Q-55 Q-60 Q-65 Q-70
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
LEZ treatment −0.662 −0.746 −0.814 −0.844 −0.853 −0.861 −0.922
(0.186) (0.197) (0.213) (0.228) (0.239) (0.244) (0.246)
Q-75 Q-80 Q-85 Q-90 Q-95 Q-97.5 Q-99
(15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21)
LEZ treatment −1.039 −1.146 −1.284 −1.498 −1.707 −1.899 −2.848
(0.261) (0.292) (0.314) (0.369) (0.480) (0.730) (0.969)
Notes: is table reports regression coe cients from unconditional quantile regressions. e dependent
variable is the number of prescriptions for respiratory diseases that accumulate over the rst ve years of
a child’s life. All regressions include birth county and birth state–birth quarter xed e ects. Standard er-




Table 4.A.4: e E ect of Early-Life PM10 Exposure – Di erent Post-Treatment Time
Windows
Δ = 2 Δ = 3 Δ = 4
(1) (2) (3)
A. First Stage Estimation
Mean PM10 -1.14 -1.53 -1.55
(0.3) (0.3) (0.3)
Mean outcome 26.44 26.44 26.44
B. Reduced Form Estimation
Respiratory diseases -0.44 -0.50 -0.62
(0.16) (0.17) (0.17)
Mean outcome 14.14 14.14 14.14
Asthma -0.16 -0.21 -0.22
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Mean outcome 2.5 2.5 2.5
C. IV Estimation
Respiratory diseases 0.39 0.32 0.40
(0.16) (0.13) (0.12)
Mean outcome 14.14 14.14 14.14
Asthma 0.14 0.13 0.14
(0.07) (0.05) (0.05)
Mean outcome 2.5 2.5 2.5
First stage F-statistic 14.50 25.92 27.19
Sample size 6,922 8,727 9,575
Weather controls x x x
Socio-economic controls x x x
Notes: is table reports coe cient estimates for shorter post-treatment win-
dows. e time window increases sequentially from two years (column 1) to
four years (column 3). Panel A presents coe cients from rst stage, Panel B
the coe cients from reduced form and Panel C coe cients from IV estima-
tions. e dependent variable in Panel A is the PM10 concentration; in panel
B and C it is the number of prescriptions for respiratory diseases in general or
asthma speci cally that accumulate over the rst ve years of a child’s life on
average. e dependent variable in Panel B and C is composition-adjusted for
the birth county–birth quarter cell. All regressions include birth county, birth
state–birth quarter, LEZ wave–event time, and LEZ wave–treated xed e ects
as well as weather and socio-economic controls. e regressions are weighted
by the birth county–birth quarter cell size. Standard errors in parentheses are
clustered at the county level.
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LEZ treatment 0.66 -0.07 -0.56
(0.47) (0.55) (0.33)
Mean outcome 2.93 -1.86 9.44
Weather controls x x x
Socio-economic controls x x x
Notes: is table reports coe cient estimates for the e ect of LEZ implementation on county mi-
gration. e dependent variable in column (1) is net migration per 1,000 inhabitants of the total
county population. e dependent variable in column (2) is net migration per 1,000 inhabitants
of the total county population younger than 18 years old and 30 to 50 years old. e dependent
variable in column (3) is the fraction of AOK-insured children moving out of the birth county
a er their rst and before their sixth year of life in %. All columns include birth county, birth
state–birth quarter, LEZ wave–event time, and LEZ wave–treated xed e ects as well as weather
and socio-economic controls. Observations of LEZ counties in the three quarters prior and sub-
sequent to implementation are included. e regressions are weighted by the birth county–birth
quarter cell size. Standard errors are clustered at the county level and are in parentheses. e
sample size is 12, 865.
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Table 4.A.6: e E ect of Early-Life PM10 Exposure on Placebo Health Outcomes (per
1,000 children)
Arm injuries Head injuries Several injuries
(1) (2) (3)
A. Reduced Form
LEZ treatment 0.58 -0.97 -0.09
(1.04) (4.64) (0.11)
Mean outcome 5.7 68.81 0.12
B. IV Estimation
PM10 mean -0.43 0.71 0.06
(0.75) (3.39) (0.08)
Mean outcome 5.7 68.81 0.12
Weather controls x x x
Socio-economic controls x x x
Notes: is table reports reduced form estimates (Panel A) and IV estimates (Panel B) for three dif-
ferent placebo health outcomes. e dependent variable is either the number of stationary hospital
treatments of arm injuries, head injuries or injuries involving several body parts, that accumulate
over the rst ve years of a child’s life on average and per 1,000 children. e dependent vari-
able is composition-adjusted for the birth county–birth quarter cell. All regressions include birth
county, birth state–birth quarter, LEZ wave–event time, and LEZwave–treated xed e ects as well
as weather and socio-economic controls. e regressions are weighted by the birth county–birth
quarter cell size. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the county level. e sample size
is 9, 609.
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Table 4.A.7: e E ect of Early-Life PM10 Exposure when limiting pre-treatment ob-
servations to cohorts born four quarters before implementation
A. Number of prescriptions B. Costs of prescriptions (e)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Reduced Form Estimation
Respiratory diseases -0.63 -0.78 -10.85 -16.02
(0.21) (0.25) (4.70) (6.70)
Mean outcome 13.94 13.94 213.11 213.11
Asthma -0.30 -0.31 -9.29 -13.12
(0.08) (0.1) (3.53) (4.87)
Mean outcome 2.46 2.46 71.96 71.96
IV Estimation
Respiratory diseases 0.49 0.49 8.48 10.2
(0.22) (0.21) (4.51) (5.13)
Mean outcome 13.94 13.94 213.11 213.11
Asthma 0.23 0.20 7.26 8.35
(0.09) (0.08) (3.59) (3.9)
Mean outcome 2.46 2.46 71.96 71.96
First stage F-statistic 9.05 12.75 9.05 12.75
Weather controls x x x x
Socio-economic controls x x
Notes: is table reports reduced form estimates (Panel A) and IV estimates (Panel B) for health e ects when we
use only cohorts born four quarters prior to LEZ implementation as pre-treatment observations of the treated.
e dependent variable is the number of prescriptions that accumulate over the rst ve years of a child’s life
on average. It refers to either prescriptions for respiratory diseases in general or asthma speci cally. e de-
pendent variable is composition-adjusted for the birth county–birth quarter cell. All regressions include birth
county, birth state–birth quarter, LEZ wave–event time, and LEZ wave–treated xed e ects. Weather and socio-
economic controls are added sequentially moving from le to right. e regressions are weighted by the birth




Table 4.A.8: e E ect of Early-Life PM10 Exposure on Medication of Respiratory
Diseases throughout Early Childhood - Two-Way Fixed E ect Estimation
A. Number of prescriptions B. Costs of prescriptions (e)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Reduced Form Estimation
Respiratory diseases -0.50 -0.52 -9.13 -11.83
(0.15) (0.18) (2.97) (3.80)
Mean outcome 14.14 14.14 218.62 218.62
Asthma -0.18 -0.23 -6.04 -8.43
(0.06) (0.07) (2.14) (2.67)
Mean outcome 2.5 2.5 73.27 73.27
IV Estimation
Respiratory diseases 0.41 0.39 7.53 8.84
(0.16) (0.15) (3.03) (3.32)
Mean outcome 14.14 14.14 218.62 218.62
Asthma 0.15 0.17 4.99 6.30
(0.06) (0.06) (2.09) (2.35)
Mean outcome 2.5 2.5 73.27 73.27
First stage F-statistic 13.26 17.23 13.26 17.23
Weather controls x x x x
Socio-economic controls x x
Notes: is table replicates our main results in Table 4.5.2 using two-way xed e ect estimation. e depen-
dent variable is either the number (panel A) or the costs in e (panel B) of prescriptions that accumulate over
the rst ve years of a child’s life on average. It refers to either prescriptions for respiratory diseases in general
or asthma speci cally. In each panel, coe cients from reduced form and IV estimations are presented. e de-
pendent variable is composition-adjusted for the birth county–birth quarter cell. All regressions include birth
county and birth state–birth quarter xed e ects. Weather and socio-economic controls are added sequentially
moving from le to right. e regressions are weighted by the birth county–birth quarter cell size. Standard
errors in parentheses are clustered at the county level. e sample size is 2, 904.
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Table 4.A.9: e E ect of Early-Life PM10 Exposure on Medication of Respiratory
Diseases throughout Early Childhood - Logged outcomes
A. Number of prescriptions B. Costs of prescriptions (e)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Reduced Form Estimation
Respiratory diseases -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 -0.07
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Mean outcome 14.14 14.14 218.62 218.62
Asthma -0.09 -0.10 -0.11 -0.12
(0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Mean outcome 2.5 2.5 73.27 73.27
IV Estimation
Respiratory diseases 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Mean outcome 14.14 14.14 218.62 218.62
Asthma 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.09
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Mean outcome 2.5 2.5 73.27 73.27
First stage F-statistic 14.25 20.14 14.25 20.14
Weather controls x x x x
Socio-economic controls x x
Notes: is table replicates our main results in Table 4.5.2 using logged outcome variables. e dependent vari-
able is either the number (panel A) or the costs in e (panel B) of prescriptions that accumulate over the rst ve
years of a child’s life on average. It refers to either prescriptions for respiratory diseases in general or asthma
speci cally. In each panel, coe cients from reduced form and IV estimations are presented. e dependent vari-
able is composition-adjusted for the birth county–birth quarter cell. All regressions include birth county, birth
state–birth quarter, LEZ wave–event time, and LEZ wave–treated xed e ects. Weather and socio-economic
controls are added sequentially moving from le to right. e regressions are weighted by the birth county–
birth quarter cell size. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the county level. e sample size is 9, 609.
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Table 4.A.10: e E ect of LEZ Implementation on PM10 Concentrations - no IDW
interpolation
First Stage Estimation
PM10 Pollution in µg/m3
(1) (2)
LEZ treatment -1.30 -1.50
(0.41) (0.40)
Mean outcome 27.26 27.26
First stage F-statistic 10.27 14.12
Weather controls x x
Socio-economic controls x
Notes: is table replicates Table 4.5.1 when we do not interpolate the
pollution data but include only counties with own measuring stations
in the sample. e dependent variable is the quarterly mean PM10
concentration in a given county and year in µg/m3. All columns in-
clude birth county, birth state–birth quarter, LEZ wave–event time,
and LEZ wave–treated xed e ects. Weather and socio-economic
controls are added sequentially moving from le to right. e regres-
sions are weighted by the birth county–birth quarter cell size. Stan-
dard errors in parentheses are clustered at the county level. e sam-
ple size is 8, 286.
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Figure 4.B.1: Event-study Estimates of LEZ Eects - Excluding All Already Treated
Counties from the Control Group
(a) PM10





before treatment with treatment
Years relative to LEZ introduction
treatment effect
(b) Number of prescriptions






before treatment with treatment
Years relative to LEZ introduction
treatment effect
(c) Costs of prescriptions





before treatment with treatment
Years relative to LEZ introduction
treatment effect
Notes: e gure presents event-study coe cients that show how LEZs a ect PM10 concentration and the medication of respira-
tory diseases for a sample that excludes all already treated counties from the control group. e dependent variable is the mean
quarterly PM10 level (Panel a), the number (Panel b) or the costs (Panel c) of prescriptions that accumulate over the rst ve years
of a child’s life on average. e gray shaded area indicates the pre-treatment period. e coe cient in the year prior to implemen-
tation is normalized to zero. e regression includes county xed e ects, state–quarter xed e ects, LEZ wave–event time xed
e ects, LEZ wave–treated xed e ects as well as weather and socio-economic controls. It is weighted by the county–quarter cell
size. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Con dence intervals refer to the 5% level of signi cance.
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Figure 4.B.2: Event-study Estimates of LEZ Eects on Medication for Asthma
(a) Number of prescriptions






before treatment with treatment
Years relative to LEZ introduction
treatment effect
(b) Costs of prescriptions





before treatment with treatment
Years relative to LEZ introduction
treatment effect
Notes: e gure presents event-study coe cients that show how LEZs a ect the medication of asthma depending on the time
distance between birth and LEZ implementation in years. e dependent variable is the number (Panel a) or the costs (Panel
b) of prescriptions that accumulate over the rst ve years of a child’s life on average. e gray shaded area indicates the pre-
treatment period. e coe cient in the year prior to implementation is normalized to zero. e regression includes county
xed e ects, state–quarter xed e ects, LEZ wave–event time xed e ects, LEZ wave–treated xed e ects as well as weather
and socio-economic controls. It is weighted by the county–quarter cell size. Standard errors are clustered at the county level.
Con dence intervals refer to the 5% level of signi cance.
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Figure 4.B.3: Event-study Estimates Excluding the Never Treated
(a) PM10
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(b) Number of prescriptions
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(c) Costs of prescriptions
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Years relative to LEZ introduction
treatment effect
Notes: e gure presents event-study coe cients that show how LEZs a ect PM10 pollution and the medication of respiratory
diseases for a sample that excludes all never treated counties from the control group. e dependent variable is the average PM10
level in µg/m3 (Panel a) or the number of prescriptions that accumulate over the rst ve years of a child’s life on average (Panel
b). We reduce the time window that de nes our control group to 4 years post-treatment and 3 years pre-treatment to avoid that the
control groups for the later treated become very small. e gray shaded area indicates the pre-treatment period. e coe cient
in the year prior to implementation is normalized to zero. e regression includes county xed e ects, state–quarter xed e ects,
LEZ wave–event time xed e ects, LEZ wave–treated xed e ects as well as weather and socio-economic controls. It is weighted
by the county–quarter cell size. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Con dence intervals refer to the 5% level of
signi cance.
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Figure 4.B.4: Event-study Estimates of LEZ Eects - Accounting for Increases in Policy
Stringency
(a) Number of prescriptions
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Years relative to LEZ introduction
treatment effect
(b) Costs of prescriptions
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Notes: e gure presents event-study coe cients that show how LEZs a ect the medication of respiratory diseases based on








𝑐𝑦 , which should absorb potential additional health
bene ts in life years two to ve linked to the two more stringent LEZ regimes banning Euro 2 and Euro 3 vehicles, respectively.
e dependent variable is either the number (Panel a) or the costs of prescriptions (Panel b) that accumulate over the rst ve
years of a child’s life on average. e gray shaded area indicates the pre-treatment period. e coe cient in the year prior to
implementation is normalized to zero. e regression includes county xed e ects, state–quarter xed e ects, LEZ wave–event
time xed e ects, LEZ wave–treated xed e ects as well as weather and socio-economic controls. It is weighted by the county–
quarter cell size. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Con dence intervals refer to the 5% level of signi cance.
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4.C Composition-adjusted health outcomes
For the estimation of Equation (4.2), health outcomes observed at the level of the in-
dividual child (𝐻𝑖𝑐𝑡 ) are aggregated to the cohort level (𝐻𝑐𝑡 ). We dene a cohort by its
birth county 𝑐 as well as its birth year and birth quarter 𝑡 . However, additional infor-
mation at the level of the individual such as the individual’s sex or the precise location
of residence within a county at the ve-digit zip code is available. To exploit this in-
formation, we conduct auxiliary regressions that are commonly used in the literature
(e.g. Currie et al., 2015).
In a rst step, we regress the children’s health outcomes on individual-level covari-
ates as well as birth county–birth quarter xed e ects:
𝐻𝑖𝑐𝑡 =𝑊
′
𝑖𝑐𝑡Z + 𝜙𝑐𝑡 + b𝑖𝑐𝑡 (4.4)
where the dependent variable𝐻𝑖𝑐𝑡 is the accumulated health outcome over the rst
ve years of life for individual 𝑖 born in county 𝑐 and year and quarter 𝑡 . 𝑊 ′𝑖𝑐𝑡 is a
vector of individual-level covariates that includes gender and location of residence
within a county at the ve-digit zip code. Additionally, Equation (4.4) controls for
a full set of birth county–birth quarter indicators 𝜙𝑐𝑡 . eir coe cient estimates 𝜙𝑐𝑡
are orthogonal to the covariates at the individual level. In other words, they give the
average health outcomes for a birth county–birth quarter cohort a er controlling for
gender and residence. In line with Isen et al. (2017), we refer to the predicted cohort
means obtained by this approach as composition-adjusted. We use the composition-
adjusted outcomes as the dependent variable in Equation (4.2).
e use of composition-adjusted group means is asymptotically equivalent to us-
ing the individual level data (e.g. Donald and Lang, 2007) if the sampling variance of
the composition-adjusted group estimates is taken into account. In accordance with
other studies (e.g. Angrist and Lavy, 2009; Albouy, 2009b; Currie et al., 2015; Isen
et al., 2017), we estimate all regressions by weighted least squares using the number
of individuals in each birth county–birth quarter cell as weights. is is assumed to
be a reasonable approximation of weighting by inverse sampling variance. Compared
to running regressions on the individual level data, the estimation of models collapsed
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to the level of variation ensures that tests are of correct size given serial correlation in




Table 4.D.1 gives an overview of the county-specic control variables used in the esti-
mations. We observe cohorts over a ve-year period and we include weather controls
for all of these years. e 2007 values of socio-economic demographic controls are
categorized in terciles and interacted with year-quarter dummies in the regressions.
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Table 4.D.1: Control Variables
Variable Denition Source
Weather Controls
Precipitation Sum of the precipitation height in mm DWD
Sunshine Total sunshine duration in hours DWD
Temperature Mean, minimum and maximum temperature, DWD
12 separate terms that count the number of days
with temperatures above 0, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 29,
30, 31, 32, 33 and 34 degree Celsius
Wind Average windspeed 10 m above ground in m/s DWD
Relative humidity Relative humidity at 2 m above ground in % DWD
Pressure Mean vapor pressure in hpa DWD
Socio-economic Demographic Controls
Average age Average age of the county population BBSR
Population density Residents per 𝑘𝑚2 BBSR
Migration in People moving out of county per 1,000 inhabi-
tants
BBSR
Migration out People moving into county per 1,000 inhabitants BBSR
Moving AOK children Share of AOK-insured children moving out of
county
WIdO
Women share Female to male population ratio BBSR
Share of foreigners Percentage of people without German citizen-
ship
BBSR
Women share in foreigners Share of female foreigners among foreigners BBSR
Employment Employees subject to social insurance contribu-
tions per 100 inhabitants of working age
BBSR
Gross Value Added (GVA) Total gross value added in 1,000 e per employed
person
BBSR
GVA share in primary sector Share of gross value added in the primary sector
in %
BBSR
GVA share in tertiary sector Share of gross value added in the tertiary sector
in %
BBSR
Household income Average household income in e per inhabitant BBSR
Housing transfers Number of households receiving housing bene-
ts, per 1,000 households
BBSR
Education Share of students graduating with higher educa-
tion entrance quali cation
BBSR
Marriages Marriages per 1,000 inhabitants 18 years and
older
BBSR
Share of young mothers Births of mothers in the age group 15 to under 20
years per 1,000 women in the age group
BBSR
Share of older mothers Births of mothers 40 years and older per 1,000
women aged 40 to under 45
BBSR
217
CHAPTER 4. KILLING PRESCRIPTIONS SOFTLY
4.D.2 Aggregating the pollution data
We aggregate the pollution data by averaging the daily PM10 readings of all measuring
stations in a county and quarter. We weight each observation by the number of station
readings in that period (c.p. Chay and Greenstone, 2003a; Isen et al., 2017).
In the few counties in our sample without measuring stations, we interpolate pol-
lution exposure from surrounding stations using Inverse Distance Weighting (IDW).
Following Karlsson and Ziebarth (2018), we consider all stations within a 60 km (37.5
miles) radius of the county’s centroid. We then calculate the weighted average using
both the number of station measurements and the inverse distance of the monitors to
the centroid as weights.
To avoid uctuations in pollution levels linked to stations not being active regu-
larly, we generate the quarterly averages including only stations with at least 60 mea-
surements. Moreover, to avoid bias from interpolating pollution levels from treated
to nearby untreated counties, we only use stations outside of LEZ counties for the
interpolation. We show that our results are robust when we do not interpolate the
pollution data and include only counties with own measuring stations in the sample
in Table 4.A.10.
4.D.3 Prescription data
e identi cation process of pharmaceutical substances that are relevant in the therapy
of respiratory diseases and asthma speci cally is as follows:
Pharmaceuticals for respiratory diseases We use a publication akin to the Red
Book called “Gelbe Liste” by the ISO 9001:2015 certi ed Medizinische Medien Informa-
tions GmbH which serves as a source of information for medical and pharmaceutical
professionals. For more than 120,000 drugs, it links ATC-code classi ed pharmaceu-
tical substances to ICD-10-code classi ed clinical diagnoses. By linking ATC to ICD
codes, we can determine for which diseases di erent pharmaceutical substances are
commonly prescribed. From the registered information we draw 6,479 unique links,
of which we select only those related to respiratory diseases (150 substances). While
this approach is comprehensive, it su ers from the drawback that it may also cover
substances generically administered for a broad variety of diseases.
218
4.E. UNCONDITIONAL QUANTILE REGRESSION
Pharmaceuticals for asthma Additionally, we dene a smaller list of pharmaceu-
ticals that are closely tied to asthma. To this end, we consult annually updated lists of
the substances prescribed most o en for asthma in a given year, that is substances in
the ATC category R03. e lists are prepared by IGES institute for the years 2006 to
2017.36 In our analysis, we consider only prescriptions of the 20 most o en prescribed
substances in the year the prescription is issued. Note, that the top 20 substances cover
almost the entire market of substances prescribed for asthma and COPD, however, they
may not include substances prescribed in rare cases. e pharmaceuticals identi ed
according to this procedure represent a strict subset of those compiled in the prior
approach).
e prescription costs are adjusted to allow for intertemporal comparisons as if the
average cost per prescription had not changed. In other words, we take both in ation
but also ATC-speci c market price changes, such as expiring patents, into account.
To this end, we calculate ATC-speci c price indices normalized to the fourth quarter
of 2017 using available prescription data for all children in Germany. Based on the
generated price indices we adjust the prescription costs observed in our sample to real
values, before aggregating them to the cohort level.
4.E Unconditional quantile regression
We estimate an unconditional quantile regression (Firpo et al., 2009) to exibly estimate
LEZ treatment e ects across the unconditional distribution of our health outcomes.
e approach is based on the use of the re-centered in uence function (RIF) de ned in
Equation (4.5).
𝑅𝐼𝐹 (𝐻𝑖, 𝑞\ ) = 𝑞\ + 𝐼𝐹 (𝐻𝑖, 𝑞\ ) = 𝑞\ +
\–I(𝐻𝑖 ≤ 𝑞\ )
𝑓𝐻 (𝑞\ )
(4.5)
It is the sum of the in uence function (IF) and the \ th quantile of the unconditional
distribution of the health variable 𝐻 denoted as 𝑞\ . e IF indicates the marginal in-
uence of an observation 𝐻𝑖 on the quantile 𝑞\ . It is determined by 𝑓𝐻 , the empirical
36More information on the underlying data and aggregation methodologies are provided on the IGES
website and in the latest published report Häussler and Höer (2016).
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density function evaluated at 𝑞\ , and by the indicator 1(ℎ ≤ 𝑞\ ) which is equal to 1
if 𝐻𝑖 is below or equal to 𝑞\ . us, an observation’s in uence is negative if its health
status lies below and positive if it lies above the health status at the \ th quantile.
e expected value of the RIF equals the quantile of the unconditional distribu-
tion.37 By the law of iterated expectations and integration over the conditional mean,
the unconditional quantile 𝑞\ can be expressed as
𝑞\ = 𝐸 [𝑅𝐼𝐹 (𝐻𝑖, 𝑞\ )] = 𝐸 [𝐸 [𝑅𝐼𝐹 (𝐻𝑖, 𝑞\ ) |𝑋𝑖]] =
∫
𝐸 [𝑅𝐼𝐹 (𝐻𝑖, 𝑞\ ) |𝑋𝑖]𝑑𝐹𝑋
where 𝑋 is the vector of covariates and 𝐹𝑋 is the marginal distribution function of
𝑋 . To obtain the marginal treatment e ects on the unconditional quantile 𝑞\ , we take
the sample quantile 𝑞\ and retrieve the density 𝑓𝐻 using a Gaussian kernel method.38
To obtain 𝑅𝐼𝐹 , we substitute both into Equation (4.5). Secondly, we apply RIF-OLS
regression to obtain the coe cients representing the marginal ceteris paribus e ect of
an in nitesimal shi in the distribution of the covariates 𝑋 on the unconditional \ th












𝑖 𝑅𝐼𝐹 (𝐻𝑖, 𝑞\ )
e identifying assumption is that in the absence of treatment, the change in the
health outcome at each quantile would have been the same in the treatment and the
control group. Because endogenous regressors cannot be addressed by the conven-
tional unconditional quantile regression framework, and because estimation times are
prohibitively long when using a stacked design, we limit our quantile regression anal-
ysis to reduced form estimations using a standard DID design knowing that some
caveats may apply (cf. Section 4.5.5)
37𝐸 [𝑅𝐼𝐹 (𝐻𝑖 , 𝑞\ )] = 𝐸 [𝑞\ ] + \–𝐸 [I(𝐻𝑖 ≤𝑞\ ) ]𝑓𝐻 (𝑞\ ) = 𝑞\ +
\–\
𝑓𝐻 (𝑞\ ) = 𝑞\
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